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Preface
KENTUCKY'S BLACK COLLEGES have produced several
generations of teachers, public servants, businessmen, and community
leaders in an era when racial segregation was the norm and black ex-
pectations for success were limited at best, yet the story of these insti-
tutions has received little attention from scholars. In 1972, after
passage of the 1960s legislation ending de jure segregation, I began
my teaching career at Kentucky State University. There, I discovered
that Kentucky blacks had struggled since 1904 to craft strategies that
would end segregated education at all levels. From my initial peek
into Kentucky's past has evolved a doctoral dissertation, several
scholarly articles, and a popular history of Kentucky State University.
I hope this work will not be the last to examine the ways twentieth-
century Kentucky blacks overcame the disabilities of racial caste.
This humble effort reflects the wise counsel and support of
many colleagues and associates. Among them are Henry E. Cheaney,
Terry Birdwhistell, Felix Boateng, Lowell Harrison, James Klotter,
Mary Langford, Richard Langford, Gerald Linderman, Marion Lucas,
and Gerald Smith. Archival staff at the following were gracious in
providing assistance and research data: Berea College, Eastern
Kentucky University, Eastern Washington University, the Filson Club
Historical Society, University of Kentucky, the Kentucky Historical
Society, Kentucky State University, University of Louisville, Murray
State University, and Western Kentucky University. A special thanks
to Western Kentucky University Faculty Research Committee for its
financial support and the Department of History for the time to work
on the project.

Introduction
A S THE SMOKE of the Civil War battles cleared in 1865,
Americans, in particular those of African descent, lived for the first
time in a national culture without chattel slavery. The immediate con-
cern for blacks was survival as emancipated men and women in a
society where they did not enjoy the full rights, privileges, and
immunities of citizenship. Aware of this conundrum, thoughtful
blacks equipped themselves for their predicament by pursuing what
they could not easily obtain before emancipation: an education.
Organizations and individuals previously involved in the fight for
abolition of American slavery now focused their efforts on the educa-
tion of freed blacks. The American Missionary Association, the Slater
Fund, the Anna T. Jeanes Fund and, much later, the General Education
Board committed extensive resources to black education over a period
that extended well into the twentieth century. At the same time, these
organizations supported the existing social order, in which blacks re-
mained subordinate to southern whites, who would be allowed to
restart the region's economy and reconstruct their state governments.
At Virginia's Hampton Institute and later at Tuskegee Institute in
Alabama, presidents Samuel C. Armstrong and Booker T. Washington
argued that blacks would best contribute to this process via industrial
education, an approach that limited blacks to agriculture and semi-
skilled occupations not wanted by white workers. In this scheme of the
future, industrial education became the key process to transform for-
merly enslaved blacks into subordinate employees, with white local
authorities and worker supervisors maintaining paramount control and
reaping the benefits.1
Not all white southerners were supportive of efforts to educate
blacks for citizenship. Most northern campaigns to educate blacks in
the 1860s and 1870s were directed toward the former Confederate
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and slaveholding states where there had been large black populations
and where their formal education had been ignored. One of these
states, Kentucky, occupied a unique position before, during, and after
the war. Kentucky supported slavery but did not join the
Confederacy. When the war ended, the state legislature refused to
ratify the Thirteenth Amendment and incredulously aligned itself
with southern states by refusing to spend public money to
educate its black citizens and by enacting racial segregation statutes.
All the while, Kentucky blacks preserved and used their right to vote
in spite of violent intimidation by white terrorist groups. Given this
racist treatment, Kentucky blacks persisted in their demands for
equal treatment under the law by local and state authorities.
As white-controlled legislatures began spending more public
funds on education in the 1860s, Kentucky blacks fought for their fair
share despite the legal roadblocks. Under an 1866 state constitutional
amendment, blacks and whites could not be taught together.2 Taxes
collected from blacks and whites were spent on white common
schools, and if there were enough funds left over, black schools re-
ceived support. When the prospect of litigation forced the state legis-
lature in 1882 to equalize public school appropriations, Kentucky
school officials began seriously to support black public schools.3
Although meager initially, state support for these schools ex-
panded black community interest in organizing and supporting local
educational institutions. Under postbellum state laws, blacks paid
property taxes that funded schools but excluded blacks from enroll-
ment. Blacks paid additional taxes or contributed in-kind materials,
for example, lumber, to establish racially segregated public schools.
Deep South blacks during the Reconstruction era accepted that con-
dition as a part of the sanctioned social order. However, some
Kentucky blacks, who operated private schools in Louisville as early
as 1847, were determined to reestablish their schools and to resume
educating their children after the war's end.4
Teachers for these schools were the greatest need in 1865.
(Facilities at early stages were less important because black churches
often doubled as classrooms.) White missionary teachers gradually fo-
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cused their energies on other states with larger black populations. This
change made attracting teachers from normal schools more critical.
Kentucky blacks struggled on their own to hire qualified "race" (or
black) teachers when "Yankee schoolmarms" went elsewhere.
Kentucky whites almost universally abdicated their responsibility,
saying the "Yankees freed them, now let the Yankees take care of
them."5
The first important organized group that supported a normal
school came from the Kentucky General Association of Colored
Baptists, established in 1865 as an organization for the common-
wealth's black Baptists. This body, representing the largest black reli-
gious group in the state, served as a locus for discussion of the issue.
Its interest in establishing such a school centered on the desire of
black Baptists to create a ministerial teacher training facility under
denominational control.
The campaign to create a state-supported teacher training
school persisted among black educators and organizations but failed
to make any substantive headway in the conservative, white-
controlled legislature. In 1877, after agitation by the Kentucky
Colored State Teachers Association and church groups,
Superintendent of Public Instruction Howard A.M. Henderson con-
vened a meeting of the state's black school teachers to discuss the
issue. The meeting reinvigorated the black Baptist association's spo-
radic efforts to establish a school of its own that would include
normal as well as theological curricula.6 After these meetings and
upon securing financial support from the state's white Baptists, the
association opened the Kentucky Normal and Theological Institute in
1879 at a Louisville site.7
The school's religious mission initially excluded industrial
courses favored by contemporary white philanthropic organizations
and black leaders such as Booker T. Washington. Kentucky's black
Baptists wanted a school primarily to train future ministers as well as
other students who wanted a liberal arts education. By 1884 the insti-
tute trustees had changed its name to State Colored Baptist
University to reflect its denominational connection and the right of
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each state senator to send one "properly equipped student" from his
district at state expense.8 With the addition of college courses to its
elementary and secondary level programs, State University became
Kentucky's first black-owned, comprehensive educational institution.
Within the next decade several local black, private professional
schools that were faced with financial shortfalls merged with State
University: Harper Law School, Louisville National Medical
College, and Central Law School. These additions spurred such con-
fidence in State University that white adjunct faculty members were
added to the medical college faculty. By 1900 State University in
Louisville had become the central location for black higher education
in Kentucky.
The growth of State University sprang from its leadership. After
its first year (1879-80) under founder Elijah P. Marrs, the trustees ap-
pointed William J. Simmons to head the school. Although he pro-
fessed public support for the Hampton-Tuskegee educational model,
Simmons still supported black schools with either all-industrial
education programs or all-liberal arts curricula; at that time he
considered hybrid institutions with both types of programs un-
acceptable.
Simmons's tenure at State University ended abruptly in early
1890, when he resigned the presidency to establish Eckstein Norton
Institute at Cane Spring, Kentucky. Named after Louisville and
Nashville Railroad executive and patron Eckstein Norton, the institu-
tion followed a mostly industrial education path rather than the di-
verse curricular approach of State University. Operating with this
narrow focus, the institute struggled for survival after Simmons's
sudden death in October 1890. Although managed effectively by
Simmons's protege Charles Henry Parrish, dwindling enrollments
and shrinking resources led to the school's eventual merger with
Lincoln Institute in Simpsonville, Kentucky.9
In contrast to the private support given State University and
Eckstein Norton Institute, the publicly supported Kentucky State
Normal School for Colored Persons (which I will refer to as
Kentucky State) was established in 1886 with limited resources and
sparse attendance. After a brisk competition among seven Kentucky
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cities for the school, a donation of land from the Frankfort city coun-
cil confirmed its site. The state legislature made initial biennial com-
mitments of three thousand dollars for operating expenses and seven
thousand dollars for classroom construction. In its first term
Kentucky State had three teachers, fifty-five students, one building,
and an industrial teacher training curriculum.10
Gradually, the school attracted more students during its first
decade and took advantage of provisions of the 1890 Morrill Land
Grant Act to acquire additional moneys and property. With them the
school received increasing amounts of political and economic support
from Kentucky whites who advocated the Hampton-Tuskegee indus-
trial education philosophy. In his report to the white trustees later for-
warded to the state school board, school president John Henry
Jackson, mindful of the white acceptance of the Hampton-Tuskegee
paradigm, praised the trustees for their support of the school's indus-
trial education efforts "by encouraging and promoting, by every
means in [their] power, those industrial pursuits that are so whole-
some and so helpful in raising up a class of producers." Jackson, who
had received a classical college education at Kentucky's integrated
Berea College, had no alternative but to praise the industrial education
paradigm. To justify his requests for increased funding for new facili-
ties for mechanical courses, he argued that the school produced
"skilled mechanics, scientific agriculturalists and females trained in
domestic economy." The presence of workers with such skills, he
maintained, improved both the "moral and intellectual well-being" of
each community.11
Jackson, while praising the soundness of industrial education
for blacks, neglected to mention what everyone knew implicitly, that
this philosophy encouraged black subordination to white employers.
Rather than depriving whites of employment, as some whites had
feared, occupations in agriculture and domestic service were desig-
nated informally as respectable "negro jobs" after proper training in
an industrial education normal school such as Kentucky State.12
As this movement for diverting blacks into industrial educa-
tion attracted increasing support both nationally and regionally, the
state legislature recognized its potential usefulness as trainers of
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workers for the commonwealth's agriculture, coal, light manu-
facturing, and thoroughbred horse industries. To make the indus-
trial education approach feasible, the legislature provided additional
land and facilities for Kentucky State through special laws in 1893,
1896, and 1897.13 Given this additional support for less-than-
collegiate—level industrial education, Kentucky State served at least
two purposes. In its early years it enabled the state to remove black
teacher training from the outside influence of northern whites at
Berea College, and it diluted the influence of the state's black
Baptists on higher education.
At the turn of the century, three issues clouded the future of
higher education for Kentucky blacks: the funding of black sec-
ondary education, the movement for accommodation to segregation
by black leaders, and the decline of white liberal support at such
places as Berea College.
Confronted by white indifference toward black activist attacks
on segregation laws, Kentucky blacks continued their private finan-
cial contributions to the inadequately funded public, all-black high
schools in Covington, Frankfort, Lexington, Louisville, Owensboro,
Paducah, Paris, and Winchester.14 One faction of black educators,
however, received measured white acceptance. After a widely cele-
brated 1895 Atlanta speech by Booker T. Washington of Alabama's
Tuskegee Institute, favoring both southern white control and indus-
trial education, Washington's ideological supporters at Kentucky
State and Eckstein Norton Institute enjoyed increased financial sup-
port from the white power structure.
In spite of Washington's accommodation to dominant southern
white views on race, one Kentucky college refused to enforce rigid
racial segregation. Since 1866 many Kentucky blacks had attended
the jewel of racially integrated southern colleges, Berea College,
which required its students, regardless of race, to undergo both indus-
trial training and classical education. However, hostility toward black
participation at Berea College had begun to increase in the 1890s
from without and within. Appalachian white students and unsympa-
thetic Berea College administrators had lost the fervor for interracial
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education advocated in 1866 by its abolitionist founder, John Gregg
Fee. In moving away from Fee's original vision, the college's ad-
ministrators, like many whites in other areas of life, enforced and
hardened a color line that W.E.B. Du Bois predicted would be the
major social problem of the twentieth century.
Although the color line started to take shape as the Civil War
ended, its dominant presence in Kentucky communities took longer
to create. In a border state later described by jurist Thurgood Marshall
as "civil" toward black litigants, educated Kentucky blacks fought in
the courts to hold on to liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. The activism of educated Kentucky blacks,
carried out in their own special ways, affected the social fiber of the
state more than the small numbers of blacks would suggest. This nar-
rative on Kentucky black higher education does not focus, therefore,
on curricula or educational philosophies per se but on a half-century
of internal struggles and institutional adaptations by educated blacks
who emerged from a complex labyrinth of antebellum racial preju-
dice. Their largely untold story exposes both black capitulations to
racism and small triumphs by other blacks over travails associated
with racially segregated higher education.
On the surface, this account appears no different from that of
other southern states. But Kentucky was not geographically in the
Deep South. The social history of the post-Civil War Deep South in-
cluded a canon of racial segregation traditions that required the social
separation of blacks and whites from womb to tomb. Kentucky, with
a smaller black population, often deviated from the accepted racial
practices. Unlike those in other southern states, Kentucky blacks
voted unhampered and were politically active in urban areas. They
were elected to local offices in counties with large black populations.
These isolated deviations permitted the state to practice what histo-
rian George C. Wright described as "genteel" or polite racism.
This study concerns Kentucky's efforts to impose an important
part of that polite racism—racially segregated public and private
higher education—on educated, twentieth-century blacks who, for
their own complex and tactical reasons, initially tolerated it but
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soon rebelled and ultimately rejected it. Kentucky civil rights ac-
tivists subsequently used these experiences in fighting segregated
education in their attack on other forms of racial discrimination in
the 1950s. They started to disestablish them, and other activists con-
tinued the task in the 1960s. Black educators in Kentucky, as well as
those few whites who recognized the basic unfairness of racial seg-
regation, fought for equality of higher education for blacks to prove
that truly equal educational opportunities could exist. Largely ig-
nored by most civil rights historians, these Kentucky battles for
higher education equity from 1904 to 1954 served both as early, crit-
ical skirmishes in the national struggles for de jure civil rights and as
test sites for activist strategies. For these reasons, the story of
Kentucky's agonizing experience with segregated black higher edu-
cation must be told.
To explain how Kentucky educators operated their system of
higher education circumscribed by a color line, this study identifies
the state's leading black educators from 1904 to 1954 and compares
their ideologies of education for blacks and the quiet, often unseen
struggles to implement them. It also examines the gradual evolution
of the institutions that these educators administered and the internal
conflicts among them in this period and thereafter. The saga begins
in 1904 when a newly enacted Kentucky law forced Berea College,
one of the South's few integrated, private colleges in the early twen-
tieth century, to exclude its 174 black students because of their race.
As opposition to the segregation law faded, such administrators at
black institutions as Green Pinckney Russell and Dennis H.
Anderson grudgingly accepted the political correctness of racially
segregated higher education. Within this social order, two factions
developed among Kentucky black educators. In the years following
1904, the majority supported Washington's Hampton-Tuskegee
model of industrial education, while a minority supported classical,
liberal arts curricula for Kentucky's black collegians. When indus-
trial education gradually lost its popularity in the late 1920s, black
awareness of the social weakness of industrial education led to its
rejection as the paramount educational philosophy for blacks.
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During this era that paralleled the Depression, national and re-
gional toleration of segregation by blacks began to change. Civil
rights activists within the education profession disputed the prevail-
ing white belief that segregated education, higher or otherwise, was
somehow positive for blacks. By 1930, moreover, the industrial edu-
cation philosophy in the state's segregated black colleges had come
under fire from most black educators. Black state representative and
civil rights activist Charles W. Anderson Jr. also challenged the
state's alleged "equal" educational opportunities for blacks as being
unequal. By 1930, the liberal arts-based teacher education curricula
at Kentucky State and Louisville Municipal College gradually re-
placed the older, narrowly focused industrial education programs.
As the turmoil of World War Two ended, American blacks who
had fought to end Nazi fascism overseas became dissatisfied with a
de jure second-class citizenship enforced under state statutes.
Lawsuits by blacks against segregation policies proliferated as vic-
tory over Hitlerian terror was celebrated and the campaign to fight in-
ternational communism developed. Without financial aid from the
national attorneys of the NAACP, Kentucky blacks financed their
own anti-school segregation litigation in 1948. The national NAACP
gave special attention to five lawsuits concerning public school seg-
regation in other states. These cases, in concert with legal challenges
filed by Kentucky civil rights activists, led to significant reversals of
state law controlling segregated schools and colleges.
As the landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education rulings dis-
rupted the national legal foundations of racial segregation, Kentucky
continued to make progress toward the destruction of segregated edu-
cation at all levels. The peaceful desegregation of Kentucky's colleges
and schools constituted a benchmark in the 1950s and 1960s for other
states to follow. In the 1970s, however, violent white resistance in
Louisville to busing to achieve school desegregation demonstrated
that the black struggle for equal educational opportunities had not
ended. In the 1980s Kentucky was ordered by the federal government
to end vestiges of segregation in higher education, a condition that
some thought was long gone. These events again reminded the nation
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and, more precisely, Kentuckians, that the color line, once created, had
become a difficult and perplexing social institution to disestablish.
Hardening the Color Line,
1904-1910
THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY racial color line predicted
by W.E.B. Du Bois materialized differently across the nation. From
1904 to 1910, Kentucky whites hardened racial barriers created after
the Civil War. Kentucky whites also rationalized racial segregation as
a moderate, morally sound policy to keep the peace. Although it was
not a centrally managed campaign, Kentucky politicians recognized
the need to control both poor whites who received substandard edu-
cation and blacks who were insistent on fair treatment. In this context
black and white educators were forced to accept legislative and po-
litical mandates to implement racial segregation in public and private
schools and, if necessary, create new all-black ones to fulfill the man-
date.
The legal foundation originated in 1866 when the Kentucky
legislature passed an amendment to the state constitution that re-
quired racially segregated public schools. By 1904 one site of interra-
cial education remained in the state's private schools. To correct the
omission, the 1904 Kentucky legislature imitated other southern and
border states and extended the existing prohibition of racially inte-
grated education to private schools. This law followed one state legi-
slator's outrage about the racially integrated, private Berea College,
in Berea, Kentucky.
Kentucky blacks who lived in the state's mountainous, eastern
coal-producing region attended Berea College, a racially integrated,
private institution affiliated with the American Missionary
Association since its founding in 1866 by abolitionist John Gregg
Fee. At Berea, blacks completed their secondary education, trained in
an "industry," and received an education leading to a bachelor's
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degree. Unlike other Kentucky schools that called them-selves col-
leges, Berea College received financial support from out-of-state
philanthropists and was thus able to hire competent out-of-state fac-
ulty in the classics and in vocational fields. As a result Berea College
graduates were well prepared either to teach or to work in several
professions.
From the perspective of early-twentieth-century Kentuckians,
Berea represented a unique educational situation. Class offerings in-
cluded liberal arts courses in grammar, rhetoric, fine arts, and sci-
ences. Before graduation all students fulfilled a college requirement
to master an industry in the campus craft shops. Berea's blend of vo-
cational and liberal arts education made it attractive to the region's
black and white citizens.1 The college's tradition of interracial educa-
tion, introduced by its abolitionist founder, remained popular among
blacks because they received the same instruction as their white
peers. White Kentuckians tolerated the college's integrated campus
because wealthy, out-of-state contributors kept the institution viable
without the use of local donations.
Not everyone approved of the college's unique biracial atmos-
phere, however. Following the 1895 Atlanta Exposition speech by
black educator Booker T. Washington, in which he condoned racial
segregation, Berea's interracial practices appeared out of step with
current thought on racial relations. Although Berea's President
William C. Frost told white audiences that he directed college re-
sources toward Appalachian whites, southern whites remained un-
convinced.2 In 1901 neighboring Tennessee passed a law excluding
blacks from privately operated Mary ville College and forced an end
to interracial education at church-owned schools in the state.3
In early 1904 Carl Day, a Democratic state legislator from pre-
dominantly white, rural Breathitt County, became disturbed about
Berea's interracial policy. He apparently witnessed a fair-skinned
black female who he thought was white give a friendly kiss to
another black female student at the Berea railroad station, and he
became incensed at this suggestion of egalitarian conduct between
whites and blacks. Encouraged by Berea townsfolk who opposed the
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college's uncomfortable experiment with interracial education, Day
translated his anger into a bill that prohibited private corporations
such as Berea College from teaching students of different races in
the same room. With public school racial segregation firmly in
place, Day's bill proposed to put an end to interracial education in
the commonwealth by including private schools such as Berea.4
Despite impassioned speeches in the legislature by President
Frost and several white Berea students opposing the law, the legisla-
ture approved Day's bill with only five dissenting votes in the House
of Representatives and five in the Senate. The last vestige of biracial
education in Kentucky, and in the entire South, had come to an abrupt
end.5
The passage of the Day Law forced the college trustees to
either exclude all black students or violate the law. The trustees took
the middle ground and did both. They allowed black students to
remain temporarily but encouraged them to attend other "good
schools" that accepted them. In the 1904-5 year, 52 of the 174 en-
rolled blacks transferred—at Berea's expense—to other schools, in-
cluding Fisk University, Knoxville College, Tuskegee Institute, and
Kentucky State. The remaining black students were encouraged to do
likewise. The trustees, largely white, non-Kentucky philanthropists,
believed this policy satisfied the immediate needs of black Berea stu-
dents and removed them from any immediate legal penalties.6
Representative Day and the large majority of the legislature had
achieved a practical, moral goal: blacks and whites were to be edu-
cated separately in order to preserve white racial sanctity and social
order.
Although the college administrators and trustees agreed on the
plan to remove its black students, the trustees also resolved to oppose
the Day Law through a legal test in the courts based on founder Fee's
belief in interracial education. To handle the legal challenge, Berea
trustees hired three eminent lawyers: John G. Carlisle, Curtis F.
Burnham, and Guy F. Mallon. Carlisle had served as a speaker of the
U.S. House of Representatives and as treasury secretary under Pres.
Grover Cleveland. Burnham served in the Kentucky Senate and was
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one of the five senators who voted against the House version of the
Day Law. Mallon operated a thriving law practice in Cincinnati.
On 12 October 1904 the Madison County Grand Jury indicted
the college on two counts of violating those portions of the Day Law
that required blacks and whites to be taught in separate classrooms and
instruction to be carried on in buildings no fewer than twenty-five
miles apart. Found guilty in Madison Circuit Court of violating both
sections of the law, Berea College paid a one-thousand-dollar fine.7
Subsequently, Berea's attorneys carried the case to the
Kentucky Court of Appeals and argued that the state had abused its
police powers and had denied students, teachers, and trustees their
rights guaranteed in the bill of rights of the Kentucky constitution and
in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which pro-
tected the rights of liberty, worship, happiness, free speech, and prop-
erty ownership.8
They further argued that because the twenty-sixth section of the
Kentucky Bill of Rights invalidated any law that conflicted with these
rights, the Day Law, which abridged Berean rights under the Ken-
tucky constitution, was unconstitutional. The commonwealth's argu-
ment, however, rested on an implied duty to maintain public order by
enforcing racial segregation. The case brief summarized not only the
state's position but also the white conventional wisdom on racial
segregation:
The natural separation of the race[s] is therefore an undeniable
fact, and all social organizations which lead to their amalgamation
are repugnant to the law of nature. From social amalgamation it is
but a step to illicit intercourse, and but another [to] intermarriage.
But to assert separateness is not to declare inferiority in either; it is
not to declare one a slave and [the] other a freeman—that would be
to draw the illogical sequence of inferiority from differencefs]
only. . . . It is simply to say that following the order of Divine
Providence, human authority ought not to compel these widely
separate races to intermix.9
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As for the legal right of the state to use its regulatory authority on
Berea College, the court declared that amalgamation of the races was
an evil sufficient to justify the use of state police powers to forbid
interracial education.10 The court nullified the second count against
the college because the requirement that a separate black school be at
least twenty-five miles away from a white one was deemed oppres-
sive.
The court's ruling supported the state's argument that teaching
was not a protected right. Under the constitution, the state exercised
its power to regulate a corporation such as Berea College. The state
also limited the corporation's authority to teach students in racially
mixed classrooms. The court presumed these classes to be harmful to
the public welfare.11
In an April 1908 appeal in the U.S. Supreme Court, the college
attorneys argued that if one part of the law (i.e., section 4, which re-
quired separate instruction of races twenty-five miles apart) was un-
constitutional, the entire law became unconstitutional. The defendant
(the commonwealth) argued that the intent of the law was to use the
state's police power to prohibit the voluntary association of whites
and blacks by a corporation and nothing more. The invalidation of the
one section should not void the entire law. In November 1908 the
Court majority agreed with the defendant and ruled against the plain-
tiff's arguments presented in section 4 because the power of states to
regulate corporations—Berea College—had more standing than
racial discrimination.12
Like the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruling, the vote was not
unanimous. Of the three dissenting opinions—Judge John J. Baker of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals and Justices John Marshall Harlan
and William Day of the Supreme Court—Harlan's became the most
compelling.
Harlan, a native Kentuckian and a Republican appointee, dis-
sented on two grounds, insisting first that, if the appeals court voided
section 4 of the law, the entire Day Law should have been null and
void; he also argued that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Consistent with his earlier rulings on civil rights cases, Harlan
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admonished the court for its unfairness. He argued that states could,
using the same logic in the ruling, make it a crime for blacks and
whites to shop at markets and meet together at political rallies.13
The legal battle in state and federal courts from 1904 to 1908
also produced parallel campaigns of nonjudicial opposition to the Day
Law. In newspapers from Berea to Boston, literate blacks and whites
expressed opposition to the Day Law's passage.14 Even white Berea
students who were not always friendly toward black Bereans became
opponents of the punitive Day Law that forced the college to expel
their peers on racial grounds.15
While white Berea students protested the law, black alumni lev-
eled criticism at both the law and President Frost. Blacks criticized
Frost for his earlier dismissal of black alumnus James Shelton
Hathaway from the college faculty and for the intensified recruitment
of whites from Appalachia.16 Concerned Berea alumni A. W. Titus and
Josie Woodford attempted to organize other black alumni against
President Frost's exclusion of blacks from the campus. Their anger
toward Frost was blunt and direct as they listed the five items to be
discussed at a meeting in Lexington on 16 September 1904. Of these,
number four was most specific: "4th. Whether or not President Frost
is responsible for the present condition of affairs and if responsible
shall we publish a letter showing his attitude toward the colored
during his entire administration."17
Black alumni John T. Robinson, John H. Jackson, Frank L.
Williams and J.W. Hughes had all expressed similar misgivings
about Frost's leadership, but they failed to speak out against the law
and their exclusion. Soon, however, Williams broke the silence by
opposing the college trustees' plan to establish a new, all-black ver-
sion of the college on a separate site.18
Black objections to this new, black Berea College received little
consideration from the trustees. As early as July 1904, the trustees
completed plans to open the school, an act that indicated their accep-
tance of the permanence of the Day Law. Even before the Supreme
Court ruling appeared, the trustees began to select a preliminary site,
create a separate endowment to permanently finance it, and develop
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what they described as a "largely industrial" mission for the new
school. The endowment's existence permitted the trustees to create
both a fiscal and a physical distance between the two institutions.19
Moreover, Berea trustees had become convinced that the color line in
Kentucky education was an insurmountable reality.
Establishing this separate endowment became a necessity in a
state that until the early 1900s had relied largely on privately en-
dowed institutions to provide quality secondary and higher education.
Smaller black and white colleges with scant resources struggled
while colleges like Berea, the University of Louisville, and Kentucky
Wesleyan College persistently attracted larger endowment donations
than all other Kentucky schools in the late 1890s and early 1900s.20
To establish for blacks another school of the quality and stature of
Berea required the college trustees to engage in massive fund-raising
for this purpose.21 Ultimately, the trustees set a goal of $400,000 to
pay for the construction of an all-black version of Berea College. To
raise these funds and legitimize the project, the trustees hired black
alumni Kirke Smith and James Bond.
President Frost obtained $350,000 in donations from Andrew
Carnegie, Russell Sage, and affluent whites in Boston, Louisville, and
New York. According to the stipulation of Andrew Carnegie's
$200,000 donation, Kentuckians had to raise $50,000 for the project
among themselves. After receiving public support from the Louisville
Board of Trade, the state Department of Education, and the Louisville
Courier-Journal, the Berea fund-raising committee raised $43,000
from local whites and $7,000 from Kentucky blacks.22
Throughout this campaign, Kentucky blacks exhibited ambiva-
lent feelings toward the "new Berea." In one incident the Louisville
school superintendent, exercising his executive authority, convened a
mandatory meeting of Louisville black schoolteachers. Unaware that
the meeting was a "new Berea" fund-raising meeting, the teachers
gave it their full attention until the white superintendent turned the
meeting over to the "Berea [fund-raising] contingent." Black teachers
who then recognized the scheme "eased out one by one."23 Whether
they left for financial or political reasons was not clear. It was clear,
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however, that they left the meeting without making financial contri-
butions to an institution obviously created to sustain racial separation
and to enforce the color line.
Black newspaper editor Julia Young supported the teachers' op-
position to the "new Berea," arguing that it strengthened the indus-
trial education philosophy.24 Her editorial opinion was not held by
leading white-owned newspapers in the state, nor by all blacks. Her
opponents included white publisher "Marse Henry" Watterson of the
Courier-Journal and black educators at Eckstein Norton Institute of
Cane Spring and Chandler Normal School of Lexington, an all-black
school affiliated with the American Missionary Association. Each of
those schools championed the "new Berea" concept with the pre-
sumption that one of them would receive the four-hundred-
thousand-dollar endowment. Their endorsements made it appear that
the concept had become acceptable to most literate Kentucky
blacks.25
While Kentucky whites sought a site for the "new Berea," the
non-Kentucky white press reported the Berea decision as a legal con-
firmation of racial segregation. Save for editorial condemnations in
the New York Evening Post and the Philadelphia Inquirer, most
whites supported the court's protection of racial segregation in edu-
cation.26
In addition to the strengthening of the racial color line in educa-
tion, the Berea case produced unexpected political turmoil among
Kentucky Republicans and their black voters. In 1911 Judge Edward
C. O'Rear, who had sided with the Kentucky Court of Appeals ma-
jority decision against the college's appeal and indirectly opposed in-
tegrated black higher education, decided to run as a Republican
candidate for governor. At the beginning of O'Rear's campaign,
Democrats, hoping that the state's black voters would vote against
O'Rear in the general election, reminded black Republican voters of
his role in the Berea case. On the other side, white Republicans pro-
vided black Republican campaign workers with enough funds to
counteract this effort and encouraged black voters to support
O'Rear.27 Opposed by former governor and populist reformer James
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B. McCreary, O'Rear failed to attract enough voters, black or white,
and lost by 31,335 votes.28
O'Rear's defeat did not, however, reflect well-organized oppo-
sition to the philosophy of segregated education. James Bond, a black
Berea alumnus and promoter of the "new Berea" idea, claimed that
most Kentucky black leaders supported the new school's existence
overwhelmingly. On one occasion Bond proclaimed that from
Louisville's black leadership alone "Drs. Howser and [J.A.C.]
Lattimore, Dr. [L.G.] Jordan, Profs. [Albert Ernest] Meyzeek,
McClellan, Lawson, [W.H.] Perry, [J.S.] Cotter, Miss Nannie
Burroughs . . . [were] among the largest supporters of the [new Berea]
movement."29 These people represented key religious, fraternal, and
cultural elements of Louisville's black community. Bond's announce-
ment of broadly based black leadership support for the "new Berea"
school also added credibility to his fund-raising campaign because
Burroughs represented a leading black Baptist women's auxiliary or-
ganization and Meyzeek, Perry, McClellan, and Lawson held impor-
tant positions as Louisville public school administrators or teachers.
By inference, Bond demonstrated again that key Kentucky black
leaders offered qualified but public support for an agency of segrega-
tion created by white leaders. This early black support for the "new
Berea" allowed whites to conclude that intelligent blacks supported
racial segregation as practical public policy. Later, most of the same
blacks took a contrary position. Those few Kentucky blacks, such as
Julia Young, who had publicly opposed the school from the outset
failed to attract widespread black support for a position at odds with
the legislative and judicial support for racial segregation.
Significantly, some members of Kentucky's black press, who
felt that the approach of white advocates of racial segregated educa-
tion was moderate and practical, had accepted the wisdom of co-
operating with them. Approval from Booker T. Washington and other
black leaders on race issues confirmed the wisdom of accepting seg-
regated education. Some blacks, including some in the press, accom-
modated these opinions by declaring the state "liberal" on race
matters. A blatant example occurred in a dispatch from a black
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Louisville correspondent to the Indianapolis Freeman: "The
Louisville Herald of August 19 carried on its first page a handsomely
ornamented double-column cut showing Governor A.E. Willson and
Dr. Booker T. Washington standing together in a characteristic atti-
tude. The publication of such a picture in a leading daily in a city in
the border South was the talk of the town. Kentucky holds first place
for liberality on the color question [and] recognition of worth, re-
gardless of race."30
During the first decade of the century, many of Kentucky's
leaders, black and white, accepted racial segregation in education as
both practical and necessary for social harmony. At all levels the edu-
cation color line became a legal mandate and a social policy. With the
jewel of formerly integrated education at Berea firmly reserved after
1904 for white mountain youth, white educators and politicians ac-
quiesced to popular racism by hardening the color line in education
and made it an integral part of the commonwealth's daily life, follow-
ing the example of other southern and border states.
Acceptance of Civil
Racism, 1910-1930
DRAWING THE COLOR LINE in Kentucky higher educa-
tion appeared simple. But managing industrial education curricula at
the various institutions proved far more complex for both white
trustees and black administrators. Black educators had to convince
their students that industrial education, with its emphasis on voca-
tional education, provided employability but not necessarily equality
with whites. Moreover, supporters of black institutions fought white
skeptics who distrusted trained black workers. In this setting
Kentucky informally supported civil or polite racism that maintained
the social order in the finest southern tradition.
This era in Kentucky education followed the incorporation in
1910 of the "new Berea" as Lincoln Institute. Institute administrators
and donors promoted the school and its industrial education mission.
The campaign to establish the school was both an ideological strug-
gle for the principles of white dominance over black life and an inter-
nal battle among black leaders to determine who should lead their
race in this nadir period. With conservative, accommodationist blacks
already in control, the campaign to expand support for industrial edu-
cation and Lincoln Institute assumed an important role in Kentucky
black life.
Ideological support for Lincoln Institute came from Booker T.
Washington, president of Tuskegee Institute in Alabama and the most
influential black person of the era. In an effort to maintain his influ-
ence in the state, Washington regularly communicated with his
Kentucky allies. Among those he wrote expressing support for indus-
trial education at Lincoln Institute were James Shelton Hathaway,
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president of Kentucky State, L.G. Jordan of the Louisville branch of
the National Afro-American Council, publisher William D. Johnson,
and influential Lexington minister J.E. Jackson.1 After Washington's
1906 and 1908 Kentucky speaking engagements, the Louisville Times
published three "Marse Henry" Watterson editorials promoting
Louisville as the school's site. The paper also argued that black indus-
trial education "is of very pertinent interest to the whites of the South
and Kentucky."2
The juxtaposition of Washington's visits and Watterson's edito-
rials created a positive climate for the philosophical acceptance by
leading whites of the new, private all-black industrial school. That ac-
ceptance did not guarantee, however, that whites in its vicinity would
tolerate such a school. In 1909 whites in the Louisville suburb of
Anchorage opposed the proposed placement of Lincoln Institute
there. A second site, located twenty-two miles east of Louisville in
the town of Simpsonville, generated vigorous opposition from local
whites and from nearby Shelbyville. As one measure of their anger,
unidentified parties sent two white inspectors of the prospective site
"a bundle of switches and hemp rope" and other death threats to per-
suade Berea agents to stop their inspections. In 1910 John Holland, a
state legislator representing Shelbyville and Simpsonville, pushed
through the legislature over the governor's veto a law requiring a
three-fourths yes vote on the location of industrial schools in a
county. The Kentucky Court of Appeals declared the law unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that it violated the state's bill of rights and sec-
tion 60 of the state constitution, prohibiting a statute that exempted
certain classes of cities from its provisions. The court's action permit-
ted the establishment of an industrial school for blacks near
Simpsonville.3
Although the court abrogated Holland's law, racist interpreta-
tions of industrial education in Kentucky black postsecondary educa-
tion had become entrenched. Many Kentucky blacks saw no hope in
opposing this powerful element of segregation.
Not all held such a fatalistic attitude, however; segregated edu-
cation had its active opponents. The industrial education focus of
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Lincoln Institute created an angry reaction from blacks excluded
from Berea College by the Day Law.4 Julia Young, the outspoken
editor of the Louisville black weekly, Kentucky Standard, argued in
January 1909 that the "new Berea" should offer the same curricula
provided at Berea College. In a column reporting her perspective in
the Indianapolis Freeman, Young observed:
The thing that is puzzling the colored people of this city and state
is why is it that the Negro can't have an academic, normal and
college training as well as toting the wood and digging the soil.
They are asking why is there to be expended $400,000 for a
school and the students not given a chance to learn the higher
things as well as the industrial pursuits. These things they claim
are now taught at the old Berea and why can't they be taught at
the new Berea? Such questions are now being asked by the
people of city and state and it [is] reported that they must be an-
swered before greater interest will be manifested in the founding
of the new institution.5
Another less dramatic example of dissatisfaction with using industrial
education for segregationist purposes appeared at the 1909 convention
of the Kentucky Colored State Teachers Association. The attending
principals voted to support the establishment of a college department
for Kentucky State, which began as a normal school. Although the
proposal went unheeded for thirteen years, their persistent advocacy
indicated that some of Kentucky's black educators remained commit-
ted to both liberal arts and industrial education for blacks.6
In 1915 the liberal arts approach was resurrected by J.W. Bell,
an obscure black school teacher from Earlington in western
Kentucky, who argued that an important aim of secondary schools
should be the preparation of black youth for higher education.7
Achievement of this goal required a broad liberal arts education
rather than a narrowly focused vocational education. Without it, Bell
insisted, blacks would be trained only to serve as manual laborers and
semiskilled craftsmen.8
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Other anti-industrial education comments from black Kentucky
teachers were rare. Key black educators William J. Simmons and
Charles Henry Parrish for example, largely tolerated segregated in-
dustrial education. Both men, who received general acclaim for their
efforts among black Baptists in Kentucky, were the products of both
the slavery and the Reconstruction eras. Simmons, born in slavery in
1849 in Charleston, South Carolina, grew up in Pennsylvania after
his mother and two other children escaped. Tutored by his shoemaker
uncle in "the common branches," Simmons struggled to find his
niche as a dental assistant to white dentist H. De Lange in
Bordentown, New Jersey. Denied entry to a dental school, Simmons
ran away and joined the Forty-First U.S. Colored Infantry, serving in
the Petersburg, Virginia, campaign and in the associated battle of
Hatcher's Run. He was present at Lee's surrender at Appomattox
Court House.9
Following the war, Simmons resumed his dental apprenticeship
in New Jersey. He became a member of a white Baptist church there,
began to preach, and received support from the congregation to enroll
at Madison (Colgate) University, graduating in 1868. He then studied
at Rochester University and at Howard University, where he earned
his bachelor of arts in 1873.
After teaching in Washington, D.C., and serving as the deputy
clerk and county commissioner in Ocala, Florida, he was selected in
1879 to serve as pastor of First Baptist Church, Lexington, Kentucky.
In 1882 he was elected editor of a black Baptist church periodical,
The American Baptist. In 1888 Simmons assumed the presidency of
Kentucky Normal and Theological Institute in Louisville, later
known as State Colored Baptist University. Simmons, whose national
reputation was enhanced by the 1888 biographical anthology Men of
Mark, used his organizational and fund-raising skills to secure the
friendship of Louisville railroad executive Eckstein Norton, whose
financial support was later helpful.10
While pastor of First Baptist Church, Simmons met Charles
Henry Parrish, who emerged as a denominational activist employing
the same methods as his own. Born in 1859 and enrolled in local
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black schools by his parents, Parrish dropped out in 1874 and worked
as a porter. He remained interested in education and continued his
own after joining the local Baptist church. When Simmons assumed
his position at Kentucky Normal and Theological Institute, Parrish
followed him there. During his early years at State University, Parrish
was an exemplary student, loyal employee, and popular part-time
pastor. After earning his bachelor's degree in 1886, Parrish became a
delegate to the Republican State Convention, the American National
Baptist Convention, and the Committee for the State Normal School,
and he assisted Simmons in organizing another school, Eckstein
Norton Institute.11
Both men had received classical liberal arts collegiate educa-
tions, yet both advocated the industrial (vocational) approach as the
true path for success for other blacks. Their advocacy of industrial
education gave them credibility among powerful white philanthropic
agencies and, in turn, respect among fellow blacks for being con-
nected with powerful whites.
Thus, Parrish became an outspoken advocate of industrial edu-
cation at Eckstein Norton Institute, established in 1890 by Simmons
in rural Cane Springs, Kentucky, twenty miles from Louisville. After
Simmons's sudden death in late 1890, Parrish assumed the presi-
dency and expanded Eckstein Norton Institute's vocational industrial
education curriculum, a step that brought praise from "Marse Henry"
Watterson.12
Watterson castigated the local elite families of both races, that
is, "the smart set of the Colored Four Hundred" and the "Caucasian
Four Hundred," for their failure to support efforts by Parrish and
Eckstein Norton Institute to educate the presumed intellectually
"weaker" black race. Parrish's approach supported the conventional
southern wisdom that the institute's graduates would fill jobs subor-
dinate to and unwanted by whites. Although he accommodated segre-
gated education, the state legislature rejected Parrish's appeal for a
three-thousand-dollar appropriation for Eckstein Norton.13
Unfortunately, Parrish's pleas for support competed with those
of James S. Hathaway of Kentucky State, which the legislature had
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recently renamed the Kentucky Normal and Industrial Institute for
Colored Persons. The school, begun in 1886 as a result of lobbying
in the state legislature by Parrish, Simmons, and the Kentucky
Colored State Teachers Association, promoted itself as the locus of
publicly supported industrial education for Kentucky blacks. Its
curriculum, composed of programs in teacher training, agriculture,
mechanical arts, and business, fit the mold of a Tuskegee
Institute-style school.14
Ironically, Parrish lobbied for the establishment of the school
that later competed with Eckstein Norton Institute for funds and stu-
dents. He did not anticipate competition from Kentucky State, since
Eckstein Norton received the bulk of its funds from private benefac-
tors.15 Only after William J. Simmons's untimely death in 1890 and a
subsequent struggle to enroll students and obtain funds, did Parrish
recognize the consequences of his earlier lobbying effort.
James S. Hathaway's aggressive promotion of Kentucky State
also undermined Eckstein Norton. Following contact with Booker T.
Washington, Hathaway moved away from his liberal arts training at
Berea and accepted industrial education as the new pedagogical ortho-
doxy. This shift may have resulted from his failure to receive a full-
time teaching appointment at Berea when blacks were still a part of the
campus. Therefore, he competed with Eckstein Norton and Berea by
enlarging the industrial element in the Kentucky State curriculum after
the school's name change in 1902 to Kentucky Normal and Industrial
Institute.16
Hathaway's promotion of industrial education at Kentucky
State became the central focus of his biennial trustees report. In 1903
he argued that industrial education had become the school's primary
instructional mission: "We are pleased with the industrial feature of
our school: we wish to extend it as prudence and good judgment may
dictate.... Students who remain at school here (long enough to catch
the inspiration of the place), will not, as a rule, consent to idleness
thereafter, but in shop or on farm, will work when and where work
can be had. We are especially ambitious to have our own students re-
garded throughout the state as good and ready workers, just as they
are now regarded throughout the state as good and successful teach-
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ers."17 These views confirmed white perceptions that industrial edu-
cation was the best method to permit blacks to achieve success with-
out stepping beyond their "place" and assured the trustees that
Hathaway, as the institute's head, supported an industrial mission.
Hathaway's leadership at Kentucky State temporarily ended in
1907. He resigned the presidency when governor-appointed trustees
were going to fire him because of his political affiliation. They then
appointed their own man. The departure of Hathaway caused no al-
teration in the fundamental belief in industrial education for blacks.
His successor, John H. Jackson, had served as president of
Kentucky State earlier, from 1886 to 1898. The son of influential
black minister Rev. J.E. Jackson of Lexington, he had become con-
vinced of the wisdom of industrial education and the folly for most
blacks of obtaining collegiate degrees in classical, liberal arts educa-
tion. Like Hathaway, Jackson had received his bachelor's degree in
liberal arts from Berea College. As a teacher and as the institution's
president, he endorsed industrial education, an endorsement that
committed the school even more deeply to the industrial education
philosophy during his second term (1907-10). Like fellow Berea
alumnus Hathaway, Jackson pleaded for more funds to expand facili-
ties and curricula, in order to concentrate on industrial education. He
wrote in his 1907 biennial report to the trustees:
Since the industries have been added and made a part of our reg-
ular school work, many students who otherwise, would have had
no opportunity to acquire a knowledge of tools, are gradually de-
veloping a taste for the same, and are showing a decided tendency
towards skilled labor pursuits. . . . But while the outlook for
skilled laborers is bright, and while very much of value is being
done for those who are doing this character of work, yet I respect-
fully call your attention to the fact that our mechanical shop is an
old frame building, poorly equipped and unsuited for its purpose,
if we are to expect better results from such training as is now
being given in it. A new shop, built of brick and well equipped for
the purpose, would do much to improve the character of the work
being done.18
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Jackson's lamentations about poor manual training facilities under-
stated the limited collegiate and vocational opportunities made avail-
able to Kentucky blacks by the state treasury. Those who wanted
more than vocational instruction at Kentucky State had to attend
State University at Louisville or colleges outside the state that al-
lowed black matriculation. By keeping State University nominally
funded via private donations and by providing minimal support for
Kentucky State, white educators upheld Washington's industrial edu-
cation model as the best way for the black man "to stand
on his feet, to bear his portion of the burdens of the community in
which he lives."19
Booker T. Washington's industrial education did not reach all of
the state's major black communities. Frankfort and Louisville blacks
lived closer to the political and economic centers of power and
wealth that supported black industrial education at Lincoln Institute,
Chandler Normal School in Lexington, and Kentucky State.
However, the educational facilities provided to Kentucky blacks in
the western half fell far short of those in the central and eastern sec-
tions. Beyond the poorly equipped, all-black, Baptist-operated
Hopkinsville Male and Female College, no significant postsecondary
industrial education institution for western Kentucky blacks operated
until the early 1900s.20
In the first decade of the century, blacks received formal educa-
tion through a polyglot of proprietary and county-supported schools.
Their plight attracted the attention of Dennis Henry Anderson, a
black Tennessean and ordained Colored Methodist Episcopal minis-
ter. Following his 1893 graduation from Lane College in Jackson,
Tennessee, Anderson migrated to western Kentucky and established
three independent elementary schools in Fulton and Graves counties.
Seeing the futility of trying to run these poorly equipped schools by
himself, he hoped that the region would support a normal school sim-
ilar to Kentucky State.
To accomplish this goal, he used his personal funds and a
Paducah lot donated by white businessman Armour Gardner. After
personally digging what he called "a mud hole" for the foundation, in
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1909 Anderson opened the West Kentucky Industrial College for
Colored Persons (which I will refer to as West Kentucky Industrial)
as a proprietary industrial school. Operating from a single wood-
frame building, the school initially offered courses in elementary
education, agriculture, carpentry, and basic crafts. Revenue came
from Anderson's personal finances, tuition payments, and cash con-
tributions from local blacks and whites. When this combination
failed to provide sufficient income for Anderson and his wife Artelia
Harris Anderson, who served as the school's other teacher, he ex-
panded fund-raising and started a campaign for state support.21
In 1912 Anderson lobbied Paducah area state legislators. After
he gained their support, they introduced a bill providing the college
limited annual funding, but unrelated political disagreements between
the governor and west Kentucky politicians interfered, and Governor
McCreary vetoed the bill. In the 1914 legislative session, Anderson
again lobbied the legislature, urging financial support for West
Kentucky Industrial at least equivalent to Kentucky State's support.
Despite unanimous support in the Senate, it failed to pass in the
House. In 1916 Anderson received strong support from Ernest E.
Reed, president of the Kentucky Negro Education Association. By a
detailed statistical analysis of black student needs in western
Kentucky, Reed tried, unsuccessfully, to convince both houses of the
practicality and cost effectiveness of establishing a second black
normal school. The Senate again approved the measure but the House
voted it down. Finally, in 1918 the legislature passed and the governor
signed a law that authorized the Paducah school to operate as "the
Booker Washington school of Alabama" did.22 After six years (1912-
18) of struggle with state legislators and governors, West Kentucky
Industrial became an integral part of the state's system of segregated
institutions of postsecondary education. Anderson's lobbying of the
legislature generated an annual state appropriation of three thousand
dollars, which provided salaries for himself, his wife, and three other
teachers.
In his later biennial pleas for state support, Anderson reiterated
his contention that Louisville and Frankfort educators ignored the
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educational needs of western Kentucky blacks. With western
Kentucky legislator backing, he argued successfully for strengthen-
ing the school that fulfilled the need for industrial education in that
part of the state.
Anderson's accommodation to segregated higher education
produced multiple effects. Not only were the annual appropriations of
three thousand dollars enlarged, but also Anderson assumed the status
of race leader, and with this status dependent on the college presi-
dency, he did not tolerate any black "enemies of the institution."
In one instance Paducah's black Lincoln High School principal
suffered Anderson's wrath. The principal, J.H. Alston, had served for-
merly as an instructor at West Kentucky Industrial. Upon Alston's ac-
ceptance of the principalship, Anderson warned him that something
serious would happen if Alston did not break away from the local po-
litical faction led by Rev. C.C. Carter and F. Harrison Hough, both of
whom fell in the "enemies" category.
Shortly thereafter, a black female high school student, Willie
Beatty, charged Alston with statutory rape, alleging that he had spent
the night with her in a local hotel. In the subsequent trial, a note was
produced by the defense in which Beatty demanded five dollars
from Alston for her silence. Alston's refusal led to a letter by him to
the girl's father, who was a minister in a rival political faction in
the town. As the trial progressed, witnesses revealed that Ander-
son had met with Beatty on several occasions at the school. As
the trial ended with acquittal for Alston, it was apparent that
Anderson had sought to frame and punish him. Despite descriptions
of the incident in the Pittsburgh Courier, the entire matter faded
from public view shortly thereafter.23 However, the trial's tawdry
revelations tarnished Anderson's image as a statesmanlike leader,
clergyman, and educator.
Anderson's reputation also suffered from external evaluations
of West Kentucky Industrial management. Reports published in
1921, 1924, and 1932 alleged that the college administration had
failed miserably to manage its resources and programs. Moreover,
Anderson rejected persistent staff attempts to strengthen the college's
weak liberal arts courses and inadequate accounting system.24
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His adamant support for high school level vocational classes at
the college also supported white perceptions that blacks were not
ready for true college work. In addition, several incidents of poor
fiscal review of college appropriations by its trustees suggested that
they cared little about the college's activities as long as the students
received training for menial "negro" jobs.25 Anderson's unvarying co-
operation with the trustees allowed him to keep his position despite
external dissatisfaction with his job performance and growing inter-
nal discomfort with his dictatorial style of management.
Other Kentucky black colleges experienced similar problems of
leadership and institutional direction. State University and Kentucky
State suffered from persistent financial stringency and from partisan
political activities. State University, which absorbed Louisville
National Medical College in 1892, Central Law School in 1890, and
their collective fiscal problems, began itself to experience financial
shortfalls as student needs outstripped campus facilities. Although
State University began as a black Baptist-supported normal school, it
had evolved by 1918 into a true college with industrial, religious, and
liberal arts curricula.
In 1918 Charles Henry Parrish assumed the presidency of State
University and persuaded the trustees to change its name to Simmons
University (cited hereafter as Simmons) in honor of his mentor and
the second university president, William J. Simmons. With this
change, Parrish began an aggressive fund-raising campaign among
local whites and blacks.
In 1919 a promise by black rest-home operator Dr. James S.
Anderson to donate two dollars for every one raised elsewhere en-
couraged Parrish to begin construction of a new dormitory. But
Anderson died suddenly and his estate was declared insolvent, and
Simmons did not receive its promised windfall. Meanwhile, the uni-
versity had overextended itself and had incurred significant long-term
debt in order to build dormitories.26 That debt forced the university to
mount a massive fund-raising effort employing a committee of fifty
whites from business, government, and churches.27
During these fund-raising efforts, a white supporter of
Simmons described his view of the university's mission as "service,
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not race equality."28 Simmons's course of study produced graduates
who would facilitate white control and stereotypes of the "good
negro." In accord with such notions, Simmons's choirs performed
concerts of "plantation melodies" on the city's first radio station.29
White supporters of the university had argued earlier that the school
helped to uplift blacks but always within the context of careful, white
supervision. White campaign manager Rev. R.O. Pirkey wrote in
November 1922, "All Southern white people know that the proper
training of the Negro, industrially and otherwise, is best handled by
their own leaders in the South, assisted and advised from time to time
by the Southern white man."30
The question of which white men were to provide that advice
became important during the first two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. Southern whites, including those in Kentucky, struggled to
remove corrupt corporate interests from local politics. Large coal
companies in eastern Kentucky made the region prosperous but had
also become influential in state decision making. Coal companies and
railroads were the industrial powers that controlled Kentucky legisla-
tors and governors.31
After two decades of increasing industrial corporate power in
state politics and of the weakening of black voting power by out-
migration, black leaders struggled over electoral tactics to achieve
maximum effect.32 Previous Simmons administrators had used secu-
lar politics for institutional advancement. In 1883 the General
Association of Colored Baptists in Kentucky had sought passage of
a special law to establish State Colored Baptist University,
Simmons's predecessor. In exchange for the word State in the title,
the association had promised each state senator the right to send to
the institution, tuition-free, a "properly equipped" student from his
district.33 Simmons used a similar political quid pro quo in its early
years.
Consistent with past policy, president Charles Parrish indirectly
involved Simmons politically by taking a visible role in Louisville
and Kentucky Republican party activities. White Louisville
Democrats responded by accusing Simmons students of voting more
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than once for Republican candidates in each election. Kendrick
Lewis, white chairman of the Louisville Democratic Campaign
Committee, claimed that forty-four Simmons students cast illegal
votes during the 1923 municipal elections.34 In response, Parrish an-
nounced that the university registrar would publish the names of uni-
versity dormitory residents involved in the controversy.35 The list
revealed that five names cited by Lewis were persons not registered
at the school and who had used the school address fraudulently. The
other thirty-nine names were not repeat voters. Louisville Democrats
complained again in 1926 about this practice.36 In neither case did the
university suffer any immediate repercussions.
It seems likely, however, that Parrish's Republican party par-
ticipation, among other factors, affected Simmons's long-term fund-
raising efforts. Campaigns in 1922 and 1923 failed to produce the
expected funds from the mostly white Democrat population of
Louisville. The trustees borrowed $60,000 from the Louisville Trust
Bank to liquidate lingering debts and underwrite the construction of
an $82,760 men's dormitory.37 But even with the loan, the school re-
mained impoverished. Parrish then reconstituted the bipartisan White
Campaign Committee, which included Gov. Edwin P. Morrow, Pres.
Frank McVey of the University of Kentucky, Louisville mayor
Houston Quin, Democratic politician/businessman Patrick Henry
Callahan, and fifty white Louisville businessmen. From 29 May
through 19 June 1925, the committee sought $100,000 for Simmons
but received only $32,316 from 161 Louisville whites.38
When the Simmons University supporters failed to raise suffi-
cient funds and its physical operation appeared threatened, Parrish
belatedly asked for support from the Louisville black community. At
a 12 July 1925 meeting of two thousand Louisville blacks, he pleaded
for, but failed to gain, widespread black financial support.39
The failure of Parrish's pleas may have been due to two factors:
Simmons had become too closely identified with the Baptist denomi-
nation, and he was too intimately connected with a white power
structure that championed segregation. For example, Parrish and
Louisville Colored Normal School head Albert E. Meyzeek violated
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a tacit agreement among local black leaders that they would avoid
public comment on a proposed city ordinance requiring racial segre-
gation on city streetcars. At a YMCA meeting held at a Baptist
church, Parrish and Meyzeek indiscreetly described black behavior
on city streetcars as "loud, boisterous and impolite." These comments
became additional grist for the mill of prosegregation whites in city
government. The next morning, a Louisville white newspaper head-
line read, "Cause Exists for 'Jim Crow' Law Say Negro Educators."40
The Parrish-Meyzeek comments reflected a simmering suspi-
cion by educated blacks that less well-educated blacks were partially
responsible for the discriminatory practices imposed on them by
whites. Meyzeek and Parrish, as members of the educated elite, expe-
rienced racial segregation but by criticizing other blacks escaped
some of its debilitating effects. Parrish, for example, was allowed to
dine at all-white locations and served as a delegate to the Kentucky
Republican Convention and the Republican Committee of Jefferson
County. Meyzeek, whose sharp denunciations of racism drew four
reprimands from his white supervisors, kept his teaching position
when other blacks would have been fired.41
Louisville blacks were not the only persons caught up in this
web of education, politics, and race. After James S. Hathaway re-
signed from the Kentucky State presidency in 1907, succeeding pres-
ident John H. Jackson resigned unexpectedly in 1910. Citing
undisclosed "disagreements" with the politically appointed trustees,
Jackson's successor, Louisville black educator Meyzeek, also re-
signed the presidency after only one month in office. According to
Meyzeek's biographer, he found "unqualified teachers solidly en-
trenched through politics" and "filed a frank report of faults and fail-
ures with the board of trustees." Louisville blacks and the Louisville
school board asked Meyzeek to return as the head of the Louisville
Colored Normal School, a makeshift teacher training institution for
blacks operated by the Louisville Public Schools.42
After Meyzeek's abrupt resignation from Kentucky State, the
trustees searched for a less contentious president, one willing to co-
operate with them. After appointing Dean Ernest E. Reed interim
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head, the trustees wrote Booker T. Washington and "other well-
known Negro educators of the country, asking them to suggest a
Negro for the post of president." The trustees sorted through one
hundred nominees and chose former president James Shelton
Hathaway, who accepted the position.43 An advocate of industrial ed-
ucation and Republican orthodoxy, Hathaway avoided confrontations
with white trustees and legislators. He failed, however, to avoid prob-
lems with the school's black constituents and with the allocation of
the meager state appropriations.
The low level of state funding, a subject on which both blacks
and whites commented, led to Kentucky State's poor physical condi-
tion. Governor McCreary charged in his message to the legislature
that the institute suffered from legislator stinginess.44 Blacks took
their concern one step further and began organizing.
In February 1912 a legislative lobbying committee met at the
home of Frankfort black attorney L.D. Smith, an intensely partisan
black Democrat, who organized a support committee for Kentucky
State after revelations of a fiscal crisis at the school.45 In a later visit
to the campus, members of the state legislature "found things in a
very bad condition," a direct result of parsimonious funding of the in-
stitute. The legislature, however, was little swayed by reports of
"things in a . . . bad condition" and voted only $ 17,500 for Kentucky
State, rather than the $50,000 requested in the appropriations bill.46
Although the school did make minor improvements with these
funds after this crisis, Hathaway's prestige ebbed three months later
when newspapers revealed that a prostitution ring operated at the
Frankfort black Knights of Pythias hall. Most of the young men pa-
tronizing the hall were high school graduates and Kentucky State stu-
dents. Reports said Hathaway permitted immoral conduct to affect
the "better class" of Frankfort's young blacks.47
On 6 July 1912 the Indianapolis Freeman reported that
Hathaway was under public attack for "immorality and incompe-
tence," although, the report continued, the "superintendent [of public
instruction] will give him ample time to prove himself innocent."48
Neither Hathaway nor the superintendent's records revealed the
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specific nature of these charges. On 17 August 1912 the institute
trustees accepted Hathaway's resignation. Hardin Tolbert, publisher
of the Frankfort Tribune and Freeman correspondent, wrote that "the
charge against President Hathaway's character was not proven, and it
was supposed by many to be the result of politics."49
That episode revealed Hathaway's managerial and political
weaknesses with regard to the school and black education in general.
His perceived failure to exercise complete control over miscreant
black students jeopardized his tenure with governor-appointed white
trustees. The black citizen-led campaign for increased funding for
Kentucky State created an awkward nexus: could legislators increase
funding for an already poorly controlled institution? The perceived
indiscretions of the students embarrassed other blacks—particularly
those in the press—who fought white stereotypes of blacks as lascivi-
ous. Ultimately, Hathaway received the brunt of the criticism as the
college head. Regardless of culpability, his voluntary departure was
welcomed by both blacks and whites.
The controversy surrounding Hathaway's missteps initially
made it difficult to hire a replacement. William Buchanon of
Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical College and J.H. Garvin of
Winchester, Kentucky, both declined the institute presidency.50 After
reviewing nearly two hundred applications for the presidency, in-
cluding that of past president John H. Jackson, the trustees named
black educator and loyal Democrat Green Pinckney Russell of
Lexington.51
Russell's appointment appeared a logical and politically appro-
priate choice. A Berea College graduate, he had held the principalship
of Lexington's black high school, later named G.P. Russell High
School by a school board grateful for his outstanding work and sup-
port for the industrial education of blacks.52 Moreover, recommenda-
tions from Democrat state auditor Henry Bosworth and Judge
Rodgers Clay gave him an edge over other candidates who were
staunch Republicans.
Russell did not fail his white Democrat allies. His willingness
to accommodate included tighter control over contentious student be-
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havior. In one nationally publicized incident, several Kentucky State
students were reprimanded in 1914 for what the president and
trustees labeled "a riot." Some students, including senior James
Dean, led students to the campus chapel on 19 October 1914 and con-
demned Governor McCreary, President Russell, and the trustees for
the favoritism shown to the president's nephew, Green P. Russell Jr.
Dean, G.P. Russell Jr., and George Parks were accused of smashing
the president's automobile. The students involved except Russell's
nephew, who allegedly was the chief perpetrator of the mischief,
were punished by three weeks of extra manual labor on campus.
Dean was expelled for insolent behavior toward a faculty member
rather than for this incident.
After convening a meeting of three hundred students in the
campus chapel, Dean and his supporters told them that the trustees
should remove President Russell because of the board's recent public
but minor disagreements with him. Russell responded to the "inflam-
matory speeches" by inviting local police and the sheriff to the
campus to arrest Dean and five other students for disorderly conduct
and, in one case, carrying a concealed deadly weapon. A subsequent
student boycott also proved unsuccessful; the boycotting students
were told to return to classes immediately or be expelled. With no
reasonable alternative, the students complied.53
Along with his heavy-handed suppression of the October 1914
campus disturbance, Russell displayed a willingness to cooperate
with trustees, some of whom wished to become vendors of supplies
to the institute. The resulting controversies encouraged Kentucky
State alumnus Clarence L. Timberlake to publish a pamphlet imply-
ing an improper economic relationship between the trustees and the
president.54 Timberlake argued that the conflict of interest had oc-
curred because Kentucky State confined itself to Franklin County
markets and suppliers. The trustees used institute funds to purchase
supplies from local vendors regardless of price or quality. As a result
the institute served as a vehicle to enrich Franklin county merchants
and worked to the detriment of the state's black students, institute
staff, and the state treasury.
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Timberlake's protests notwithstanding, Russell and the trustees
continued to carry out the institute's industrial education mission. But
it continued to be hobbled by the legislature's lack of concern for
funding even the white schools and colleges. Black education contin-
ued to occupy a low rank on the General Assembly's legislative
agenda.55
As a consequence, Russell's first term at Kentucky State pro-
moted industrial education despite persistent underfunding. During
his first term he became more authoritative and his relations with the
board of trustees more clouded. In 1921 the state auditor criticized
the institute for its mismanagement of state appropriations and fed-
eral rehabilitation funds for black war veterans.56 Russell survived
the controversy by winning public support from George Colvin,
chairman of the Kentucky State trustees and superintendent of
public instruction.57
Two years later Colvin sought the governorship. Because he
needed the help of the black Republican leadership, he agreed that a
black Republican should again become president of Kentucky State.
Colvin therefore had to remove Russell without seeming to compro-
mise his 1921 endorsement. When outgoing governor Edwin P.
Morrow did not appoint another Democrat to fill a vacancy on the
Kentucky State board of trustees, Colvin and two Republican trustees
maneuvered to remove Russell from his position as president.58
In closed sessions, the trustees created a rationale for Russell's
ouster. Colvin and the trustees alluded to low student morale and a
weakening of the institute's management. Blaming Russell for these
conditions, the board voted not to rehire him for the 1923-24 aca-
demic year. Immediately, the trustees selected an institute staff
member, Francis Marion Wood, to serve as president.59
The selection of Wood was based on political considerations
rather than academic criteria. Wood was the brother of John E. Wood,
publisher of the black weekly Danville Torchlight and member of the
Kentucky state Republican committee. John Wood also exercised in-
direct political influence by serving as the moderator (president) of
the General Association of Colored Baptists in Kentucky, the largest
black Baptist organization in a state where the Baptist denomination
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was paramount among black worshipers and voters. After F.M.
Wood's presidential appointment, Colvin assumed that John Wood
would provide an endorsement to his readers and to General
Association congregations.60
Russell publicly objected to his dismissal and Wood's appoint-
ment by exposing Colvin's scheme and by arguing that Colvin should
have fired him "if I was incompetent as he says I was." Russell also
argued that Colvin waited to act until "negro politicians" had told
him that Russell's removal had become the price for their support.61
Russell then received letters suggesting that however much black
Republicans liked Colvin, black voters wanted better education than
the institute's Republican president could provide. Russell's percep-
tions of black voter preferences proved correct: Colvin's bid for the
governorship failed.62
As for Russell, he waited for the political winds to change with
the arrival of new Kentucky State trustee appointments. Incoming
Democratic governor William Jason Fields named new Democratic
trustees to the college's board. Pres. F.M. Wood, following Colvin's
suggestion, introduced a junior college program and continued the
existing industrial education courses. Beyond this improvement,
Wood, an institute staff member and 1904 alumnus, made few
changes in Kentucky State. For the remainder of the 1923-24 aca-
demic year, Wood served as a lame-duck administrator because the
new board had decided to restore Russell to the presidency on
1 July 1924. Wood later moved to Baltimore, Maryland, where he ob-
tained a fellowship to study at Morgan State College. After appoint-
ment as supervisor of the city's fifteen black public schools, he
remained active in that position until his death on 8 May 1943.63
The Wood-Russell era at Kentucky State had amply shown that
public black institutions of higher education too often served as plat-
forms for white political advancement and agencies for black voter
manipulation.
Russell's controversial presidential terms occurred during a period of
heightened expectations for improvement in all of Kentucky black
higher education, especially in Louisville. In 1920 white educators
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asked a committee of black educators and citizens to promote a bond
issue for the improvement of the all-white University of Louisville
and the city public schools. Following an unsatisfactorily vague
remark by the white bond issue committee that local black education
needs would be "taken care of," the black committee refused to sup-
port the bond issue's passage.64 Louisville blacks recognized the need
to exert themselves to extract concessions from indifferent whites.
Irritated by their curt treatment, the ad hoc committee of Louisville
blacks (excluding Pres. Charles H. Parrish and William Steward of
Simmons University, who supported the bond issue) acquired the sup-
port of an influential, wealthy white Democrat and social activist.
Patrick Henry Callahan, who had earlier opposed anti-Catholic and
anti-immigrant activities in Kentucky, now took on the struggle be-
cause he recognized that strong Republican support for it and the bond
issue's benefits excluded blacks. The committee publicized its opposi-
tion and developed a coalition of black and white voters that produced
a four-thousand-vote margin to defeat the bond issue in the November
1920 general election.65
This moment of biracial electoral cooperation over the bond
issue provided younger black leaders I. Willis Cole, William Warley,
and Wilson Lovett an opportunity to develop their political skills. A
rump group of these black Republicans decided to field a slate of fif-
teen opposition candidates for city wide offices. Opposed by Charles
Parrish, Albert E. Meyzeek, and other conservative black
Republicans, the 1921 Lincoln Independent Party (LIP) slate indi-
cated that some Louisville blacks continued the activism begun in the
1920 bond issue campaign. As the campaign evolved, it took on an
ominous tone when the businesses of LIP candidates suffered vandal-
ism and the candidates themselves were harassed by black under-
world figures allegedly hired by political opponents.66
Although the LIP failed to elect a single candidate, it forced the
older, educated black leaders to relinquish control to the younger
ones. Conservative leaders Parrish and Meyzeek could no longer
claim to speak for their community. Parrish, whose fiscal woes at
Simmons would soon begin to overwhelm him, had to share his race
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leadership with Cole, Warley, and others. That gradual redistribution
of race leadership coincided with the 1925 resurrection of the
University of Louisville bond issue. The university recognized that
black voter support was essential for passage. In a concession to the
black ad hoc committee, the university agreed to reserve one-sixth of
the $1 million proceeds ($166,000) for the improvement of Louisville
black education.67
With black support assured, the bond issue received approval
in the November 1925 general election. After the election, however,
the university virtually ignored its oral commitment to the black
education project. University of Louisville presidents George Colvin
and John Patterson concentrated instead on refurbishing campus
buildings, restructuring the administration, and reorganizing curric-
ula. This situation continued for four years while the black leader-
ship grew more and more impatient with their dilatory treatment by
the white leadership. In late 1929 the university proposed the orga-
nization of a black junior college. Of the one hundred thousand dol-
lars set aside for this purpose, thirty-five thousand to forty thousand
dollars would be used to purchase the building, and the remainder
would go for equipment. The other sixty-six thousand dollars
promised in 1925 had been deleted by the university. The ad hoc
black leadership committee rejected this proposal.68 As a stopgap the
university granted two thousand dollars to Simmons for "extension
courses" for blacks. Given the unfulfilled political and fiscal assur-
ances made in 1925, this temporary measure did little to satisfy
Louisville's black leaders.
Louisville blacks were not the only ones who felt the continu-
ing effects of politics on the fortunes of education. The most glaring
example occurred at Kentucky State after the 1924 reappointment of
Green P. Russell. Russell's resumption of power meant a continuation
of the industrial education tradition, limited state appropriations, and
close cooperation with white Democrat trustees and their political
cronies.
His administration remained uneventful until 1926, when sev-
eral significant episodes occurred. A disastrous dormitory fire in which
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three students died forced the institute trustees to request $184,000
from the legislature in order to rebuild; the state legislature approved a
special appropriation to cover the cost. Subsequently, at the trustees'
request, the legislature changed the legal name of Kentucky State to
Kentucky State Industrial College for Colored Persons to reflect the
introduction of a new, four-year liberal arts college program. Such a
move followed the national and regional trend to create liberal arts
colleges for blacks, since industrial jobs once held by blacks were be-
coming more acceptable to unemployed whites. Moreover, public
schools were requiring their teachers to have collegiate rather than
normal school preparation. Also, in a move sparked by electoral
promises of the reform of state government, the legislature limited the
Kentucky State president's term of office to four years. An earlier
statute had permitted it to be indefinite.69
Shortly after passage of this law, Gov. Flem Sampson appointed
H.D. Martin and J.M. Perkins to replace members of the board of
trustees whose terms had expired. Both men expressed suspicions
about Russell's management of the college accounts. As a result the
board hired its own accountant, E.R. Burch, to audit the college's
fiscal condition. His investigation revealed, among other problems,
that Russell had conspired with previous white Democratic trustees to
misuse the college's state appropriations. As an example of this collu-
sion, Burch cited Russell's hiring of his wife and his daughter as li-
brarians for the college library of two hundred books. In response
Russell argued that hiring his wife and his daughter had saved the col-
lege money. The trustees remained skeptical.70
The trustees' distrust encompassed nearly the entire college
staff and institutional operations. They questioned Russell's hiring of
senior college students as faculty and, shortly thereafter, asked for the
students' resignations. At the end of lengthy and intense questioning,
the trustees finally asked for Russell's resignation on 20 February
1929. After some hesitation, he resigned effective 1 March 1929, and
Dean James A. Bond was appointed as interim college head.71
Russell was indicted on three counts of defrauding the state by
paying his wife and his daughter for their campus duties.72 In his legal
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defense Russell received support from former trustees, and the pros-
ecutor failed to persuade Burch to come from New Orleans to testify
and thus strengthen the prosecution's case. Given Russell's strong
character references, the absence of a witness to provide evidence
against him, and a second continuance of the trial, the judge dis-
missed the case.73 Again, Russell had survived. He moved to
Waukegon, Illinois, to join his married daughter and dentist son-in-
law. There he worked in the public schools, became a respected citi-
zen, and remained active in local Democratic politics until his death
in 1936.74
Russell's resignation at Kentucky State, the fiscal and political
troubles of Charles H. Parrish at Simmons, and the growing disillu-
sionment of some whites with Dennis H. Anderson at West Kentucky
Industrial were similar in several dimensions. All three college presi-
dents exercised political clout not directly related to education. As a
result each president had to contend with two institutional constituen-
cies: an internal one comprised of faculty, staff, and alumni and an
external group made up of the governing boards and the state legisla-
ture. The latter group, composed of whites, remained generally un-
concerned about day-to-day operations unless malfeasance or
nonfeasance appeared. The students became dependent on the presi-
dent's recommendations in order to obtain their degrees and to find
employment thereafter.
This saga again denies any student or community roles in the
process. After the 1914 incident in which several student protestors
were arrested by local police on the order of President Russell and
later expelled, Kentucky State students remained suspicious of its ad-
ministrative leadership. The president and his family lived in a brick
home and received abundant food from the school farm, while stu-
dents were constrained to live in poorly insulated, wood frame build-
ings and were fed inadequate meals. Under each administration
before 1929, the presidents implored the trustees to improve campus
facilities and also to raise the meager staff salaries. Student concerns
about campus conditions were addressed only infrequently by the
administrators.
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Meanwhile, white educators continued to advocate the classi-
cal, liberal arts curricula for white collegians, and black educators
grew increasingly distrustful of the industrial education curricula.
Attempting to resist these changes, industrial education advocates
argued unsuccessfully that black industrial education schools better
served the needs of most blacks. Because black higher education had
become more acceptable to whites as part of the public education
mission, the creation in the 1920s of local college programs for
blacks had indirectly confirmed the inadequacy of industrial educa-
tion as the primary direction for black postsecondary education.
Many black secondary schools, however, continued to be dominated
by vocational education curricula.
This change in educational philosophy for black colleges coin-
cided with the expansion of black postsecondary education in the
South. In the Reconstruction era, blacks could choose from a handful
of southern institutions that offered them college level work. In 1927
the number had increased to eighty-two. Although most were poorly
equipped in comparison with southern white colleges, southern white
acceptance of black colleges demonstrated that the educated black
elite fulfilled leadership roles within segregated southern society.75
Southern whites, however, kept those schools inferior in scope
and thus circumscribed black participation in the institutional and in-
tellectual growth of the region. Southern black higher education sus-
tained only two viable medical schools—Meharry Medical College
and Howard University School of Medicine. Howard University had
the only law school. State University's law and medical programs had
disappeared by 1920. Engineering and business programs were lim-
ited to courses in drafting and bookkeeping. At the end of the first
two decades of this century, only a dozen southern black colleges of-
fered programs in these professional areas that were comparable to
those at small, southern white colleges.76
Such conditions resulted from Kentucky whites' efforts to oper-
ate higher education for blacks as no more than an afterthought.
Chronic pleas for funds for black public and private institutions were
given minimal attention until crises forced state legislators or private
donors to provide nominal funds.
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In this context the formative period of black higher education in
Kentucky from 1910 to 1930 prepared blacks for specific racial roles
and ignored black intellectual and professional growth. What little
black higher education existed in these decades confirmed the Day
Law's requirement for separate black education and the assignment
of blacks to a subordinate status. Whites expected postsecondary in-
dustrial education to emphasize vocational/industrial education that
limited blacks to low-paying, semiskilled jobs in agriculture, domes-
tic service, and crafts. Other types of jobs were rare or unlikely for
most blacks. Given these assumptions, white politicians and philan-
thropists, eager not to disrupt the racial status quo, justified both the
philosophy and the funding of industrial education through 1930.
With few exceptions, black educators in Kentucky accepted this state
of affairs as a fait accompli.
Clearly, institutions of black higher education from 1910 to
1930 had become systemic agents for the maintenance of racial seg-
regation. What reforms Kentucky's black educators expected to make
as the system shifted from an industrial education to a liberal arts
focus became more problematic after 1930. That year marked the
strengthening of Kentucky State, the continuing deterioration of West
Kentucky Industrial, and the opening of a new black college in
Louisville. As usual, Kentucky's black educators adjusted to these
changes. But the deepening national depression that began in 1929
further complicated educational reform, as leaders in Kentucky and
in the nation concentrated on ending the "hard times" rather than on
improving schools and colleges.

Hopes, Reforms, and
Resistance, 1930-1939
AS THE NATION REACTED to the financial turmoil fol-
lowing the stock market collapse of October 1929, black educators
and race leaders sorted out their cautious responses to white demands
for efficiency and quality in the operation of black educational insti-
tutions. Since 1921 black educators in the state colleges had been at-
tacked for inefficient management and poor quality of instruction
under their separate but unequal status.
Changing this arrangement took on quixotic dimensions. If
black educators persuaded their governing boards to make reforms in
curricula and management, any adjustments had to conform to edu-
cational theories acceptable to white educators usually unfamiliar
with life on black college campuses. If black Kentucky students de-
clined to participate in this segregated system, then they had to go
elsewhere—presumably out of the state—for desegregated and pre-
sumably better higher education.
Complicating these conditions, Kentucky's black institutions of
higher education were compelled to adapt to shifting national edu-
cational trends. In 1928 and 1930 the U.S. Office of Education
published studies that described (and indirectly supported) con-
temporary approaches to black higher education. In place of the
industrial education promoted in earlier decades by Booker T.
Washington and others, liberal arts curricula that emphasized the fine
arts and sciences had appeared in many black normal and even
industrial schools. As a result some of these schools became "col-
leges for Negroes" that offered blacks both vocational skills and lib-
eral arts programs leading to teaching certificates. Legitimating these
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institutions among blacks and suspicious whites often became prob-
lematic in southern states. The unsuccessful struggle to convince
Kentucky blacks that Lincoln Institute ought to be like Berea rather
than an outright industrial school exemplified this problem.
The difficulty of making these institutions academically credi-
ble was also compounded by personnel and institutional upheavals.
For example, after the forced ouster of Pres. Green P. Russell,
Kentucky State trustees elected a new president who was mandated
to develop a fiscally efficient and academically sound institution.
Louisville black educators and community leaders witnessed the
swift deconstruction of Simmons University from a comprehensive
private liberal arts college for Kentucky blacks to a denominational
Bible college. Following a painful campaign to gain state support,
West Kentucky Industrial's administrators fostered a nagging public
perception of corruption and chronic ineptitude at the helm.
Yet, these higher education institutions, while functioning as in-
stitutional agents for a racially segregated society, produced positive
economic and political changes—however subtle—within that struc-
ture. The best example of that process occurred in Louisville in 1930.
The ad hoc committee for Louisville black education visited new
University of Louisville president Raymond Kent in July 1929, want-
ing to know how the university intended to provide promised oppor-
tunities in higher education.1 Declining to answer their demands
immediately, President Kent brought their concerns before the
trustees. To resolve this problem, the University of Louisville and
Simmons University trustees negotiated the sale of the existing
Simmons campus to the University of Louisville. Simmons paid off
its outstanding long-term debts with the proceeds. As a part of the
agreement, Simmons's trustees halted its collegiate level programs.
Students who would have enrolled in Simmons's collegiate curricula
could enroll at the proposed Louisville Municipal College for
Negroes, an all-black, physically separate liberal arts unit of the
University of Louisville. As for Simmons, the agreement permitted it
to function as a Baptist Bible college using one of the old Simmons
University buildings until Louisville Municipal needed it. In the in-
Hopes, Reforms, and Resistance 49
terim, Simmons trustees worked to relocate to a new campus site in
west Louisville.2
These events were the culmination of black political pressure
that began in 1920, directed toward the foundation of a nondenomi-
national public college for Louisville blacks. In 1931 Louisville
Municipal opened with fifty students and seven faculty members. All
of the faculty had graduate training from non-Kentucky universi-
ties—a first among Kentucky black colleges.3 Although Louisville
Municipal also began as a two-year college with a liberal arts orien-
tation, within four years the University of Kentucky placed Louisville
Municipal on its list of approved state institutions. Blacks could not
enroll at the University of Kentucky, but it would have accepted aca-
demic credits from Louisville Municipal if blacks had been able to
enroll. With this recognition from the University of Kentucky and
with the University of Louisville president Kent's claim that the
school was the only liberal arts municipal college for blacks in the
country, Louisville Municipal quickly attracted additional students
from the local black community.
While Louisville blacks welcomed their inclusion—albeit
segregated—within the University of Louisville, other Kentucky
black colleges struggled continuously for improved facilities and for
equity in the funds allocated to them. These problems intensified as
Kentucky State's new president, Rufus Ballard Atwood, worked to
end the school's traditional entanglement with Kentucky parti-
san politics and to fulfill the trustees' mandate for institutional
efficiency.4
Atwood, a native of tiny Hickman, Kentucky, and a black war
hero, was no stranger to difficult situations. During World War One
he received several battlefield commendations for bravery, including
the Bronze Star. Upon his return from overseas duty, he earned bach-
elor's degrees from Fisk University (1920) and Iowa State College
(1923) and served briefly as professor of agriculture at Kansas
Vocational College and then as professor and dean of the Prairie View
Agricultural and Mechanical College in Texas from 1923 until his se-
lection for the Kentucky State presidency in 1929. In his first months
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in office, he fired faculty and staff who had been hired on the basis of
political connections.5
Atwood established for the college an academic mission that
placed greater emphasis on the liberal arts and teacher preparation
than on industrial education. Because this mission required compe-
tent faculty, one of Atwood's first actions as president was to not
renew the teaching contracts of fourth-year college students who
served as part-time instructors. Instead, he sought out and hired in-
structors with master's and doctor's degrees from integrated universi-
ties outside the South. Atwood's forceful actions revived a moribund
campus wracked by cronyism, overt intrusion by white politicians,
and student suspicion of the administration. His nonpartisan approach
to education strengthened his presidency and the college's integrity
and academic credibility.
Unlike his predecessor, Green P. Russell, Atwood had prepared
himself by eschewing any overt Kentucky political connections. The
trustees who fired Russell wanted a replacement who had no connec-
tions with the state's Republican or Democratic parties. Although his
father, Pomp Atwood, served on the city of Mayfield's black school
board, Rufus Atwood avoided any overt local or regional partisan po-
litical activity. Moreover, he registered later as an independent, which
excused him from participating in the hotly contested Republican and
Democratic primary elections.6 To circumvent partisanship in staff
appointments, he relied on contacts made when he was appointed in
1931 as the secretary of the Association of the Negro Land Grant
Colleges. His experiences enabled him to resolve the multiple prob-
lems faced by a southern black college, including that of academic
integrity.7
Atwood's endeavor to remove Kentucky State from Kentucky
politics coincided with efforts in Kentucky higher education to over-
come general fiscal deprivation. In the depression era of the 1930s,
the state's public higher education institutions struggled to operate
with fewer dollars. To reduce waste in education, the state wanted to
tighten its control over the semiautonomous white teachers colleges
and the state university.
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In the 1930-39 decade Kentucky, Indiana, and Rhode Island
adopted reorganization plans according to which the governing
boards of white state-supported colleges were nominally attached to
a state administrative department.8 This change affected white insti-
tutions at a time when total enrollments were dropping. For example,
Western Kentucky State Teachers College lost 22.3 percent of its stu-
dents between 1931-32 and 1933-34. Faculty members at other white
state-supported colleges were also affected. At Murray State Teachers
College the total number of faculty declined by 22 percent between
1931-32 and 1933-34.9 Such losses in students and faculty under-
mined the operations of these institutions during the depression years.
Black higher education, too, fell victim to the depression. The
Kentucky State faculty suffered during the early depression years as
state funding became scarce. In the 1931-32 academic year
Kentucky State had thirty-four full-time faculty. By 1933-34 the
number had dropped to twenty-six, and although there were fewer
Kentucky State teachers, student enrollment at the college increased
by 56 percent from 1931-32 to 1933-34.10 Kentucky blacks, includ-
ing those in Louisville, continued to enroll at the older Kentucky
State rather than Louisville Municipal.11 With a new institution and
an increased national emphasis on liberal arts education, more
blacks sought out advanced education. However, white student en-
rollments declined, aggravated by the fiscal and faculty reductions at
the teachers college and the state university. Although all Kentucky
campuses were faced with serious challenges, black students re-
sponded to their campus conditions more positively. Unlike
President Russell, Atwood defused student opposition and estab-
lished in 1929, with the students, a pattern of campus reform and ad-
ministrative cooperation.12 In 1932 the college administration
permitted the students to edit (with an advisor's oversight), publish,
and finance the Thorobred, a campus newspaper started in 1929.n
Previously, the college had exercised complete control of student ex-
pression. For the next three decades this newspaper reflected the
opinions of literate students who fiercely defended the college
family, including faculty and staff.14
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The close-knit character of the college originated only in part
from Atwood's leadership, for Kentucky State also developed a strong
intercollegiate athletics program under Henry Arthur Kean, a student
of Notre Dame's outstanding coach Knute Rockne. In 1934 and 1937,
the Frankfort college was recognized as the unofficial national foot-
ball champion among black colleges.
Under Atwood's leadership the campus became an intellectual
oasis as outstanding black thinkers visited it. Among them were
W.E.B. Du Bois (in 1940), Mary McCleod Bethune (1941), Zora
Neal Hurston (1942), Langston Hughes (1943, 1951, and 1960), and
Walter White (1946).15
The college had also made important qualitative changes in cur-
ricula. The central focus remained on teacher education, but Atwood
introduced distinct departments for the three areas: natural science
and mathematics (in 1929); agriculture, sociology, and economics (in
1931); and health and physical education (in 1931). The remaining
departments—music, education, home economics, English, and for-
eign languages—offered bachelor's degree programs that had been
unavailable prior to 1929.16 Within the restrictions of Kentucky's seg-
regated education law, the college also attracted academically accom-
plished black men and women who came to the campus as junior
faculty with earned bachelor's degrees and subsequently earned
master's and doctoral degrees from out-of-state universities. In the
1929-39 decade, 50 percent of the Kentucky State faculty pursued
further graduate training.17 Setting the example was President
Atwood, who used summer leaves of absence to earn a master's
degree in education administration in 1939 from the University of
Chicago. By 1939 46 percent of the faculty had earned at least
master's degrees, and 16 percent had earned doctorates.18
The academic advances made at Kentucky State and Louisville
Municipal had profound effects on both schools. The Southern
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools assigned a B rating
to Kentucky State in 1931 and Louisville Municipal in December
1935. That meant that graduates of the two schools had received ap-
proved bachelor's degrees, but the degrees were not equal to those re-
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ceived at white colleges. In 1937 the association ranked Louisville
Municipal A, indicating that the college was meeting the standards of
white colleges. In 1939 the association changed Kentucky State's
1931 rank of B to A as well.19
While Louisville Municipal was developing into a strong lib-
eral arts college, the college's dean, Dr. Rufus Clement, resigned in
1936 to become the president of the private, black research-oriented
Atlanta University.20 The former dean of West Virginia State College
for Negroes, David A. Lane, assumed the Louisville Municipal dean-
ship and continued to pursue the college's liberal arts mission.21
The decade-long evolution of Kentucky State and Louisville
Municipal into effective institutions overshadowed the decline of
Kentucky's smallest state supported college for blacks, West
Kentucky Industrial College. Revelations about its poor financial
condition and inadequate campus facilities continued to make it less
attractive to west Kentucky blacks. In 1931 and 1932 West Kentucky
Industrial came under fire from the state auditor and the University of
Kentucky School Service Bureau for poor fiscal management. The
college also received criticism in a legislature-commissioned effi-
ciency study of Kentucky state government.22 The all-white study
team, after evaluating all agencies of state government, criticized
West Kentucky Industrial heavily for its inadequate bookkeeping
system and its poorly trained faculty and staff.23
Despite that criticism, Dennis H. Anderson remained as presi-
dent. He held on because he accommodated the needs of Paducah's
white elite. In 1936, for example, he supported a bond issue for
Paducah Junior College, which blacks could not attend; his willing-
ness to promote the bond issue among Paducah's black voters en-
deared him to white politicians and educators.24
Although grateful, Paducah's white leaders were only at first
willing to renew their support for Anderson. Other actions during the
decade from 1926 to 1936 began to undermine support for West
Kentucky Industrial from both blacks and whites. Poorly prepared
faculty, insufficient income from the college farm, and low student
morale created serious new doubts. Western Kentucky blacks
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observed these problems and chose to attend Kentucky State
instead.25
Anderson's resistance to change also discouraged some staff
members who sought improvements. In one case, Dean George D.
Wilson left West Kentucky Industrial, citing Anderson's intransi-
gence as the reason. Later, he became a faculty member at Louisville
Municipal.26
With conditions deteriorating, the trustees decided in 1935 to
assume for themselves most of Anderson's duties and responsibili-
ties, leaving him only his title as president.27 But their management of
campus life was not much better. Students resorted to desperate
means to resolve a dispute over student life policies. In December
1936 the student body refused to attend classes, citing college prohi-
bitions against males walking with females from classrooms to the
dining hall, visitation privileges, and Sunday church escorts. The fac-
ulty yielded to the demands for change and the strike ended.28
In 1937 Anderson was removed as titular president. To replace
him, the trustees selected Harvey Clarence Russell, a Simmons
University and University of Cincinnati graduate who had been the
dean at Kentucky State. Russell immediately began to introduce cur-
ricular and administrative reforms similar to those enforced at
Kentucky State by Atwood.29
As the trustees of West Kentucky Industrial implemented
Russell's reforms, prominent Kentucky blacks became concerned
about the declining quality of all higher education. One of these per-
sons, Charles W. Anderson Jr. of Louisville, became a central figure
in Kentucky black politics from 1935 to his untimely death in 1960.
In 1935 Louisville and Jefferson County Republicans nominated
Anderson to represent the predominantly black Forty-Second State
Legislative District. Local Democrats supported black attorney
C. Eubank Tucker, but Anderson, a young lawyer in his first political
campaign, easily defeated him, assisted by Tucker's opposition to the
Louisville Urban League's civil rights campaigns.30
Anderson's election to a state legislature was the first of a
southern black since Reconstruction. As the state's only black legis-
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lator, he won approval in the 1936 legislative session for a law that
provided Kentucky black college graduates with tuition grants for
out-of-state graduate and professional education. This action was
remarkable because the Supreme Court in Murray v. University of
Maryland had voided Maryland's use of such grants to escape creat-
ing separate graduate and professional schools. Just as surprising, the
national NAACP legal advisory committee, of which Anderson was
a member, withheld criticism of the Kentucky legislator's action.31
The Anderson-Mayer Student Aid Law had forced white
Kentucky legislators to contend with the absence of graduate and
professional training for blacks in its segregated educational struc-
ture.32 The law's passage also exposed the failure of the governance
board of Kentucky's black colleges to create comprehensive college-
level institutions while sustaining the requirements of the Day Law.
Awarding out-of-state tuition grants did, however, temporarily thwart
lawsuits by blacks ready to argue that the state provided them un-
equal higher education.
Anderson's legislation allowed Kentucky white educators to
continue their neglect of black higher education. At the same time,
criticism of West Kentucky Industrial and Kentucky State revealed
doubts by white educators and politicians in state government about
the viability of these schools as distinct institutions. Such questions
melded with a gradual, national philosophical shift from industrial
education to liberal arts as the key instructional approach for black
colleges. Editorials in the Chicago Defender and the Pittsburgh
Courier questioned the competence of black colleges to "adjust cur-
ricula to adequately prepare graduates to properly find their place in
life."33 Hence, even black critics appeared to corroborate Kentucky
whites' criticism that black colleges were often weak and industrially
oriented. By inference, black colleges created to support industrial
education had become anachronisms in need of reinvention.
Such revelations in the midst of a national economic depres-
sion and a shift of black voter allegiance from the Republican to the
Democratic Party prompted white politicians to press for subtle
changes in Kentucky black higher education. The chief white
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proponent of these changes was the controversial populist governor,
Albert Benjamin Chandler.
Elected in 1935 with a mandate to reform Kentucky's corrupt
political system, Chandler completed the reorganization of state gov-
ernment as directed by the 1934 session of the legislature.34 The con-
trol of Kentucky State and West Kentucky Industrial was shifted to
the State Board of Education, thereby centralizing the oversight of
two institutions with a recent history of poor fiscal management.
Intended as a reform measure, this section of the reorganization law
had important implications for black higher education. President
Atwood believed that the change removed Kentucky black colleges
from politics by placing them under the control of the less partisan
state board. It had the effect, however, of associating black higher
education with elementary and secondary education.
In 1935 public criticism of Kentucky's black colleges had
begun to resurface, particularly after continuing difficulties at the
Paducah college. Governor Chandler's concern focused primarily on
the positive developments at Kentucky State. Both Chandler and
Kentucky State president Atwood were born and raised in small
western Kentucky towns; their wives both had Virginia back-
grounds. Recognizing their similarities, including the reformist
philosophies that they held in common, Atwood established a cor-
dial but discreet friendship with Chandler. That relationship mani-
fested itself in the 1937-38 dispute over the closure of West
Kentucky Industrial.
The controversy began when Dennis H. Anderson's successor,
Harvey Clarence Russell, made substantial progress in correcting de-
ficiencies at West Kentucky Industrial. Despite Russell's efforts,
Governor Chandler announced in a December 1937 meeting with
Louisville black leaders that he wanted to close the Paducah school
and assign the property to other state agencies. He proposed that
Kentucky State become a "high-type institution in Frankfort."35 This
proposal met with stiff opposition from black educators, race leaders,
and white western Kentucky politicians, including Paducah state rep-
resentative Henry Ward and the Paducah board of trade.36
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Some members of the Kentucky Negro Education Association
(KNEA) argued that black students needed more, not fewer, higher
education institutions if Kentucky's segregated system was to offer
blacks truly equal education. Other KNEA members, including
Atwood, supported Chandler's view and cited data showing that west-
ern Kentucky black students preferred to attend the stronger and better
organized Kentucky State.37
On top of black educator disarray, Charles Anderson refused
Chandler's request to introduce the merger bill.38 After extended dis-
cussion and lobbying by West Kentucky Industrial backers and
promerger advocates Chandler and Atwood, western Kentucky legis-
lators Henry Ward and Clyde Lester joined Charles Anderson to in-
troduce a compromise bill that, upon subsequent passage, gave both
sides something. As originally proposed by Chandler, West Kentucky
Industrial closed on 30 June 1938. But as a concession to western
Kentucky blacks and their white allies, it reopened on 1 July 1938 as
West Kentucky Vocational School for Negroes (WKVSN) with a
clearly defined vocational mission.
The law also shifted all liberal arts courses to the Frankfort col-
lege. Since Kentucky State no longer focused primarily on industrial
education, domestic science, agriculture, or mechanics, it became, on
1 July 1938, the Kentucky State College for Negroes, the sole
provider of state-supported higher education for blacks in Kentucky.39
This law did not affect Louisville Municipal, which continued to
function as a segregated unit of the private but municipally supported
University of Louisville.
The process of transforming the Frankfort and Paducah institu-
tions tarnished Chandler's reputation among blacks. Chandler argued
that he had improved black educational opportunities by creating a
"new" black vocational school. He also contended that higher educa-
tion evaluators had, since 1923, cited the absence of this type of
school as a deficiency in the state system.40
The effects of these changes were not immediately noticeable
in Kentucky black higher education. Atwood felt, however, that the
controversy strengthened the personal friendship between himself
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and Chandler. He remained a covert ally of Chandler and of others in
the Chandler faction of the Kentucky Democratic party. Using politi-
cal aplomb, Atwood made it appear that Kentucky State received no
tangible, direct benefits from the relationship.41
The merger controversy erupted in a period when southern
higher education as a whole lagged far behind higher education in the
rest of the nation. Southern white colleges did not rank with the lead-
ing institutions of higher education. To remedy this, national studies
of higher education encouraged southern colleges to introduce
stronger liberal arts and science curricula and to move away from
normal schools to four-year teachers colleges and comprehensive col-
leges, universities, and professional schools.42
The scarcity of education dollars from private donors and state
legislatures postponed the immediate introduction of those changes.
Kentucky, which had benefited from the 1920s prosperity of "King
Coal" in eastern Kentucky, struggled to maintain public services with
slim depression-era tax revenues. Unsuccessful efforts to introduce a
sales tax and a $75 million revenue bond issue delayed needed im-
provements in Kentucky education and other social services. White
colleges and the state university at Lexington, moreover, had become
the first priority for improvement; black higher education again
received far less attention.43
Faced with meager public support from whites, Kentucky's
black colleges also had to contend with a growing national criticism of
black higher education.44 Such black critics as James Weldon Johnson,
Charles H. Thompson, and W.E.B. Du Bois wanted black colleges to
redefine their missions and specify what kind of institutions black stu-
dents needed to survive in a racially hostile society.45 At one point
those critics proposed consolidation or closure of the smaller, weaker
black colleges.46 That position seemed to strengthen President
Atwood's support for the transformation of West Kentucky Industrial
into a vocational school and to undermine anti-merger opponents.
Atwood also supported the replacement of Kentucky State's industrial
education courses with liberal arts curricula. Louisville Municipal,
under Dean Rufus Clement until 1936, had included few industrial
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education courses. A commuter student institution, Louisville Muni-
cipal emphasized humanities and science degree programs in its cur-
ricula, with one- and two-year programs in limited vocational areas.
Even in those programs, the black instructors had earned master's de-
grees and doctorates.47
The hiring of credentialed faculty at Louisville Municipal
prompted Kentucky State to follow suit. In 1929 six (28.5 percent) of
the Kentucky State faculty had no degrees, fourteen (66.66 percent)
had bachelor's degrees, and only one person (4.76 percent) had a
master's degree. No faculty members had yet earned a doctorate.48 By
the 1938-39 academic year, ten (38.47 percent) of the Kentucky State
faculty had bachelor's degrees, twelve (46.15 percent) had master's
degrees, and four (15.38 percent) had earned doctorates. Of the latter
four, one degree was in the natural sciences, one in mathematics, one
in agriculture, and one in education. The college put pressure on fac-
ulty without master's degrees to earn them during the summer
breaks.49
By 1938 all Kentucky black higher education emphasized lib-
eral arts curricula that led to teacher certification. At the same time,
its institutions gradually improved their academic integrity and in-
structional quality. These improvements at Kentucky State and simi-
lar programs at Louisville Municipal enlarged the in-state college
offerings. Also, under the governance of the nonpartisan State Board
of Education, black higher education offered truly collegiate-level
curricula and without the scandals of previous decades. Such a gov-
ernance system was not intended for white colleges since black ones
were never presumed to be their equal.
Based on the changes since 1929, black higher education had
made perceptible improvements, but a few black educators and race
activists remained unconvinced that the system had become philo-
sophically or financially equal to that provided whites. Led by
Louisville school teacher Lyman T. Johnson and by publisher
I. Willis Cole of the Louisville Leader newspaper, an informal group
of fifteen Louisville blacks met regularly to discuss strategies to end
the racial discrimination that they deemed the ultimate barrier to
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educational parity.50 Because of their vulnerability as public school
teachers and a real fear of reprisals by whites, most members of the
group shunned publicity. In a 1984 interview, Johnson recounted
that most members of the group belonged to the NAACP and used
its Louisville branch as a platform for public comments on civil
rights issues. William H. Perry, a Louisville black school teacher op-
posed to the informal group, charged that it attempted to monopolize
black educator demands for educational equality. He argued that it
wielded undue influence over the educational progress of Louisville
blacks.51 Clearly, Cole and Johnson did not represent all black teach-
ers in Louisville. Dr. George D. Wilson of Louisville Municipal,
who served as the Kentucky Negro Education Association's research
committee chairman, took the middle ground.52 He argued that
blacks were victims of Kentucky's persistent de facto and de jure
racial discrimination in education, but instead of condemning those
responsible, he appealed to school district superintendents' "spirit of
justice and fair play" to first remove the racial differentials in
salaries paid to black teachers.53 School districts largely ignored this
moderate 1938 KNEA request because of the mixed signals sent to
whites regarding black educator acceptance of the segregated system
and their unequal working conditions. If Wilson's comments were at
all representative, Kentucky black teachers, while continuing to
accept the existence of segregated schools, had become restive about
their unequal salaries.
Another example of internal division among black educators
occurred during the 1937-38 Kentucky State-West Kentucky
Industrial merger controversy. Black advocates and opponents of the
merger outlined their positions in the January-February 1939 issue of
the KNEA Journal, with opponents outnumbering advocates.
Whitney M. Young Sr. of Lincoln Institute and Atwood of Kentucky
State defended the merger, while Albert E. Meyzeek of the Louisville
Public Schools, William H. Fouse, president of the KNEA, Moneta J.
Sleet of Paducah, and J. Bryant Cooper argued against it.54 Such
divergent views revealed that black educators failed to reach a con-
sensus on the higher education that Kentucky blacks wanted. The
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KNEA board of directors decided to poll the membership and study
the issue more thoroughly.55
The 1938 merger compromise did not mean that black educa-
tors had moved to oppose racially segregated education. None of the
statements by either side opposed segregation per se. Both sides had
instead hinted that the best solution would be to improve higher edu-
cation for blacks. That meant expanding existing institutions into
comprehensive colleges truly equal to white ones that included both
liberal arts and vocational programs. However, the merger arrange-
ment arrived at by Chandler, Anderson, and others deftly skirted this
issue.
Although Kentucky was thus left unpressured to consider the
equality of education, it could not avoid the consequences of a
Missouri case decided in the U.S. Supreme Court. In November 1938
the belief that educational segregation would continue indefinitely
was shaken. Lloyd D. Gaines, a Missouri black college graduate, was
denied admission to the University of Missouri law school because he
was black. The denial of admission rested on two grounds: that
Missouri law prohibited biracial classes and that a publicly supported
jim crow law school existed at the black Lincoln University in
Jefferson City, Missouri. After suing unsuccessfully in the federal
courts, Gaines and his NAACP counsel appealed to the Supreme
Court. It subsequently ruled that the state must provide separate but
equal graduate and professional school opportunities to qualified
blacks. In the 1938 ruling that affirmed segregation but demanded im-
proved graduate education for blacks, it ordered the University of
Missouri Law School to admit Gaines.56
This ruling required all states employing racially segregated ed-
ucation to reassess their graduate and professional offerings for
blacks. Kentucky, which had decided only in March 1938 to create a
truly comprehensive, public undergraduate college for blacks, now
had to consider the even costlier project of providing state-supported
graduate and professional education to blacks.
Black educator response to the Gaines decision came not from
President Atwood or Dean Lane, but from W.H. Fouse, a high
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school principal and president of the KNEA, who wrote in the
Louisville Courier-Journal that although blacks did not oppose
separate education, "what the Negro does oppose and I believe
rightly so, is unequal education." He also argued that if white
Kentuckians wanted completely separate education, they should
offer "absolute equality in educational opportunities" to the poorer
blacks who could not afford to make up the difference between
white and black schools.57
Within weeks of the Gaines decision and Fouse's comments,
Governor Chandler decided not to decide. He convened a conference
of black and white educators to investigate the implications of the
Gaines ruling for Kentucky.58 To permit blacks to attend the all-white
graduate and professional schools at the University of Kentucky and
the University of Louisville required an alteration in the 1904 Day
Law, a move that Chandler firmly opposed.59 Against the backdrop of
that opposition, an interracial committee of college presidents and
other educators met to propose the state's response to the Gaines
ruling.
Complicating the committee's work was the necessity of com-
pleting the task before Chandler's administration expired and re-
cently elected Keen Johnson's began. Chandler's appointment of the
committee did not bind Johnson to abide by its recommendations.
Under these constraints, the committee did not recommend signifi-
cant changes in the educational system. The only committee meeting
of substance, on 24 November 1939, produced publicity but little
progress. Its preliminary report recognized the legal right of blacks
to enroll in courses at the University of Kentucky provided that
Kentucky State did not offer such courses and that the blacks in-
volved refused to accept state aid for non-Kentucky higher educa-
tion. The committee agreed that a subcommittee should investigate
how many blacks might possibly enroll at the University of
Kentucky professional and graduate schools. They also wanted in-
formation on the statutory changes necessary to permit desegrega-
tion. Rather than to confront an administration on its way out, the
committee avoided making any substantive recommendations until
the new governor and his administration assumed control.60
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Sensing another victory deriving from its litigation against seg-
regated higher education, the national NAACP declared that the
24 November 1939 report of the Kentucky committee was the "direct
result of the campaign waged by the NAACP to open the doors of
state universities in Southern and border states to all persons without
regard to color."61 As expected, the Kentucky legislature and the State
Board of Education ignored the committee's findings. The general
lack of support for the committee's recommendations among state
legislators signaled to white college governance boards that it was
unnecessary to make significant changes in Kentucky's segregated
higher education system.62
In that climate it was inevitable that Governor Johnson also
would avoid reform. Kentucky therefore followed the general prac-
tice of southern states that enforced segregation: to maintain or
strengthen educational segregation unless a court order was issued. In
an apparent effort to reinforce Kentucky's separate but equal policy,
Kentucky State received provisional permission to offer graduate
courses in agriculture and home economics during the 1939 and 1940
summer terms, but these course offerings ended when Kentucky State
discovered that only the University of Kentucky had the legal au-
thority to offer graduate degrees.63 Since the courses did not lead to a
degree, the college stopped offering them. Yet the state continued to
claim that Kentucky blacks received an equal educational opportu-
nity through the Kentucky State makeshift graduate program or
through out-of-state tuition grants. A Games-style lawsuit would be
seriously flawed because the state offered blacks so-called separate
but equal undergraduate and graduate courses.
Although Kentucky refused to change its segregation law,
Alfred Carroll, a graduate of Ohio's all-black Wilberforce University,
attempted in February 1939 to enroll at the University of Kentucky.
Representatives of the KNEA and the local NAACP met to devise a
strategy to help him overcome Wilberforce University's unaccredited
status and the Day Law prohibition. Charles Anderson, legal advisor
to the Louisville NAACP, wrote Chief NAACP Counsel Charles
Hamilton Houston in Washington that the university officials and the
governor needed to work out "amicable arrangements" by notifying
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the attorney general of this case before the NAACP filed the test
lawsuit.
Before these arrangements took shape, the university denied
Carroll admission based on his unaccredited college degree and on
the Day Law. The NAACP assistant special counsel, Thurgood
Marshall, did not recommend litigation in this instance. He recom-
mended instead that another, stronger test case on Kentucky segrega-
tion be initiated because the presence of Charles Anderson should
give Kentucky blacks adequate legal counsel, and Marshall believed,
according to a cryptic comment, "Kentucky is more or less civi-
lized."64 Marshall's benign vision of Kentucky changed in the next
decade.
The Carroll case also forced President Atwood to clarify his po-
sition on the equalization of higher education opportunities. He
wanted the parties involved to wait until the Gaines committee ap-
pointed by Governor Chandler had a chance to explore all the possi-
bilities. Given strong white support for the Day Law, Atwood decided
that a class-sharing arrangement between Louisville Municipal,
Kentucky State, the University of Louisville, and the University of
Kentucky was the best and perhaps most workable approach to equal-
ize black higher education.65
In retrospect, the 1930-39 decade produced important changes
in Kentucky black higher education. It lost one weak institution,
Simmons University, and gained a strong replacement, Louisville
Municipal College. State government centralized black higher educa-
tion at Frankfort under Kentucky State and changed West Kentucky
Industrial into a strictly vocational school. Kentucky black colleges
established liberal arts curricula as did others in the southern and
border states. Kentucky whites refused to amend the Day Law de-
spite the Murray and Gaines Supreme Court rulings in 1935 and
1938, but those rulings nudged the Kentucky legislature toward pro-
viding graduate education to blacks. That meant giving $175 per term
to blacks wanting graduate education if they enrolled in out-of-state
universities,66 a practice that kept blacks out of the state's graduate
and professional institutions but conceded that selected blacks must
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be given an opportunity to enroll at non-Kentucky desegregated uni-
versities, most of which were nationally outstanding academic insti-
tutions.67 The law that provided for the out-of-state education also
undermined an original subtext of the Day Law—that blacks were
distinctly inferior to whites and needed to be kept apart in order to
maintain social order. Based on contemporary racial prejudice, white
legislators, however, remained adamant in retaining the Day Law as
originally written. Yet, educators of both races on the Gaines com-
mittee acknowledged the necessity of future, imprecise changes in
the law. These changes required a redefinition of Kentucky higher
education.68 Until that fateful, distant moment, however, Kentucky
black and white educators were required to operate a dual system of
higher education.
In this dual system, most whites attended five state-supported
colleges and twenty-five private colleges. Blacks attended one pri-
vate and two public segregated institutions of uneven quality, if
these schools had enough places for the state's black students.
Quality higher education for blacks therefore depended on black
administrators and faculty. Although Kentucky ranked consistently
near the bottom among southern states in provision of funds for
public higher education for blacks, Kentucky whites could argue that
it was not the fault of whites if blacks failed to use the higher educa-
tion opportunities provided to them. Based on statistical data (see
the appendix), Kentucky's appropriations for black colleges and
normal schools remained small but consistent for a declining black
population in the first three decades of the twentieth century.69
Again, it could be argued that the state should not be expected to
provide more funds to educate fewer black collegians. Black educa-
tors were expected to manage their resources prudently and avoid
any appearance of mismanagement of state funds, such as in the
cases of Green P. Russell and Dennis H. Anderson. Later, President
Atwood of Kentucky State and Dean Rufus Clement of Louisville
Municipal did improve the image of black college administrators by
using fiscal conservatism to make their institutions both academi-
cally credible and financially sound.
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Further, black college presidents occasionally placed their own
immediate needs ahead of those of the black community. Dennis H.
Anderson's dictatorial control of West Kentucky Industrial con-
tributed to its dissolution, to his dismissal, and to the transformation
of the college into a vocational school. In another case, President
Atwood's effort to centralize black higher education at Kentucky
State produced opposition among key Kentucky black teachers and
protective western Kentucky legislators. Although Atwood sought to
improve higher education for all Kentucky blacks, the immediate
result appeared to be more funding for the Frankfort college. Again,
Kentucky black expectations for improved higher education were de-
layed by institutional defensiveness among the state's leading black
educators.
Separate and Unequal,
1940-1948
THE 1938 BLACK COLLEGE merger, the turmoil over it,
the battle for black leadership, and the Gaines Supreme Court ruling
muddied the prospects of what all parties had hoped would be a
stable education system, within the limits of Kentucky's depressed
economy. Kentucky blacks wanting higher education were left with
dubious choices. They attended Kentucky State or Louisville
Municipal, both of which lacked the resources of white teachers col-
leges, or, upon completing undergraduate programs at these or at
out-of-state colleges, they enrolled at out-of-state desegregated uni-
versities for graduate or professional training. The Gaines commit-
tee's final report, issued on 7 March 1940 after several meetings,
recommended possible changes in the Day Law, but, failing to gain
white political support, the report had little chance for real impact.
The prospect of amending the Day Law generated controversy
between blacks and whites from 1940 to 1948. The debate over that
alternative forced Kentucky white educators and politicians to bar-
gain with blacks to ascertain what quality of segregated education
blacks were willing to accept in lieu of changing the linchpin of
school segregation. Black educators and activists responded by de-
veloping immediate strategies against segregation and for improved
education. From 1940 to 1948 black educators and their few white
allies crafted legal strategies to achieve a new goal of desegregated
education—a goal that the Gaines ruling had already given birth to.
The discomforting implications of the decision became readily ap-
parent to Governor Chandler's committee of educators commis-
sioned to analyze it.
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The committee's conclusions reflected its racial division. White
members, including the presidents of the University of Kentucky, the
University of Louisville, and the four state teachers' colleges, agreed
that the Day Law had not been overturned and that segregated higher
education must continue. Conversely, the Gaines decision implied
that whites should make improvements for black higher education.
Black members of the committee, including the dean of Louisville
Municipal and the president of the KNEA, sought for black colleges
parity of funding with white institutions. Both factions in the com-
mittee accepted the premise that desegregated higher education was
unlikely in the immediate future, but the black members wanted
more than the out-of-state tuition law. They wanted black students to
receive education funds equal to those provided to whites.
White educators on the committee refused to support such an
extreme proposal; it would pose both financial and political problems
for all public education. Only in 1934 had the state education depart-
ment approved the minimum requirement of two years of college
training for elementary school teachers, four years of college for sec-
ondary school teachers, and a master's degree for advanced, lifetime
teaching certificates. Usually strapped for funds, school districts
required their teachers to obtain additional teacher training. Fortu-
nately, white Kentucky teachers had a variety of choices: a public
university, a municipally supported private university, four public
teachers' colleges, and twelve private four-year colleges. Black
Kentucky teachers had only two four-year colleges, both of which of-
fered general bachelor degrees in the arts and sciences and no gradu-
ate degrees.1
Compounding this inequity between white and black teacher
preparation institutions were significant gaps in the basic literacy
of Kentucky's citizens. If the U.S. Census of 1910's definition of
illiteracy as an inability to write is accepted, 16.5 percent of all
Kentuckians over ten years of age were illiterate. Although standing
substantially better than the regional percentage of 23.1, the state re-
mained substantially above the national percentage of 10.7. White
regional illiteracy, however, was 12.8 percent compared to 40.1 per-
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cent among blacks. When Kentucky white illiteracy dropped eight
percent during the 1920s and 1930s, black illiteracy remained twice
the percentage of whites, 5 percent above the regional average and
4 percent above the national average. The declining population of
Kentucky blacks, resulting from outmigration and declining birth
rates, reduced the number of illiterates, but the remaining blacks
made only minor gains in literacy compared to the improvement in
white literacy during the period. Put simply, Kentucky was more lit-
erate than its southern neighbors but was not among the nation's in-
tellectual elite.2
Since 1921 Kentuckians had, in a series of legislative investiga-
tions, scolded themselves on the poor quality of their schools.
Following each report, the legislature and the people ignored the rec-
ommendations and failed to levy the necessary taxes to improve the
educational system. One of those reports, that of the Kentucky
Educational Commission of 1933, observed that "certain provisions
of the Constitution pertaining to education, and many provisions of
the school law, actually work as a deterrent to education efficiency."
Kentucky historian Thomas Clark later said, "The constitutional
mandate that the people every four years elect by popular vote a su-
perintendent of public instruction has denied the Commonwealth the
advantages of planning, promoting, and executing a progressive edu-
cation program."3 Each elected superintendent proposed perfunctory
solutions—often politicized by the appointment of noneducators to
positions associated with the task—for the improvement of the state's
education system. With each new governor, Kentucky educators ad-
justed to a different paradigm for educational improvement and for
reducing illiteracy. The result was superficial, inconsistent, and inef-
ficient campaigns for expanding formal education for the state.4
Many Kentucky educators refused to be hindered by the educa-
tional politics. Kentucky's colleges became key institutions in
moving the state's average education level beyond what nineteenth-
century legislators called "a fair English education" of three elemen-
tary grades. In 1933 the legislature authorized the Kentucky
Educational Commission to make recommendations for change in the
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state education system. The legislature's response to the commis-
sion's proposals was the 1934 revised Kentucky School Code, which,
as already indicated, expanded the duration of higher education and
the qualifications required for teachers and staff. Despite this attempt
to provide better-prepared teachers, increasing the numbers of for-
mally educated Kentuckians remained a Herculean task. One indica-
tor of its enormity appeared in the 1940 census of Kentucky.
The census of 1940 did not reveal the actual literacy of its re-
spondents. Instead, it recorded the highest grade completed by each
respondent. Of the 1.4 million Kentuckians 25 years of age and older,
32.4 percent of whites had completed eight years of elementary
school, compared to 18.8 percent for blacks. The largest group of edu-
cated blacks, 26.8 percent, had completed only one to four years of el-
ementary school; 15.1 percent of whites fell into that category. At the
college level, 6.8 percent of Kentuckians had finished one to three
years of college. Of these, 4.4 percent were white, 2.1 percent were
black, and .3 percent belonged to other races. Of the 4.7 percent of
Kentuckians who had finished four years of college, 3.1 percent were
white and 1.6 percent black. The median number of years of com-
pleted education for Kentucky blacks was 6.3 and for Kentucky
whites 8.3. National levels were 5.7 years for blacks and 8.8 years for
whites. Although blacks were statistically better off in Kentucky than
in the nation at large, 83 percent of all blacks in the state had eight
years or less of formal education, whereas only 72 percent of the
whites were at that low a level of education. Clearly, more blacks than
whites remained under-educated.5
Because the Day Law had prohibited interracial teacher educa-
tion and had limited black teacher training, the need to increase the
number of formally educated blacks grew larger. More black teachers
were needed for the state's 120 county school districts, 2 black col-
leges, and 1 vocational school. In the period 1910-40 black teachers
had left the expression of their views to KNEA officers such as Albert
E. Meyzeek and R.B. Atwood, who set forth in the KNEA Journal
and the black press the dire fiscal straits of black schools. In the
1940s Kentucky black teachers and their leaders expanded the at-
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tacks, arguing that segregation prevented any social fairness to the
nation's black citizens. Their concern with the unfairness of segrega-
tion accelerated as Kentucky blacks continued to concentrate in the
state's large and small cities. In 1900 35.2 percent of all blacks lived
in the urban areas, and by 1940 54.6 percent lived there.6 Over a
fifteen-year span, Paducah and Louisville blacks used their political
clout in the 1920, 1925, 1932, and 1935 elections to extract conces-
sions from whites. Black successes in the political arena and legal
challenges in lower education areas increased the interest of civil
rights activists in the problems of black schools and colleges.
Salaries too had become a prime concern for black educators.
In 1940 the NAACP successfully challenged in court the race-based
salary discrimination of a Virginia school district. That precedent en-
couraged seven black Louisville teachers and five citizens to attack
the unequal black and white salary scales of the city's school dis-
trict. Calling itself the Education Equalization Committee and in-
cluding members of the Louisville NAACP and the Louisville
Urban League, the committee devised a simple strategy to pressure
the Louisville city schools to equalize salaries. Their effort led to a
legal attack on the unequal funding of local black schools.
Subsequently, black elementary school teacher Valla Dudley
Abbington informally complained to the Louisville board of education
that the average black teacher pay was $1,490, whereas that of the av-
erage white teacher was $l,750.7 To develop her case against the
school board, Abbington, with the committee's assistance, sought
legal counsel. At that time attorney and state representative Charles
Anderson served as the Louisville NAACP chief legal counsel, but the
Equalization Committee had begun to express private dissatisfaction
with Anderson's lack of success in gaining civil rights legislation. His
only major victory had been the 1936 Anderson-Mayer State Aid Act,
and it affected only Kentucky black college graduates seeking gradu-
ate or professional degrees. So when Anderson indicated that "he was
too busy" to pursue the Equalization Committee's case and suggested
that the committee use Louisville black attorney Prentice Thomas as
its chief counsel, members of the committee were privately relieved.8
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With Thomas serving as local NAACP counsel, and with
Charles H. Houston and Thurgood Marshall representing the national
NAACP legal committee, Abbington's petition went to the school
board in late November 1940. Following the board's rejection of the
petition, the NAACP lawyers filed a complaint for relief with the U.S.
District Court at Louisville in December 1940. The suit claimed that
the Fourteenth Amendment's "equal protection" clause had been
violated.9
Shortly thereafter, the Equalization Committee stepped up its
activities on this matter. Its support of the Abbington case seemed to
grow stronger when three similar out-of-state cases were resolved in
favor of black plaintiffs. Moreover, the Louisville Courier-Journal
recognized the case's significance; it published three consecutive edi-
torials in December 1940 supporting Abbington's stand.10
Confronted by such negative publicity, the Louisville board
began to equivocate in the matter of race-based salary discrimination.
Although the board said it would phase in the equalization of salaries,
the NAACP legal counsel pressed on with the lawsuit.11 In response,
the Louisville board of aldermen under Mayor Joseph D. Scholtz
undertook to divert other city revenues to make up the salary dif-
ferences. Based on a lengthy letter sent to Mayor Scholtz on
21 December 1940 from John Miller, president of the board of educa-
tion, the city and the board agreed to grant the black teachers their re-
quest.12 The NAACP lawyers advised the Louisville black teachers to
continue their suit until a consent decree had been won; the teachers,
however, agreed with the court's dismissal of the case in October
1941 after they had signed contracts equal to those of whites.13
In the midst of organizing the case for the Louisville black
school teachers, attorney Thomas directed Thurgood Marshall's at-
tention to questions posed by two Berea College faculty members
who were interested in challenging the Day Law by enrolling a black
student from Appalachia. Interest in this approach developed from
the college's mission, since it served only Appalachian students and
not other Kentucky students. Ultimately, this tactic failed because
Thomas did not have the funds to travel to the Appalachian region
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and find an interested student.14 Despite the failure, Thomas's interest
in opposing the Day Law revived when he heard that a black stu-
dent had been secretly attending the all-white Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary in Louisville.15 This development encouraged
Thomas to expand his anti-Day Law efforts.
On 18 June 1941, during the Abbington trial preparations,
Thomas wrote Marshall, "[A] statewide committee has been formed
to have a student apply at the University of Kentucky this fall."16 The
unidentified members of the Anti-Day Law Committee then rallied to
support Kentucky black student William Harkins's attempt to enroll
at the university. This test case failed ostensibly because Harkins did
not have a college preparatory background strong enough to meet the
university's academic requirements and because the committee pre-
pared the case poorly.17
Undaunted, civil rights activists again targeted the Day Law.
They focused their attention on the University of Kentucky graduate
and professional schools, and it was decided that to desegregate these
colleges a well-prepared black student had to seek admission to an
academic program not offered at Kentucky State.
A volunteer, Charles Lamont Eubanks, expressed an interest in
attending the University of Kentucky engineering school. Eubanks,
an honors graduate of black Louisville Central High School, filed
suit against the university after being denied admission based on
race.18 Pleaded by attorneys Charles H. Houston and Thurgood
Marshall of the national NAACP office, Eubanks's case plodded
through the Eastern Kentucky federal district court in Lexington
from 1941 through 1945. Eubanks's legal team argued that the state
neglected to provide separate but equal training for black engineer-
ing students.19
From the beginning, the suit met with frustrating political and
judicial problems as well as opposition from state government. In
November 1941 Gov. Keen Johnson requested the State Board of
Education to authorize the opening of Kentucky State's "school of
engineering" in September 1942. Composed of one teacher, two stu-
dents, and meager engineering teaching materials, it became part of
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the state's effort to defeat Eubanks's suit by demonstrating that
"equal facilities" existed.20 The state also used delaying tactics to
prevent the case from coming to trial as quickly as the plaintiff
wanted. Eubanks's attorneys inadvertently contributed to this
process by incorrect deliveries of summonses and errors in naming
the defendants.21 Eubanks also became the target of personal criti-
cism by anonymous Louisville blacks who disliked his brashness in
suing the university and creating potential race relations "trouble"
between blacks and whites.22 During this time Eubanks's marriage
ended in divorce. The case was postponed, a development that for
Eubanks meant further denial of his education and increased per-
sonal frustration.23
By 1944 Eubanks's case lost ground because the state's lawyers
argued that a separate but equal engineering school existed in
Frankfort at Kentucky State; the delay had given the state enough
time to pressure the State Board of Education to strengthen Kentucky
State's makeshift engineering program. The defendants also claimed
that the prospect of Mr. Eubanks or anyone successfully completing
an engineering program in wartime appeared unlikely.24
While Eubanks's attorneys sparred with the university counsel
over his entry, there appeared another tactic directed at achieving
black enrollment in the university. During the 1944 session of the
legislature, Charles Anderson, who had declined to participate in
both Abbington's and Eubanks's cases, offered a bill that would
retain the Day Law's segregation provisions except in professional
and graduate schools.25 Anderson's legislative proposal would not
destroy the Day Law but would establish a selective exception to its
provisions.
The bill was opposed by rural Jessamine County white legisla-
tor James R. Dorman, who proposed a bill to increase appropriations
for Kentucky State.26 It would, he alleged, make the college the
equivalent of the University of Kentucky.27 The two bills reached the
legislative docket on the same day. A motion to take up Dorman's
bill failed. After approval by the rules committee, Anderson's bill re-
ceived the support of an urban contingent of thirty-one Republicans
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and nine Democrats. Thirty-two Democrats and six Republicans
from rural areas voted against the measure.28
The House struggle for Anderson's proposal evoked the opposi-
tion of black civil rights activist and publisher William Warley, exec-
utive committee member of the Louisville branch of the NAACP and
publisher of the Louisville News. He urged support for the Dorman
bill, saying, "[It] declares absolute equality of Kentucky State and the
University of Kentucky and the University of Louisville. . . . If this
bill should become law Kentucky State College would become a mil-
lion dollar university giving to Colored youth law, medicine, and
everything the 'white' universities would give and give it as went
along in his schooling."29
Warley's public opposition manifested itself at a Louisville
NAACP branch meeting at which he and executive committee
member Stephen A. Burnley, in a rare show of black leader dissen-
sion, voted not to support Anderson's bill. Kentucky's largest
NAACP branch, composed of black school teachers, ministers, social
activists, and laborers, discussed both bills at length. Finally, the exe-
cutive committee voted to support the bill, with twenty-three in favor
and two—Warley and Burnley—against. The committee supported
Anderson's bill because it would have forced the state to conform to
the Gaines decision, an objective of the NAACP's national office.
Even the potential beneficiary of Dorman's bill, President Atwood of
Kentucky State, came out in support of Anderson's proposal, citing
the need for true graduate facilities for Kentucky blacks.30
Warley opposed Anderson's bill because it allowed unequal
education for most blacks, provided equal education for the tiny mi-
nority of Kentucky blacks who completed their bachelor's degrees,
and would save the state treasury at least $1 million. Warley argued
that whites would be forced to spend more on Kentucky State and
black higher education generally if Dorman's bill passed.31
Warley's activism made him the only Kentucky black news-
paper publisher supporting the Dorman Bill. Other black Louisville
newspapers, the Louisville Leader and the Louisville Defender, lent
their support to the Anderson bill. Despite Warley's opposition,
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Louisville NAACP branch president Lyman T. Johnson wrote acting
NAACP national executive secretary Roy Wilkins that the branch
had decided to provide prudent support of a "Citizens Committee"
promoting the Anderson bill.32
With the controversy surrounding the bill, the campaign to
obtain for Kentucky blacks higher education equal to that provided
whites came to a critical crossroads. Dorman's bill, although propos-
ing financial increases for Kentucky State to make it appear equal to
the university, had the potential of undermining any lawsuits by
black students who claimed a denial of equal higher education at
Kentucky's segregated public colleges. The state could claim that it
offered, in good faith, separate but equal higher education facilities
and programs. Meanwhile, endorsement of Anderson's bill by the
Louisville Courier Journal, by the Civil Rights Committee of the
predominantly black National Bar Association, by the ad hoc black
Citizens Committee of Louisville, by the Kentucky NAACP
branches, and by a majority of the Louisville NAACP branch sus-
tained Anderson's belief that his approach was a practical method to
weaken the Day Law. Warley's opposition, however, "gave some
[people] rather cool to the bill a good excuse to oppose it on the
grounds the Negro people themselves were divided on it."33 Warley
inadvertently gave segregation supporters ammunition for their
cause, as had Meyzeek and Parrish in the 1920s.
The only glimmers of hope were the forty yes votes the House
of Representatives gave Anderson's bill, a development demonstrat-
ing that the idea of total segregation outlined in the 1904 Day Law
had lost its previous strong white legislator support.34 It also sug-
gested that white legislators preferred ending racial segregation in a
small, selective part of the educational system rather than to equalize
funding for all black higher education. As for the eventual fate of
Anderson's bill, it became bottled up in the Senate rules committee
and died on 15 March 1944.35
As the Warley-Anderson quarrel subsided in late 1944, the
Eubanks case went on its slippery slope to oblivion. On 8 January
1945 a federal district judge, citing court rules, dismissed the case be-
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cause the plaintiff had failed to prosecute it within two terms of the
court.36 Charles H. Houston and Thurgood Marshall believed that the
case had insurmountable problems.37 Eubanks, it appears, had
become an incidental participant in a legal process completely for-
eign and confusing to him. He agreed to abide by his lawyers' advice
to back off from the issue and abandon the lawsuit.38
Nonetheless, the commotion external to Eubanks's case af-
fected Kentucky black higher education. Although the plaintiff's at-
torneys failed to argue adequately the original complaint, the
University of Kentucky fought back with legal technicalities and the
establishment of a jim crow engineering school. University trustees
successfully avoided a direct confrontation over the validity of the
Day Law, which the case originally sought to provoke. Defenders of
racial segregation also took solace in that it remained unscathed by
excluding Eubanks from the university. However, opponents of the
Day Law had pushed the legislature to consider, ever so briefly, a di-
lution of the color line in graduate and professional education.
The debate surrounding the Anderson and Dorman bills and the
failure of the Eubanks case revealed a persistent structural weakness
within Kentucky's NAACP branches: they could not mount an effec-
tive campaign to overturn one law. This debacle was attributed to the
lack of a state NAACP conference to attack statewide racial discrimi-
nation problems. Had there existed a state conference organization,
Eubanks's attorneys would have had the support of all the Kentucky
branches in their respective cities. A conference organization might
also have reduced the logistical problems faced by the NAACP's
Washington attorneys, who had to work both with the Louisville
branch of the NAACP and the eastern Kentucky district of the federal
district court, 110 miles east in Lexington. That experience, among
others, persuaded the branches to establish a Kentucky conference in
1946.39
The dismissal of the Eubanks case also resurrected the
intermittent public disagreement between Charles Anderson and
Pres. R.B. Atwood over civil rights tactics. Anderson blamed the
case's failure on Atwood, who he believed had created the makeshift
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engineering school that allowed defense attorneys to claim that
"there was no denial or failure to provide equal education facilities
within the state." Atwood did not respond immediately to
Anderson's charges of collusion with the defenders of segregation.
He did later accuse the black press of instigating these and other dis-
putes. "After all," he wrote in 1964, "a fight between two prominent
Negro leaders was news." To repair the rift between the two,
Louisville Defender publisher Frank L. Stanley arranged for Atwood
and Anderson to exchange views at a Louisville church meeting.
This public forum resolved what Atwood considered an unfortunate
misunderstanding.40 Again, the state's black leaders had allowed
their internal disagreements and personal disputes to divert attention
from the legal campaign against segregation.
Although the Eubanks case faltered, the NAACP legal team of
Thurgood Marshall, Charles H. Houston, Robert Carter, and Leon
Ransom continued their attack on segregation with a successful 1944
U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating Texas's all-white primary.41
This decision created a significant precedent in opposition to racial
segregation in local and state political primaries. Since Kentucky al-
ready permitted blacks to vote in primaries and general elections, the
case had little impact on Kentucky except to encourage civil rights
activists to continue antisegregation litigation.
Another indirect influence during this period was the admission
of social scientists that racial segregation remained a nagging, un-
solved American social problem. Swedish sociologist Gunnar
Myrdal's compelling 1944 analytical compendium on American
blacks, An American Dilemma, pointed out that the United States
could not maintain the fraud that blacks enjoyed equal treatment in
every aspect of life while they continued to have inferior housing,
schools, jobs, and political rights. Myrdal also concluded that black
higher education suffered from an intellectual blindness: white edu-
cators, already suspicious of the quality of black higher education,
did not treat black colleges as equivalent to white institutions in the
higher education system.42 If blacks completed their education under
segregation, their education was presumed inferior, thus keeping
them in a subordinate, second-class status.
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Those assumptions on the part of white educators came under
attack during the post-World War Two era when American higher
education experienced enrollment of older, nontraditional students.
Returning World War Two veterans used the G.I. Bill benefits to
enroll in college. As the upper-class and upper-middle-class students
soon discovered, American colleges now admitted more low- and
middle-income students, some of whom were black.43 Confronted
with war-tempered black veterans, who were unwilling to accept the
pervasive color line in the academy, black higher education institu-
tions strained to absorb them and endure the socio-economic changes
wrought by four years of conflict. In the years immediately after
World War Two all higher education underwent increased self-
scrutiny—as did the nation—as it struggled to cope with both social
change and demands for more education opportunities.
Consequently, internal studies of higher education, such as that
of the 1947 National Commission on Higher Education, exposed the
chronic weaknesses of all higher education, including the form and
function of black colleges. In some instances these colleges contin-
ued as subterfuges for the maintenance of racial segregation; they re-
ceived additional funding and were permitted to expand to provide
temporary "equal" higher education opportunities for blacks.
Although not specifically cited in the study, the Kentucky State
"school of engineering," hastily organized in 1941, fit this category.
Kentucky, like other southern and border states, recognized that
the opponents of segregation were no longer willing to accommodate
the philosophy or practices of racial segregation. Although the white
leadership claimed that Supreme Court precedents protected each
state's racial segregation laws, the national political leadership felt
otherwise.
In 1948 Pres. Harry Truman issued an executive order decree-
ing the elimination of racial segregation in the U.S. Armed forces.44
With de jure segregation outlawed in the military, de jure civilian
racial discrimination was weakened indirectly, and the prospect for
future racial desegregation brightened.
In southern states individual blacks attacked segregation. When
returning black veterans attempted to earn college degrees through
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the G.I. Bill of Rights and sought admission to white colleges and
universities, southern state governments used every method to keep
them and other blacks out. To defeat lawsuits alleging the denial of
opportunities afforded whites, southern state governments continued
the post-Games practice of creating ad hoc graduate and professional
"schools" on state-supported black college campuses.
In 1946 black college students sued Louisiana State University
as they tried to enroll in the law and medical schools. In response the
state created an out-of-state tuition grant program. In 1947 the
Louisiana state board of education permitted the establishment of a
law school at all-black Southern University in Baton Rouge.45 In a
similar 1945 case in South Carolina, the state legislature authorized
the single black state-supported college to create law and medical
departments. After a July 1946 federal district court ruling that a
black applicant must receive legal training in the state, the South
Carolina legislature created a law school of three professors at South
Carolina State College for Negroes.46
In Kentucky Gov. Simeon Willis first reacted by creating in
1945 an investigative body on Kentucky blacks. Willis ordered the
Commission on Negro Affairs to "study all the facts and conditions re-
lating to the economic, education, housing, health and other needs for
the betterment of Negro citizens of Kentucky."47 Black leaders Charles
Anderson, Dr. Maurice F. Rabb of Louisville, and W.H. Perry Jr. from
the KNEA led the interracial commission in analyzing the social and
economic status of Kentucky blacks. Assisted by interracial advisory
committees named by the commission, the group found that racial
segregation hampered blacks in all areas of life except voting. The
commission's final report made recommendations in the six areas of
housing, welfare, education, economics, civil affairs, and health. The
report's authors hoped it would help in the long term to mitigate the ef-
fects of racial discrimination. In its recommendations, the commission
did not ask for the complete destruction of segregation but proposed
carefully framed modifications that would permit blacks to exercise
their rights and somehow cope with a racially segregated Kentucky. It
was unclear from commission proceedings whether its black members
agreed with these conclusions.
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The commission's education subcommittee examined the seg-
regated education provided to Kentucky blacks and found it unequal
to that provided to whites. The subcommittee also recognized that
blacks no longer accepted the poor quality and insufficient quantity of
their education. Particularly egregious was the inequality existing at
the level of higher education. For example, Kentucky State offered
two degrees—bachelor of arts and bachelor of science—with fifteen
majors. The University of Kentucky offered whites eleven under-
graduate and professional degrees. In most of the degree programs
students had a wide choice of majors within the divisions of the uni-
versity.
The commission also ranked Kentucky below the neighboring
states of Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia in 1945-46 annual
state expenditures per black college student. Tennessee spent
$500,000 for 1,000 students, or $500 per student, while Kentucky al-
located $150,000 for 426 students, or $352 per student. West Virginia
spent twice as much as Kentucky—$621,500 for 803 students—and
Virginia appropriated more than three times as much—$1,196,740
for 1,121 students. Another state, Oklahoma, operated a segregated
black college and had a black population ratio approximating
Kentucky's 7.2 percent but spent more than twice as much—
$373,000 for 460 students.48 To summarize, the commissioners hoped
fiscal disparities between black and white education would disappear
when "Kentuckians allow[ed] their consciences and not their fear[s],
to dictate public policies in education."49
In this context the commission admitted that Kentucky offered
graduate education to the public with "the exception of the Negro
people."50 The report's authors sidestepped the question of that day's
racial exclusion by saying that the issue must be "faced at some
future time."51 Until then, the commission said, Kentucky State
should improve its undergraduate courses, and graduate courses at
the University of Kentucky should be made "available without dis-
tinction of race," a proposal that implied an eventual black admission
to the university.52
As had happened with the earlier Gaines Committee report,
legislator indifference to the commission's report marginalized its
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significance, Charles Anderson, who was the sole black legislator in
the General Assembly, did not have enough political clout to gain
passage of the bills necessary to remove Kentucky's de jure color
line. Moreover, the report's release on 1 November 1945, only a few
days before the general election, limited the possibility that its con-
clusions would enter the political debate.
The report exposed continuing dissatisfaction with the dual
system of higher education. In the editorial "Kentucky Must Make a
Choice," the Courier-Journal argued that either white colleges must
accept blacks or Kentucky must spend vast sums on the equalization
of Kentucky State.53 The dean of the University of Kentucky's gradu-
ate school also admitted that the choices had narrowed to two: "a dual
system of professional and graduate schools at considerable more ex-
pense, or [the admission of] Negro students to existing courses."54 No
longer disagreeing as they had in the 1938 merger controversy and
the Eubanks case, black leaders Charles Anderson and R.B. Atwood
both supported the report's key education recommendations.55
In the midst of this debate, Gov. Simeon Willis appointed a
black Republican and loyal supporter, Onis M. Travis of Lexington,
to the State Board of Education.56 Travis, a past member of the
Republican State Central Committee, became the first black invited
to enter the political structure at the state appointive level. Although
his appointment was a political reward, it symbolized the accumulat-
ing social and political power of the board over black education. The
board supervised all public elementary and secondary schools and,
since 1938, Kentucky State and West Kentucky Vocational School.
Travis's appointment also came when black votes had contributed
significantly to the election of Republican Willis to the governorship.
Although Travis's moderation on race issues qualified him for
such a visible political appointment, other blacks pressed for renew-
ing the struggle against all racial discrimination laws and overt prac-
tices. Indeed, they experienced continual reminders of the strident
and uncivil character of Kentucky's antiblack temperament. One
such reminder occurred in August 1945 when three black WACS
were beaten by a white mob in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, near Fort
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Knox. After military authorities were summoned and arrested the
black women, they were acquitted of violating military rules and
quickly transferred from the area. The incident reminded Kentucky
blacks that violent racists ignored both the rule of law and the state's
alleged racial civility. Undeterred by such incidents, Kentucky black
activists continued their legal and political attacks against racial seg-
regation.57
Black activist Lyman T. Johnson taught at Louisville Central
High School after earning a master's degree in history from the
University of Michigan in 1933. With his preparation and experience,
Johnson felt himself equipped for a role beyond that of high school
history and government teacher. He joined the Louisville NAACP
branch and the attack against Kentucky segregation laws and tradi-
tions.58
In his 1948-49 term as NAACP branch president, Johnson qui-
etly sought another individual suitable for participation in a case that
would again test the Day Law. An unnamed Louisville black woman
agreed to apply at the University of Louisville in March 1948.59
According to Johnson, she withdrew from the project after the
Louisville Defender revealed that the NAACP had supported her en-
rollment. The untimely publicity and her withdrawal pressured the
Louisville branch of the NAACP not to pursue the project as planned.
As the Louisville branch of the NAACP contemplated its next
action against segregation, local black political leadership unexpect-
edly changed. In the fall of 1947, Charles Anderson abruptly declined
to run for another term in the state legislature. His refusal apparently
derived from the growing impatience of the Louisville black commu-
nity and press and from their charges that the representative had
failed in the 1944 and 1946 sessions to weaken the state's segregation
laws.60 Under such criticism, Anderson accepted an appointment as
the first black assistant Commonwealth's Attorney (prosecutor) in
Jefferson County, Kentucky.
In the 1947 primary election, voters in the forty-second House
district turned to Dennis Henderson, a graduate of Howard University
Law School and a partner in the Ray and Henderson Law Agency.
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Following his election in November, he persuaded Charles Anderson
to chair a local citizen advisory committee organized to propose anti-
segregation bills. This action expanded community involvement in
the antisegregation law campaign.61
In the same election Earle C. Clements became Kentucky's
governor. Clements and Clarence L. Timberlake, black educator and
president of West Kentucky Vocational School, had maintained a
long and cordial relationship, and, although Timberlake's influence
on Clements cannot be measured, Timberlake intimated that
Clements's "moderate" racial views resulted from their long friend-
ship.62 Even so, Clements did not move quickly to end racial discrim-
ination. Timberlake's covert attempt to persuade Clements to end
segregation was not immediately successful.
Instead, Clements was governed by his conviction that most
Kentucky whites, notwithstanding the Gaines decision and the 1945
Commission on Negro Affairs recommendations, remained firmly and
publicly opposed to desegregation of all schools, public accommoda-
tions, and housing. Clements, who later claimed that he privately sup-
ported school desegregation, acquiesced in the conventional white
view that de jure racial segregation should not be ended immediately.
Ultimately, he did respond to the desegregation tide when national liti-
gation forced all Kentucky white politicians to accede to important
changes in the Day Law that led to its dissolution. Yet, black and white
Kentucky politicians refused to address head-on that Supreme Court-
approved foundation of Kentucky's racially segregated schools and
colleges. Clements changed his public position, as did others, when
court rulings mandated a softening of the color line. Racial segrega-
tion in education was a product born of law and sustained by the social
accommodation by blacks and whites; its demise arrived via the same
paths.
Desegregated but Still
Separate, 1949-1954
THROUGH 1947 THE STRUGGLE of Kentucky blacks to
achieve truly equal higher education had been stalemated by legal
and legislative counter-measures. Litigation to remove race as a basis
of admission to the University of Kentucky ended in defeat. Attempts
by civil rights activists to repeal the Day Law itself failed as confu-
sion among their ranks developed and unity among their opponents
prevailed.
In 1948 approaches to breaking this deadlock seemed to
promise frustration again to blacks. If they did nothing, they ap-
peared to support segregated education. If they again fought segre-
gation laws through the courts, another volunteer test case would be
needed; and that volunteer's education might be delayed in the re-
newed effort to reach a distant and uncertain legal victory. In the in-
terim, whites could either pressure the individual to abandon the
lawsuit or erect new segregated facilities. To surmount these barri-
ers, blacks might make another direct attempt to repeal the Day Law.
Each choice, in its own way, centered on desegregating Kentucky
education. If any one plan succeeded in making desegregated educa-
tion a reality, other areas of society could be pressured to make simi-
lar transformations.
Some courageous blacks, with covert white support, fought
school segregation in their own ways. In the eastern Kentucky town
of Lynch, black educator John V. Coleman headed an integrated high
school of ten black and fifteen white teachers during the last decade
of the Day Law. Although it is not clear why the school district was
willing to violate the Day Law, it may have been that the obvious
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financial saving to poor white and black taxpayers by operating a
single high school made the risk worthwhile. In another case, Berea
blacks used white school facilities by sneaking in when someone—a
friendly staff member—turned off the lights. Once inside, blacks par-
ticipated in classes or other activities. Mindful of the potential prose-
cution of both the school district and the college, the participants
avoided publicizing these practices.1
While some Kentucky blacks and whites resisted the law di-
rectly, subtle changes in the demography of Kentucky black commu-
nities added momentum for change. Since 1930 Kentucky blacks
had been moving away from rural areas and establishing stronger
urban communities. In the 1940 census, seven of thirteen Kentucky
communities of more than 10,000 persons had black communities of
10 percent or more. Louisville had 47,210 blacks in a total popula-
tion of 319,077.2 The presence of growing black communities pres-
sured local and state governments to provide both more and better
schools for Kentucky blacks. Black voters continued the established
tradition of voting for candidates who supported their educational
concerns. With the appointment of blacks Onis M. Travis to the
State Board of Education and Clarence L. Timberlake to the
Kentucky Textbook Commission, state politicians made overt but
measured gestures to black voters for educational reform. This was
also true for governors Simeon Willis and Earle Clements, who
named blacks to state regulatory boards. Although Kentucky whites
remained in the majority, these appointments put black educators in
key positions to articulate and implement black community demands
for truly equal education.
As a result of these appointments, the state legislature was chal-
lenged by Louisville's black community to end racial segregation. It
took advantage of its sizable professional class of teachers, politi-
cians, and attorneys to coordinate a new attack on the Day Law.
Marshaling its resources and drawing on other experiences in fighting
segregation and racial discrimination, the Louisville black commu-
nity encouraged its state representative Dennis Henderson to file
three bills in the 1948 regular legislative session addressing civil
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rights for blacks. The first bill established exceptions in the Day Law
to permit blacks to attend white graduate and professional schools.
The second allowed black nurses to take their training with white
nurses at hospitals whose governing boards approved. The third and
perhaps most unusual allowed blacks to try on clothing in department
stores without being required to buy all the clothes tried on.3
The graduate school exemption and the department store bill
were rejected by the legislature because they produced immediate
changes in racial practices. The narrowly defined and less-threatening
nursing school bill, however, passed. For the first time since 1904,
limited biracial education was legal in Kentucky. Because the law
shifted the burden of introducing desegregated education to hospital
governing boards, white legislators passed legislation that allowed
Kentucky blacks to receive medical education in the private, white
nursing schools and not at public expense or under public control.
This provision removed the ultimate responsibility for desegregation
from the legislature and Governor Clements, who did not veto the bill
and later took credit for its passage.4
As the statute took effect, desegregation efforts elsewhere cre-
ated discomfort within other prosegregation state governments. An
Oklahoma case centered on the fight of Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher to
gain admission to the University of Oklahoma Law School. Ignoring
her academic credentials, the university barred her on the basis of
race.5 Her attorneys then petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
require the law school to admit her. When that body rejected her peti-
tion because she had failed to ask for separate but equal legal train-
ing, her lawyers appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Using social science data, findings of the President's
Commission on Higher Education, and studies completed by Gunnar
Myrdal and others, the Supreme Court ruled that Fisher's legal edu-
cation was to begin immediately. Following announcement of the de-
cision on 12 January 1948, Fisher requested immediate admission to
the law school during its winter term beginning 29 January. At this
point the Oklahoma legislature intervened to establish a separate
black law school in the state capital's law library through the govern-
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ing board of black Langston University. Undaunted, Fisher's
attorneys pointed to the obvious academic deficiencies of the
"Langston University Law School" and called the legislature's action
contrary to the Supreme Court order.6
The NAACP lawyers then argued that inferior education pro-
vided under segregation had become the central issue.7 Fisher there-
fore had not received immediate admission to a superior law school
at the University of Oklahoma as suggested by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Equivocation and legal subterfuge nominally provided her
with "equality of educational opportunity," but it was hardly equal to
that afforded whites.8
As Fisher and her attorneys struggled against Oklahoma's de-
fenses of segregation, governors of nine southern states—including
Kentucky—agreed to prevent similar cases by developing a higher
education consortium called the Southern Regional Compact. It would
permit member states to provide joint separate but equal graduate and
professional facilities for blacks while keeping existing state universi-
ties for whites only. The compact's initial project focused on the pur-
chase, with federal funds, of the financially strapped Meharry Medical
College in Nashville, Tennessee, for use as a regional black medical
school. Meharry, a privately operated black medical school since
1879, had incurred such heavy debts that some external support had
become necessary for it to remain open.9 Kentucky participated in the
planning conference for the compact. Lt. Gov. Lawrence Wetherby at-
tended and concurred in the majority's plans to maintain racial segre-
gation with the aid of federal funds.10
The board of education of the Methodist Episcopal Church
(South), which had originally established Meharry but no longer pro-
vided direct financial support, opposed this plan because it would
create a separate educational system for blacks in medical educa-
tion—an area of constant failure in southern higher education sys-
tems. Nashville black leaders and black newspaper editors across the
country also criticized the proposal for the same reason.11 Kentucky
blacks would be immediately affected because of the 1948 law that
permitted biracial nursing education.
Above left, Clarence Timberlake, president of West Kentucky Vocational School for
Colored Persons (Timberlake Papers, Forrest G. Pogue Special Collections, Murray
State University Archives). Above right, John H. Jackson, president of State Normal
School for Colored Persons from 1886 to 1898 and Kentucky Normal and Industrial
Institute for Colored Persons from 1907 to 1910 (photo from the Kentucky Headlight;
courtesy of Kentucky Historical Society). Below, Normal School students with Profes-
sor Paul William Lawless Jones (standing, right) in 1913 (photo by Gretter Studio,
Frankfort; courtesy of Kentucky Historical Society)
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Above, the instructional buildings on the main campus of the Normal School in 1916
(photo by Gretter; courtesy of Kentucky Historical Society). Below, President Rufus B.
Atwood with 1931 Kentucky State College graduates (photo by Cusick; courtesy of
Kentucky Historical Society)
Above, Kentucky State Industrial College Orchestra in 1931 (photo by Cusick; courtesy
of Kentucky Historical Society). Below, domestic science class at the Normal School,
circa 1900-1906 (photo by Gretter; courtesy of Kentucky Historical Society)
Above, the first graduating class of Kentucky State
Normal School for Colored Persons, 1890 (cour-
tesy of Kentucky State University-Blazer Library
Photographic Archives). Left, William J. Simmons,
president of State University and founder of
Eckstein Norton Institute, 1888 (from Simmons
Bible College Records, University of Louisville
Archives). Below, Panoramic view of Kentucky
State Normal School main campus, circa 1910
(courtesy of Kentucky State University-Blazer Li-
brary Photographic Archives)
Above left, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and President Rufus B. Atwood in 1957 at the
Kentucky State College Commencement. Above right, Green Pinckney Russell, presi-
dent of Kentucky Normal and Industrial Institute, 1914-1923 and 1924-1929 (both cour-
tesy of Kentucky State University-Blazer Library Photographic Archives). Below, Presi-
dent Charles Parrish (standing at right) in front of State University's Citizen's National
Hospital, 1525 Jefferson Street in Louisville (from Simmons Bible College Records,
University of Louisville Archives)
Above left, Lyman T. Johnson. Above right, Dr. Rufus E. Clement, dean of Louisville
Municipal College, 1931-1936 (both from Louisville Municipal College Files, Univer-
sity of Louisville Archives). Below, President Charles H. Parrish (center front row) with
Simmons University graduating class, year unknown (from Simmons Bible College
Records, University of Louisville Archives)
Above, President Charles Parrish (second row center) with Simmons University Band,
year unknown (Simmons Bible College Records, University of Louisville). Below, Lou-
isville Municipal College library, 1937, with librarian Hortense H. Young in the back-
ground (Louisville Municipal College Files, University of Louisville Archives)
Above, Steward Hall, Simmons University and Louisville Municipal College, 1973 (photo
by the author). Below, a wide-angle view of Artelia Anderson Hall, West Kentucky
Industrial College, 1983 (photo by Richard Holland; courtesy of Kentucky Heritage
Council)
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On 19 May 1948 the U.S. Senate rejected a bill funding the
compact and the purchase of Meharry Medical College.12 This defeat
encouraged blacks to renew their attack on the Day Law.
Since the 1945 failure of the Eubanks case, the only attack on
the Day Law had been the Louisville NAACP's attempt to enroll a
black graduate student at the University of Louisville. As indicated
earlier, this endeavor failed after the student's name appeared in the
Louisville Defender and such unwelcome publicity dissuaded her
from the attempt to enroll.13
According to Lyman Johnson, the branch could not find another
candidate who had both sufficient academic preparation and intellec-
tual fortitude to challenge the law. When the membership asked
Johnson, as branch president, to undertake the challenge himself, after
some hesitation he agreed.14
Johnson made formal application to the doctoral program in
history at the University of Kentucky.15 After he had submitted the
proper application forms and transcripts, the university registrar in-
formed him, "Our policy is pretty well defined. We are prohibited by
both State law and the State constitution from accepting the registra-
tion of a Negro."16 On appeal to the university's trustees, Johnson
was again denied admission. Local lawyers hired by the Louisville
NAACP sought relief for Johnson in the federal district court at
Lexington. Like the earlier desegregation efforts, Johnson's attempt
forced the university administration and the Kentucky attorney gen-
eral's office to act in concert to resist desegregation. The defendants
were compelled to address the issue of graduate and professional
education for blacks, as the 1939 Gaines Commission and the 1945
Commission on Negro Affairs had predicted. Although out-of-state
tuition grants provided nominal educational opportunities to
Kentucky blacks, they plainly violated the intent of the Gaines deci-
sion. After the filing of Johnson's suit, the university trustees asked
the State Board of Education, which also served as the governing
board of Kentucky State, to establish through the university another
separate but equal graduate program on the Kentucky State
campus.17
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Although Gov. Earle Clements privately expressed his doubts
about this project, Atty. Gen. Arvin E. Funk, University of Kentucky
president Herman L. Donovan, and most State Board of Education
members promoted it as a workable solution to the problem of pro-
viding black graduate education without violating the Day Law.18
Again, Kentucky followed other southern states that had begun to
devote significant funds to the creation of jim crow graduate pro-
grams.19
Unlike the 1939-40 graduate courses at Kentucky State, the
1948 graduate offerings operated under joint Kentucky State-
University of Kentucky administrative control and could lead to a
graduate degree. To carry out the plan, President Donovan of the uni-
versity and the State Board of Education signed an agreement on
13 July 1948 to create a joint Kentucky State-University of Kentucky
graduate program. The program required black graduate students to
enroll at Kentucky State and to take their classes separately from
white University of Kentucky students or in special sessions on the
Kentucky State campus. Pressured by its advocates to supply funds
for the venture, Governor Clements released forty-five thousand dol-
lars from the Governor's Emergency Fund. With this funding,
Attorney General Funk proclaimed that the plan would eventually
develop "the best colored university in the nation."20
Funk's optimism notwithstanding, Kentucky black leaders re-
mained skeptical. Albert E. Meyzeek, successor to O.M. Travis and
the second black on the State Board of Education, publicly de-
nounced the plan as "fantastic and unworkable" and voted against
it.21 In September 1948 Meyzeek contended that any advanced degree
from Kentucky State under this plan would be a "joke" and he urged
that black school principals not hire anyone with such a credential.22
Lyman T. Johnson, whose attempted enrollment and lawsuit had pres-
sured state agencies to enact the Kentucky State-University of
Kentucky program, claimed that the state deliberately lied when it
claimed that the plan provided separate but equal facilities.23
In reality, Kentucky's provision of black higher education was
not equal, nor even adequate. White students consistently had more
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educational opportunities. At this time they could choose among five
publicly supported colleges and fifteen private colleges, whereas
blacks attended one public and one municipal college, neither one
providing graduate degrees. Although the state appropriations per
student at Kentucky State in 1949-50 were higher than at the state
university—due in part to the Kentucky State-University of
Kentucky program—blacks were still denied complete in-state
graduate and professional degree programs.24
This statutory exclusion of blacks from better-equipped white
colleges also forced the Kentucky State administration to deny ad-
mission to whites on the basis of race. In a peculiar 1948 incident,
President Atwood refused admission to the college's first white appli-
cant on the grounds that a white student, under Kentucky's Day Law,
could not be educated with black students. In this instance Atwood
concluded that racial segregation under the Day Law must apply to
whites and blacks alike.25
While Kentucky struggled with the Johnson suit and its
makeshift graduate program for blacks, another lawsuit, one similar
to that of Ada Sipuel Fisher's, attracted national interest. Heman
Marion Sweatt sued the Board of Regents of the University of Texas
Law School because he had been refused admission to it. Sweatt's
suit traveled a path similar to Johnson's. Sweatt's argument too fo-
cused on the denial of due process as guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment. His attorneys argued that limiting him to at-
tendance at a hastily established three-room law school in Houston
under Prairie View Agricultural and Mechanical College for Negroes
would violate his constitutional right to equal treatment under the
law. Sweatt contended that the black law school was certainly not
the equivalent of the white University of Texas Law School. After he
lost his suit in the Texas courts, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.26
Meanwhile, Lyman Johnson's attorneys pursued his case at the
federal district court level in Kentucky while the Louisville branch
and the state conference of the NAACP solicited funds and public
support for his legal expenses.27 The campaign for funds followed
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internal disputes between the Louisville NAACP branch, the state
conference, and national office lawyers concerning which case to
support. Walter White, executive secretary of the NAACP, agreed
with Johnson that the bickering had to stop.28
Although blacks finally presented a united public stand on
Johnson's case, the Louisville branch also experienced internal con-
flict over legal personnel. Robert Carter, NAACP assistant special
counsel, wrote in his personal notes on 23 February 1949 that James
Crumlin and Alfred Carroll, both of whom had participated in the
early stages of the case, "seemed very much embittered because they
were afraid that the case would be taken out of their hands."29 Their
bitterness came in the wake of the procedural mistakes made by the
national office legal team several years earlier in the Eubanks case.
Also, removal of the case from their hands would suggest incompe-
tence. In any event, this was a case that the black community would
watch closely and that Crumlin and Carroll both had wanted.
Carter also had to contend with the suspicions of the Louisville
branch that the national NAACP intended to delay or forgo Johnson's
appeal in favor of the Fisher and Sweatt cases, which covered the
same ground.30 Carter convinced the Louisville branch's legal redress
committee during a February 1949 visit that the national NAACP
would support the Johnson case if the branch membership allocated
at least five thousand dollars, which was needed to defray appeals
costs. Lyman Johnson argued that Carter wanted the branch to sup-
port the Fisher and Sweatt cases only.31 After Carter left the meeting,
the Louisville branch membership voted to support the Johnson liti-
gation with or without national NAACP support. Its first step was the
formal appointment of James Crumlin as the local attorney in
charge.32
Soon the Louisville Association of Teachers in Colored
Schools and the KNEA voted to collect thirteen hundred of the five
thousand dollars needed for the prosecution of the case.33 Johnson
reported other contributions from the local community, and the
Louisville Defender began to publish weekly tallies of funds raised.34
Given this financial support, NAACP attorneys Thurgood Marshall
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and Robert Carter agreed to pursue the case, and the legal team of
Marshall, Crumlin, and Carter began to develop its strategies and
arguments.
The most crucial argument focused on the "equivalent" gradu-
ate courses offered on the Kentucky State campus by University of
Kentucky faculty. Although many black graduate students were given
the out-of-state tuition grants, Robert Carter found only four who had
been permitted to use the Kentucky State-University of Kentucky
graduate school arrangement. Low black participation showed that
blacks had suspicions about the motives behind the Kentucky
State-University of Kentucky graduate program.35
Their doubts were confirmed when black graduate students
who had accepted out-of-state tuition grants were required to sign
waivers affirming that they had declined to attend Kentucky's "sepa-
rate but equal" graduate school, therefore strengthening the state's
legal position should these students decide to sue. On 5 April 1949
Robert Carter advised them not to sign the waiver and, if they were
denied additional state grants, to present themselves for enrollment at
the university in the next term.36 The NAACP's advice was a part of
the tactic by which blacks would "flood" white colleges. Advocated
by James Nabrit, dean of Howard University Law School, that strat-
egy was the same one employed against segregation in other southern
states.37
The experiences of black graduate and professional students
who participated in this plan fulfilled Meyzeek's original prediction
of the plan's unworkability. The first law school student under the
plan, John Wesley Hatch, suffered a difficult first semester. Initially,
the University of Kentucky had hired eight law professors to teach
black law students at Kentucky State. However, the professors them-
selves agreed to teach such students at the State Law Library in the
state capitol, two miles from the campus. Given the absence of public
transit for blacks, transportation to classes was difficult for Hatch. As
he struggled to meet the standards of a first-year law curriculum,
Hatch's legal studies became controversial when the eight faculty
members resigned in protest, claiming that the jim crow law school
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threatened the accreditation of the university's white law school.38 To
replace them, the university hired four Frankfort attorneys. Hatch
thus had to adjust to new teachers with four weeks left in the term.39
President Atwood objected to the hirings because the original con-
tract required regular University of Kentucky faculty.40 Nevertheless,
the university, the State Board of Education, and the attorney gen-
eral's office maintained that they provided a separate but equal grad-
uate education for blacks as required by the Supreme Court.41
The Hatch controversy did not impede the Johnson case. On
20 October 1948 the thrust of the Johnson case became more pre-
cise.42 Johnson, as plaintiff, had to prove that Kentucky did not pro-
vide equal educational opportunity for a black person interested in
completing a Ph.D. in history within the state.43
The University of Kentucky and the State Board of Education
had failed to duplicate the university's graduate school programs, as
they had the law school program, for blacks. The joint graduate
school programs of Kentucky State and the University of Kentucky
enrolled only eleven students from 1948 to 1950.44 Unable to deny
sparse enrollments and a paucity of funding for graduate courses, the
university failed to prove that its graduate program offered equivalent
educational opportunities for blacks. Depositions by University of
Kentucky history professor Thomas Clark and university registrar
Maurice Seay provided powerful evidence of the meagerness of the
university offerings for blacks.45
Significantly, Johnson's attorneys had prepared one and one-
half days of testimony from expert witnesses, including professors
John Hope Franklin of Howard University and Goodwin Watson of
Columbia University, to sustain the plaintiff's contentions.46 But the
commonwealth's own defense witnesses provided sufficient evidence
for the plaintiff's case so that Johnson's attorneys rested their case
and moved for summary judgment for the plaintiff.47
Shortly thereafter, on 30 March 1949, Judge H. Church Ford
ruled in favor of plaintiff Johnson. Ford concluded that Johnson had
not received an equal education opportunity and had been denied due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. His ruling, however, did
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not nullify the Day Law. If or when the state of Kentucky created a
black graduate school equal to the one at the University of Kentucky,
blacks would be required to seek initial admission at such a school.
Until then, the University of Kentucky graduate school must admit
qualified black applicants.48
Johnson's legal victory might have been transitory at best. The
University of Kentucky board of trustees voted to appeal the decision
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which was headed by a Kentucky-bom
chief justice, Fred Moore Vinson.49 One trustee, Judge Edward C.
O'Rear, demanded that Gov. Earle Clements convene a special session
of the legislature to appropriate funds for the establishment of a black
university equal to the University of Kentucky. O'Rear's passionate
oratory almost led to a physical confrontation with Clements, who had
not opposed the university's desegregation.50
Another trustee, Judge Richard Stoll, originally an opponent of
black admissions at the university, sensed the dangerous volatility of
the issue and persuaded other trustees to vote again. Given the explo-
sive nature of this challenge to the university's policy, they reconsid-
ered and decided not to appeal the ruling.51
The trustees' acceptance of black enrollments signaled the end
of segregated higher education in Kentucky. Although some scholars
suggest that the Johnson case had minor influence on the dissolution
of southern school segregation, the case powerfully affected
Kentucky.52 It produced immediate results: blacks enrolled at the
University of Kentucky. Atty. Gen. Arvin E. Funk and University of
Kentucky president Herman L. Donovan no longer used the separate
but equal argument to exclude black graduate students, and blacks
began to undermine the racist premises underlying the Day Law by
sharing education with whites in the best-equipped public college in
the state.
The Johnson victory also exposed as a falsehood "equal higher
educational opportunity" in Kentucky. Within segregated Kentucky
higher education, qualified whites'could live in the state and at moder-
ate cost complete all requirements for both undergraduate and gradu-
ate degrees. Equally qualified blacks had to go elsewhere to establish
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residency in a state that did not subsidize black nonresident tuition and
board. If these black students could acquire most of the tuition, board,
and other fees, the state of Kentucky would provide three hundred dol-
lars per black graduate student per year with the notion that this was
somehow equivalent to the support provided Kentucky whites.
Ironically, most of the institutions attended by the Kentucky black
graduate students had better academic facilities, programs, and repu-
tations than those available in the state to Kentucky whites.53
A section of the judge's decision declared that Kentucky's
blacks and whites would receive the same level of graduate education
only if the state built an all-black university equivalent to the
University of Kentucky. This idea received no support from
Governor Clements, his successors, or the state legislature. The only
alternative, then, was to permit blacks to enroll for graduate educa-
tion at the University of Kentucky.54
The Johnson victory also laid the groundwork for a later
Paducah case that nearly overturned the Day Law. Joseph S.
Freeland, a white Paducah NAACP attorney, wrote Thurgood
Marshall in August 1949 requesting a copy of the original complaint
filed by Johnson's attorneys against the university. Freeland's request
came after the Paducah branch of the NAACP authorized him "to
prepare suit against the [Paducah Junior College] authorities on
behalf of a negro student who desires to attend the institution."55 The
Paducah Junior College case became especially important as
Kentucky blacks continued to pressure Kentucky to end its racial seg-
regation.
The Johnson case and the attendant makeshift graduate school
at Kentucky State also induced some Kentucky whites to make public
their views on desegregation. Harry Best, professor of sociology at
the University of Kentucky, wrote to the New York Times on
2 September 1948 advocating repeal of the Day Law and urging
black admissions to the university. In a contradictory statement, he
claimed that his proposal would not violate the Day Law. He also
believed blacks should be less insistent in demanding admission to
white colleges and universities. Blacks should pursue desegregation
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only at those institutions willing to desegregate.56 Best's contradic-
tory proposals, although moving at least some distance from the in-
transigence of segregation defenders, elicited little support from
whites and even less from blacks.
With white schools declining to voluntarily desegregate,
Louisville's black leadership conferred with University of Louisville
officials. A committee that included black leaders Albert E. Meyzeek
and I. Willis Cole met with white University of Louisville trustee
Fred H. Willkie and Pres. John W. Taylor in September 1948. The
meeting concerned black higher education and other matters "per-
taining to the advancement of the race in these parts."57 Although no
immediate changes in University of Louisville policies resulted, the
successful prosecution of the Johnson case generated an aggressive-
ness in the Louisville NAACP and the black professional class.58 The
same black leadership, while supporting black candidates for the city
board of education, also fought to desegregate city parks, housing,
public accommodations, and libraries.59
After Johnson and the NAACP celebrated their victory, the
effort to realize its benefits became the next crucial step. Thirty-one
blacks enrolled in the University of Kentucky graduate school in the
1949 summer term were confronted with on-campus racial discrimi-
nation, including separate dining and library arrangements. Asst.
Atty. Gen. Marvin B. Holifield announced that the federal court
ruling permitting Johnson and other blacks to attend the university
did not invalidate the section of the Day Law requiring separate
classroom instruction.60 Responding to this threat of segregation's
social reimposition, Johnson and his fellow students refused to use
the separate dining areas. Subsequently, seventeen crosses were
burned on the campus during the summer term as traditional re-
minders of white racist displeasure at the black presence; only one
of the burnings received any publicity.61 Despite this intimidation
and questioning of Lyman Johnson afterward by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the small band of black graduate students attended
their classes and the term ended quietly; black matriculation at the
University of Kentucky had been achieved.62
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With the success of the University of Kentucky case still fresh,
Louisville black leaders and the NAACP branch set out to desegre-
gate (among other facilities) their original target, the University of
Louisville. The university president, John W. Taylor, argued in May
1949 that until there was a reversal of the 1908 Berea decision, the
university must refuse black applicants.63
Debating this public posture internally, University of Louisville
trustees struggled to determine their own position on the desegrega-
tion question. Confronted with a possible lawsuit against the univer-
sity similar to that of Lyman Johnson's, the trustees had three
choices. They could desegregate, they could resist desegregation
using the Day Law as a rationale, or they could delay until the white
community's reactions crystallized.64 Finally, the university opted to
delay desegregation pending resolution of the legal questions. One
University of Louisville trustee, Wilson Wyatt, argued that the uni-
versity, as a private institution, should admit blacks despite the Day
Law. His motion was defeated.65 Instead, trustees approved Rogers
Morton's proposal that the university publicly endorse desegregation,
exclude blacks per the Day Law, and invite a test case. Such a case
did not occur, however, because the university failed to cite race as a
reason for rejecting a black student.66 Simultaneously, Louisville
NAACP activists and University of Louisville trustees discussed
changes in the Day Law that could be proposed to the 1950 session of
the General Assembly.67
Meanwhile, University of Louisville faculty began to urge the
trustees to drop their reliance on the Day Law as the basis for exclud-
ing blacks. After six meetings and the submission of a petition sup-
porting black enrollments, signed by forty-five of the three hundred
University of Louisville faculty, the trustees still refused to admit
blacks, claiming that the legal questions remained unresolved.68 In re-
sponse, a committee of Louisville black leaders decided not to sue the
university but to go themselves to the trustees and, according to
Lyman Johnson, "see if a friendly adjustment of the situation could
be worked out."69 Johnson later maintained that he had orally threat-
ened the trustees with a legal battle if they did not consider a desegre-
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gation plan.70 Given five weeks by Johnson and the black committee
to study the issue, the trustees announced that the university would
"voluntarily desegregate" graduate schools in the 1950-51 academic
year and undergraduate programs in 1951-52.71
Meanwhile, several southern states had created new arrange-
ments for token black admissions to all-white state universities. For
example, the University of Arkansas, which had permitted a black
student to enroll in January 1948, admitted blacks to its graduate and
professional school programs starting in the fall 1948 term.72 Texas,
embroiled in litigation by Heman Marion Sweatt, allowed blacks to
attend the University of Texas if graduate programs could not be or-
ganized at the Texas State University for Negroes at Houston.73 The
state of Florida, entangled in litigation with five black graduate stu-
dents, permitted black enrollments at the University of Florida until
establishment of programs in law, pharmacy, and engineering at
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College for Negroes.74
In Kentucky, Gov. Earle Clements, who indirectly supported
Dennis Henderson's 1948 law permitting an exception to the Day
Law, did not oppose legislative efforts to introduce additional excep-
tions.75 Other white leaders also began to look on desegregation more
favorably. Among them were Barry Bingham, liberal Democratic
publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal, and James Hanratty, ma-
jority floor leader of the Kentucky House of Representatives. All,
however, expressed only the most cautious, qualified support for
future desegregation of Kentucky colleges.76
Blacks who held leadership positions occasionally attacked
white officials who continued to use the Day Law to uphold segre-
gated education. Among these black critics were Albert E. Meyzeek,
who voted against the Kentucky State-University of Kentucky
shared graduate school plan; James Crumlin, NAACP Louisville
branch vice president and civil rights attorney; and even R.B.
Atwood, who eventually criticized the graduate school arrangement
linking the University of Kentucky and Kentucky State. Their criti-
cisms were often provoked by white attempts to defend segregation
as a "southern tradition" to the neglect of the rule of law. Given this
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black censure, the strong black community support of the Johnson
case, and the mounting wave of litigation in other states, Kentucky
white civic and political leaders who had formerly supported segre-
gated schools began to revise their positions toward desegregation,
including modification or repeal of the Day Law.77
A sign of these changing attitudes appeared during meetings of
the Committee for Kentucky. Organized in 1943 by diverse statewide
labor, farming, and urban organizations, it served as a private, inter-
racial, economic development policy group and included President
Atwood and Frank Stanley, publisher of the Louisville Defender. As a
result of years of often-heated discussions about Kentucky's future,
the committee's final report recommended that the state desegregate
its public schools.78 The report did not by itself create immediate
change, but it, too, forced upon whites a public consideration of im-
minent changes in Kentucky's racial segregation traditions.
As the committee published its recommendations, Hortense
Young, a Louisville black activist and Republican politician, pro-
posed to Louisville Mayor Charles Famsley's Legislative Committee
that it offer in the 1950 General Assembly a bill amending the Day
Law. The bill as proposed would permit colleges in first-class cities,
such as Louisville, to accept qualified students for graduate, profes-
sional, or vocational training regardless of race.79
In the 1950 legislative session, the black state representative
from Louisville's Forty-Second House District, Jesse Lawrence, pro-
posed a law similar to Young's proposal, one amending the Day Law
to permit blacks to attend any institution if courses of equal quality
were not available at Kentucky State.80 Lawrence's bill passed,
50-16. Sponsored in the Senate by white Louisvillian Leon Shaikun,
the amended Day Law passed without debate with a 23-to-3 tally.
This dismantling of de jure segregation received quiet support from
Governor Clements. The bill did not affect desegregation at other
educational levels, and it left the responsibility for maintaining racial
segregation to individual colleges. The legislature simply allowed
each college to decide whether it wanted to desegregate, pro-
vided equivalent courses were not available at Kentucky State.
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Significantly, the legislature avoided any definition of what consti-
tuted courses "equivalent" to those at Kentucky State.81
As a result, Kentucky private and public colleges loosely inter-
preted the ambiguous provisions of the new law to desegregate their
campuses. Three Louisville Catholic colleges immediately opened
their doors to blacks, publicly citing an absence of theology courses
at Kentucky State as the reason. Berea College opened its doors
under pressure from the Citizens Committee for the Repeal of the
Day Law and the Berea Students for Democratic Actions, both
anti-Day Law organizations.82 Other Kentucky colleges, eager to be
seen as progressive, announced policies permitting black student ad-
missions. Nearly six hundred blacks later enrolled in Kentucky white
colleges before 1954.83
Although the 1950 law was more successful than Young origi-
nally expected, some whites continued their efforts to circumvent de-
segregation. Residual support of segregation appeared in 1950 when
the state became a member of the Southern Regional Compact, per-
mitting Kentucky to share educational resources with other southern
state governments. As mentioned earlier, the compact leaders pro-
posed the purchase of Meharry Medical College. Acquisition by the
compact member states of a regional, black medical school could pre-
vent blacks from enrolling in white medical schools. As a counter-
measure, publisher Frank Stanley of the Louisville Defender,
Representative Jesse Lawrence, and Charles Steele, of the Louisville
Urban League, lobbied for a state senate resolution that would forbid
the compact's use as a segregation tool against Kentucky blacks.
With the help of white Louisville legislators Leon Shaikun and
Sidney Baer, the effort succeeded.84
With white legislative support and no opposition from
Governor Clements, the modified Day Law escaped legal challenge.
While "testing the waters" for desegregation, it also permitted blacks
to matriculate at Kentucky white colleges that wanted to accept them.
Along with this momentum for change, the U.S. Supreme Court
issued on 5 June 1950 a ruling favorable to desegregation. In the
cases of Heman Marion Sweatt and George W. McLaurin, it said that
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universities and colleges, regardless of racial designation, must pro-
vide the same treatment for students and that special all-black gradu-
ate programs established to avoid desegregation were unequal to
those at white institutions.85 As a sidebar to this controversy, activists,
attorneys, and educators struggled to answer the question: Could an
"inferior" black college ever be equal to a "superior" white college?
Diverse academic programs and educator preferences complicated
the efforts by local, federal, and supreme courts to decide whether
black college programs were truly equal to their white counterparts.
On their own, eight white Kentucky colleges had already determined
that Kentucky State's curriculum was indeed different from but not
inferior to their own and promptly admitted blacks under the
amended Day Law.
With other private colleges admitting blacks, University of
Louisville trustees decided on 19 April 1950 to implement their deci-
sion to desegregate. Under this policy change, the Louisville
Municipal College closed in 1951, and its students enrolled at the
University of Louisville or Kentucky State.86 The closure of
Louisville Municipal produced a personnel controversy, however,
which continued until August 1951. At its center was the university's
plan to merge the student population of Louisville Municipal with
that of the main campus and fire the college's faculty with two
months' severance pay. The plan drew criticism from the Louisville
Municipal faculty and from the University of Louisville chapter of
the American Association of University Professors. Although non-
tenured faculty accepted the university's offer, tenured faculty ob-
jected. Sensing the university's hesitation to discuss their cases, the
four tenured faculty employed local black attorney Harry McAlpin to
represent their interests before the University of Louisville trustees.
After six months of private and public discussion of their up-
coming separation from the University of Louisville, two of the
tenured Louisville Municipal faculty members won a favorable reso-
lution of their cases. Dr. Charles Parrish Jr. accepted an appointment
as a University of Louisville "faculty advisor" to black students and
was permitted to teach elective courses in sociology. Dr. Charles
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Bright received a Ford Foundation Fellowship and one semester's pay
of nine hundred dollars. Professors George D. Wilson and Henry S.
Wilson refused the latter offer and continued to hold out for one
month's pay for each year of service, or thirteen thousand dollars,
each. Both men considered litigation as a solution.
Phillip Davidson, elected to the University of Louisville presi-
dency in 1951, proposed to end the stalemate at the 18 May 1951
trustees' meeting by compromising with the black faculty holdouts.
Reasoning that a long court battle might be detrimental to their per-
sonal interests and the process of desegregation, professors G.D.
Wilson and H.S. Wilson agreed to accept Davidson's offer of forty-
eight hundred dollars (one year's salary of University of Louisville
professors of equal rank) plus nine hundred dollars each. The univer-
sity also helped each to find employment elsewhere. George D.
Wilson obtained a teaching position at Kentucky State through
University of Louisville trustee Wilson Wyatt's personal contact with
Gov. Lawrence Wetherby. Henry S. Wilson worked briefly at a black
Louisville insurance company before accepting a teaching appoint-
ment in 1955 at a Louisville Catholic college.87
In these cases, university trustees used financial reasons to jus-
tify measured desegregation of University of Louisville, when a uni-
versity study revealed that local sentiment would not oppose it. The
majority of the trustees demonstrated an aversion to treating their
black students and faculty equitably. That disposition influenced local
black students, who often chose other in-state institutions for their
undergraduate education.88 As an alternative to the desegregated and
possibly hostile institutions, Kentucky State persisted as the college
that most specifically and amicably served the needs of the majority
of the state's black students.
Kentucky State came under legislative scrutiny and periodic
review, as did all public higher education. In order to discover the
system's true condition, the General Assembly's Committee on
Governmental Resources asked Dr. John D. Russell of the U.S.
Federal Security Agency to conduct a nonpartisan study. The study
team was charged to determine the prospects and needs of Kentucky
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public higher education without the political influence in college af-
fairs so characteristic of twentieth-century Kentucky education.
Using an out-of-state team of five researchers, the study team
reviewed each state college, including Kentucky State. In its report it
recommended that Kentucky State drop "for Negroes" from its offi-
cial name. It also recommended that Kentucky State have its own
board of regents, thus placing it on the same statutory level as other
state colleges. These recommendations, among others, received leg-
islative approval in 1952.89
These actions suggested a willingness by state education offi-
cials and legislators to significantly improve the status of Kentucky
State. Recognizing it as a peer of white public colleges and the
University of Kentucky laid the foundation for Kentucky State's
gradual acceptance as an equal institution of public higher education.
Although Kentucky State emerged as a public, independently
governed, four-year college in 1952, the state continued to designate
it informally as a state college reserved for blacks.90 Despite that em-
phasis, the amended Day Law of 1950 allowed eight of Kentucky's
forty historically white colleges and universities from 1950 to 1952
to enroll 456 blacks, including the 223 blacks merged into the
University of Louisville from Louisville Municipal.91
In 1952 overt resistance to desegregation in Kentucky higher
education remained strong at Paducah Junior College. This private
school, established in 1932 by Paducah whites, refused to admit
blacks on the grounds that the 1950 amended Day Law did not end
racial segregation. College administrators declared that they risked
prosecution if blacks were permitted to take courses equivalent to
those at West Kentucky Vocational School. Buoyed by Lyman
Johnson's victory over the University of Kentucky in March 1949,
Paducah black students Fred A. Wilson Jr. and Henry Lee Powell,
represented by Paducah NAACP attorney Joseph Freeland, sued the
college in November 1949 as they sought admission.92
A 1938 state law that had removed all collegiate courses from
West Kentucky Industrial and placed them at Kentucky State weak-
ened Paducah Junior College's defense.93 The successor to West
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Kentucky Industrial College, West Kentucky Vocational School of-
fered postsecondary vocational courses, none of which carried colle-
giate rank or resulted in certification. On 27 October 1950 federal
district judge Roy A. Shelburne affirmed the right of qualified black
students to attend Paducah Junior College on the grounds that the in-
stitution operated as a municipal college, that the failure to provide a
separate but equal college for blacks deprived them of the equal pro-
tection of the law, and that the Day Law did not provide adequate de-
fense for the college. Shelburne's decision effectively scuttled the
Day Law as a defense in similar cases. He did not, however, find the
act unconstitutional as the plaintiffs had hoped.94
After the order became public, plaintiffs Wilson and Powell re-
ceived draft notices from the Paducah draft board.95 Whether their
sudden draft status was coincidental or planned by whites opposed to
segregation is unclear. But Wilson and Powell's absence did not deter
Curlee Brown, a black Paducah NAACP member. Brown and attor-
ney Freeland found two other black Paducah college students,
Marion Wilson and Eloise Broady Ray, who sought admission to
Paducah Junior College in the fall 1951 term. The college refused
their applications based on its interpretation of the amended 1950
Day Law. Here the college dean and board of trustees decided simply
to ignore Judge Shelburne's order because it did not prescribe penal-
ties for noncompliance. Subsequently, Paducah NAACP attorneys re-
ceived permission from the federal district court, through Fred A.
Wilson, Jr. et. ah v. City of Paducah et. ah, for Wilson and Ray to in-
tervene.96
After hearing briefs from both sides, the U.S. District Court at
Paducah issued a mandatory injunction perpetually enjoining
Paducah Junior College from excluding qualified blacks.
Recognizing defeat, the city of Paducah withdrew from the case.
Nevertheless, in an attempt to continue resistance, Paducah Junior
College won an indefinite stay of judgment on 25 January 1952 until
the college appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals. After a year of waiting, the court of appeals upheld
Shelburne's order. The college, faced with a costly and probably
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futile appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, did not exercise its option to
appeal. On 9 June 1953 four blacks registered without incident for the
college's summer term.97
After two and one-half years of litigation, blacks had succeeded
in gaining admission to Paducah Junior College and expanding the
precedents against the Day Law's de jure segregation. Yet, the
amended Day Law continued as a bulwark of segregated elementary
and secondary schools. Opposition by blacks Jesse Lawrence, Frank
Stanley, and Charles Steele and by whites Leon Shaikun, Sidney
Baer, and others failed to nullify it. Although national NAACP attor-
neys warned Kentuckians to expect a decision favoring school deseg-
regation from the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1954 spring term, the
Kentucky General Assembly rejected a bill offered by Louisville
white legislators Thelma Stovall and Charles McCann that would
have simply repealed the 1950 amended Day Law.98
Continuing resistance to repeal implied that political and edu-
cation leaders were unsure of Kentucky whites' acceptance of the
prospect of public school desegregation. Governor Clements had not
interfered with token desegregation in 1948 and 1950; the succeeding
administration of Democratic governor Lawrence Wetherby had not
taken any major steps toward school desegregation. The experimen-
tal nature of the amended Day Law and the fear of opposition from
Kentucky whites constrained Wetherby to maintain the segregation
policy consistent with his 1948 approval of the Southern Regional
Compact's policies.
Wetherby's administration did obtain passage of the Minimum
Foundation Program for Kentucky Public Schools, a measure that in-
creased financial support for public elementary and secondary
schools.99 Superintendent of Public Instruction Wendell P. Butler later
argued that such legislation proved fortunate because it helped public
schools meet improvement and eventual desegregation costs.100
Given the continued white resistance, broad school desegrega-
tion did not come quickly to Kentucky. While Paducah Junior
College reluctantly enrolled its first blacks in 1953, the U.S. Supreme
Court studied the arguments and briefs of attorneys for Oliver Brown
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and twelve other black parents in Topeka, Kansas. They had filed suit
to overturn a Kansas law that permitted racial segregation in public
elementary and secondary schools. That case and three other school
segregation cases from South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware
became known collectively as Brown v. Board of Education. On
17 May 1954 the Supreme Court ruled for the plaintiffs in those
cases, declaring that "separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal" and that the plaintiffs had therefore been denied due process
of law.101
In a break with most southern governors, Governor Wetherby
issued a brief statement confirming the state's compliance with the
decision.102 U.S. Senator Earle Clements, formerly governor of
Kentucky, went one step further in his analysis. In an Omaha,
Nebraska, interview, he called the decision "a fine thing," a directive
that the state and the nation would obey. In addition, he believed that
Democrats rather than the Republican administration of President
Eisenhower should claim credit for it, since Democratic presidents
had appointed eight of the nine Supreme Court justices and the action
had begun during a Democratic administration.103
Clements's comments may have influenced Governor
Wetherby. Although there is no clear causal relationship, within a
week of Clements's statement, Wetherby established the Governor's
Advisory Committee on Education Desegregation "to advise the
state on problems ending segregation in public schools." Next, he
appointed two blacks to the committee: Rev. Homer Nutter of
Lexington and Earl Pruitt of Louisville.104 Wetherby's biographer
later argued that the governor's swift response reflected his true be-
liefs, previously hindered by the Day Law, and that his actions
helped Kentucky to integrate its schools "with little acrimony."
Wetherby's public support for desegregation ostensibly encouraged
the Kentucky State Board of Education to urge public school dis-
tricts to integrate their schools "as rapidly as conditions warrant."
Wetherby's turnabout was also demonstrated in his refusal to sign a
statement with other southern governors denouncing the ruling.
Kentucky became one of five states with segregated schools (the
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others were Maryland, Tennessee, Arkansas, and West Virginia)
whose governors refused to denounce desegregation.105
Following the lead that he and the State Board of Education of-
fered, several Kentucky schools began slowly to desegregate. Early
desegregation occurred in unexpected places. The public schools of
sparsely populated Wayne County, Kentucky, for example, began de-
segregation in the summer of 1954.106 In another surprise move, on
30 September 1954 Mrs. Geraldine Ogden, a Frankfort white, en-
rolled at Kentucky State after President Atwood announced that the
college would admit white students. Ogden, who needed one course
to complete her bachelor's degree at the University of Kentucky,
withdrew one week later, citing a job opportunity in Lexington.107
Later, Atwood urged other public institutions to reciprocate by admit-
ting qualified black students.
Shortly thereafter, in the October/November 1954 issue of the
Kentucky Teachers Association Journal, President Atwood extolled
the virtues of an integrated Kentucky State. Two of his 1954 notions
had remarkable accuracy as predictions of Kentucky State's future: it
should direct its energies to serving the academic needs of state work-
ers, and it should continue as a teacher education school. Both points
became key parts of the institution's mission in the 1960s and
1970s.108
President Atwood's comments attempted to create a future di-
rection for Kentucky State College, but he also recognized the whole
system's need for improvement. At the time of his article, Kentucky
ranked forty-seventh among the states in percentage of college-edu-
cated residents. Atwood also realized that desegregated colleges
meant keener competition for black students. In 1954 only the best-
prepared black students attended Kentucky's institutions, white or
black. Whites enrolling at Kentucky State challenged it to become a
more efficient college and academically competitive. On the other
hand, the enrollment of white Kentucky State students strengthened
Atwood's contention that it provided liberal arts curricula attractive
to whites, but the school still needed to transcend the jim crow image
fostered in the Day Law era. Kentucky State was therefore content to
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join a growing national trend among black colleges to aggressively
recruit white students.109 Briefly restated, desegregation meant the be-
ginning of a new era requiring a nonracial raison d'etre for Kentucky
State. With the desegregation of historically white colleges and uni-
versities, Kentucky blacks had a wide choice of colleges. As able as
he was to perceive the future, even Atwood could not predict the slow
pace of desegregation that followed the Brown decision.
The 1954 Brown ruling initiated a new period in race relations
in the United States. State laws requiring segregated education had
become unconstitutional. Public school administrators were com-
pelled to recognize that the "separate but equal" policy no longer had
judicial support or legal mandate.110 But the Supreme Court had not
specified in what ways black schools and colleges should be made
equal to white ones. Immediately before the Brown ruling, most
southern states refused to engage in even minimal desegregation.
From 1950 to 1954, court decisions had forced Missouri, Oklahoma,
and Kentucky to desegregate their graduate and professional schools
and undergraduate colleges. Token enrollments of black students on
white campuses made the desegregation process more tolerable but
not completely acceptable. Although Kentucky had tolerated minimal
college desegregation since 1949, educators remained reluctant to de-
segregate until 1954. The University of Kentucky and the University
of Louisville accepted black students in 1949 and 1950 respectively;
other public colleges refused to follow their lead before the Brown
decision."1 A second Brown ruling in 1955 encouraged desegregation
with "all deliberate speed," but still few blacks actually enrolled at
Kentucky colleges.112
Kentucky's opposition to school desegregation appeared also at
the grassroots level. Two early examples of this behavior occurred in
1955 in the western Kentucky towns of Clay and Sturgis. When black
students wanted to enroll at all-white public schools, the resulting vi-
olent resistance by whites created national headlines. Both towns
denied the blacks admission.113 Faced with rebellion against both
Supreme Court rulings, recently (November 1955) elected governor
Albert B. Chandler sent National Guard troops and tanks to restore
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order and to permit black students to enroll without fear of violent
attacks.
After the Clay and Sturgis incidents had demonstrated the
state's disapproval of violent behavior, Kentuckians became more re-
ceptive to school desegregation. The Louisville public schools, under
Superintendent Omer Carmichael, developed a plan for systemwide
desegregation in the 1955-56 school year. Carried out in the fall of
1956 without conflict, the Louisville plan gave students freedom of
choice; that approach served as a model for other southern urban
school districts.114
These events coincided with another significant ruling affecting
the desegregation of colleges and universities. In 1956 the Supreme
Court issued a decision in Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control
that required colleges to give qualified black applicants "prompt ad-
mission."115 Delay in desegregating colleges became unacceptable to
the federal courts. No longer could segregationists find shelter in the
ambiguous language of the Fisher, Sweatt, McLaurin, and Brown de-
cisions. The Court stated clearly that colleges and universities must
admit qualified black applicants.
Presented with these legal imperatives, Kentucky higher edu-
cation faced the inevitable: complete public and private college de-
segregation. Under the Brown decision and the later litigation of
1956, the complete responsibility for segregation and desegregation
shifted to college governing boards; it no longer fell on politically
driven state legislators or governors.
The paucity of black enrollments at state colleges and universities
clearly indicated continued acceptance of segregation. During the
1955-56 academic year, state regional colleges remained reluctant to
admit blacks. However, presidents of the state's regional colleges
wanted to desegregate their campuses. At a 23 November 1955 meet-
ing of the Council on Public Higher Education, president Kelly
Thompson of Western Kentucky State College moved that black stu-
dents be admitted to all of the public colleges at once, effective
during the 1956 summer term.116
Desegregated but Still Separate 111
One writer claimed that Morehead State College was "the first
state college in Kentucky to admit Negroes" and the first to establish a
policy to admit any person who met the admission requirements re-
gardless of race. Such a statement ignored Kentucky State College and
the few part-time black students at the University of Kentucky.
Although the University of Kentucky blacks were enrolled in the
smaller summer sessions when few whites were on the Lexington
campus, the desegregation of the university preceded the desegrega-
tion of other white public institutions by seven years."7
The presence of the predominantly black Kentucky State en-
couraged the persistence of de facto segregation. Despite the assump-
tion by white administrators that Kentucky blacks preferred the larger,
predominantly white, colleges and universities, Kentucky State con-
tinued to draw many of the black students through the 1950s.118
Although the Brown decision was a moral and political victory
for blacks, Kentucky State students were not immediately enthusias-
tic over the prospect of closely associating with persons who consid-
ered them inferior. Kentucky State attracted few white students after
the Brown decision, and the black collegians remained loyal to the
campus and traditions of Kentucky State."9 Such perceptions fostered
steady black enrollments at Kentucky State, which allowed
Kentucky's predominantly white Kentucky colleges to remain so.
Later, as a new generation of black high school students, famil-
iar with integrated settings, began to attend other Kentucky colleges,
the need for a wholly black institution of higher education began to
ebb. Pres. R.B. Atwood rightly perceived that black educational insti-
tutions and teachers would become casualties of desegregation. Still,
he astutely recognized the persistence of southern white prejudices
and black student preferences. Kentucky black leaders such as
Atwood, Lyman Johnson, and Frank Stanley of the Louisville
Defender preferred that racial discrimination and segregation end, but
they did not push for immediate, widespread integration as the
solution.
Instead, securing desegregation and establishing nondiscrimi-
nation in education, employment, housing, and public accommoda-
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tions became their primary goals. To this extent Kentucky's black
leaders continued their efforts to unravel the labyrinth of racially dis-
criminatory state and local laws. The early token desegregation of
Kentucky higher education permitted such Kentucky black leaders as
James Crumlin and Hortense Young to attack other areas of persistent
racial discrimination.
The movement of Kentucky higher education toward desegre-
gation quickly generated a quiet, de facto segregation of black stu-
dents at Kentucky State and did not encourage more blacks to enroll
at Kentucky's white colleges and universities. Thereafter, Kentucky
State administrators defined the college's mission as a desegregated,
public liberal arts college concentrating on the education of both
Kentucky blacks and local whites in state government in Frankfort.120
Epilogue: After 1954
T H E POST-1954 ERA of Kentucky black higher education is
characterized both by old traditions and by blacks' impatient de-
mands for substantive change. Kentucky educators and politicians
who formerly used higher education institutions to protect racial seg-
regation strained to deconstruct the color line of 1904.
With the arrival of wider college-level desegregation and
student-initiated sit-ins in 1960, Kentucky State no longer promoted
itself as having an all-black student body. Before 1960 Kentucky
State students and staff had avoided direct participation in the broader
campaigns for civil rights, but as the nonviolent protest tactics of
black student movements in Nashville and North Carolina became
known, black Kentucky State students adopted them. Kentucky State
administrators initially tolerated student sit-ins, protest marches, and
demonstrations against Frankfort's businesses that practiced racial
discrimination toward their black customers. A clash developed,
however, when students observed President Atwood's moderate, con-
ciliatory responses to local merchants who refused to desegregate
their businesses. Frustrated by their lack of success with nonviolent
protests, several hundred students rebelled in 1960 in a series of vio-
lent campus incidents. Although the white press and politicians sup-
ported Atwood in his suppression and ouster of the "student
agitators," he opted to retire in 1962.'
Atwood's retirement marked the end of his remarkable contri-
butions to black higher education. Described by his biographer as an
"interracial diplomat," Atwood had benefited blacks and whites in
different ways through his term as president. White governing boards
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from 1929 on perceived him as competent and apolitical in directing
Kentucky's only public jim crow four-year college. Black leaders
Charles Anderson and Albert E. Meyzeek, on the other hand, often
opposed his collaborative activities with the segregationists that kept
Kentucky State functioning. Alumni and student publications until
the 1960s supported president Atwood as the key figure who champi-
oned the college's existence and who deflected local criticism of
black higher education.2
The pace of change brought on by Brown and associated rulings
did not mean that segregated higher education in Kentucky had sud-
denly disappeared. The controversy over Kentucky State's existence
as the remaining legacy of segregated higher education continued for
nearly two decades after Atwood's retirement. The parallel campaign
of Kentucky blacks to achieve equal treatment at other institutions
widened. Kentucky black students wanted white colleges to increase
the presence of black faculty, staff, and curricula. University of
Louisville black student sit-ins in the late 1960s produced confronta-
tions with police. After the arrests of the students were resolved, the
university responded by establishing a pan-African studies depart-
ment and hiring more black faculty and staff.3
Other Kentucky black students then sought similar changes.
Pres. Otis Singletary at the University of Kentucky appointed Robert
Zumwinkle as vice president for student affairs in 1970, and one of
his first assignments was to resolve black student issues. Using two
faculty and staff volunteers, the university opened the Office of
Minority Affairs in 1971.4 The last state university created in the
state, Northern Kentucky University, developed in 1987 an Afro-
American studies program. Although black students accounted for
less than 2 percent of the total student population, the university cre-
ated the program following their expressions of concern about the
poor quality of campus race relations. According to one observer, this
program "made a significant impact on the institution, whether it is
acknowledged or not by history writers." The controversy over the
Afro-American studies program intimated that the institution was not
free of institutional racism although it began as a state college in
1968, fourteen years after the Brown ruling.5
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State officials charged with desegregating higher education di-
rected their energies toward Kentucky State College and its succes-
sor, Kentucky State University. Since 1952 many college-bound
Kentucky black students made it their first choice. As indicated in
earlier chapters, other institutions, such as the University of
Louisville, the University of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky State
College, Morehead State College, Murray State College, Western
Kentucky State College, and the private colleges did not attract large
numbers of black students in the early years of desegregation.
When Dr. Carl M. Hill was inaugurated as president of
Kentucky State in 1962, supporters hoped he would transform the
college in the same way that President Atwood did in 1929. Hill, a
chemistry professor and former dean of arts and sciences at
Tennessee State University, worked to enroll more local white stu-
dents and state workers as suggested by President Atwood in 1954.
Yet, Frankfort newspaper critics portrayed the campus as a "negro"
college campus that should be merged into the University of
Kentucky community college system. This not-too-subtle effort to
close Kentucky State produced protracted opposition by alumni, fac-
ulty, staff, and friends.6
After several months of extended discussion in the Frankfort
press on this issue, the legislature responded by approving increased
appropriations for the college. The intent was to improve both the fa-
cilities and curricula and expand both black and white student enroll-
ments. Although more whites enrolled in Kentucky State's evening
division, the campus retained a predominantly black full-time student
body with an emphasis on liberal arts programs.
In 1968 Kentucky State black students reacted angrily to the
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King by attacking sporadically
several businesses adjacent to the campus. After these incidents
newspaper editorials urged the legislature and the Council on Higher
Education to reconsider the merger of Kentucky State into the
University of Kentucky. Again, alumni and Kentucky's black
community leaders responded by channeling their political support
and pressure for Kentucky State to remain a freestanding, four-year
college.7
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A massive self-study in 1969 for accreditation by the Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools suggested that new programs
were again needed to define clearly Kentucky State's mission and
role in the Kentucky system of higher education. Supported by the
self-study visitation committee recommendations, the regents and
the administration obtained legislative relief through enactment of a
statute permitting the college to become a university on 1 July 1972.
Under this law Kentucky State University offered its own graduate
courses in public affairs for state workers seeking to improve their
skills and could award its own graduate degrees—a very different
picture from that of the 1940s, when it could offer graduate courses
but not award degrees. President Atwood's 1952 predictions about
Kentucky State's future mission finally came to fruition.
The physical and academic development of Kentucky State
University continued at a measured pace while other Kentucky higher
education institutions gradually attracted more Kentucky blacks. The
increasing black presence at the University of Kentucky and the
University of Louisville could be attributed to the creation of offices
for minority affairs at both institutions. Although hampered by limited
funding, both operations pushed their respective institutions to add
black studies curricula and to recruit more black faculty, staff, and stu-
dents. The four regional state universities hired token black faculty to
complement the growing numbers of black students. By 1980 the
Commonwealth assumed that the vestiges of the Day Law's 1904
color line had been largely destroyed via court rulings, a 1966 state
civil rights act, and their actions in the late 1960s and 1970s. The fed-
eral courts and the federal government did not agree.
An effort to correct these misconceptions developed from out-
of-state events in the late 1970s. Beginning in 1977, a series of law-
suits broadly called the Adams cases required southern and border
states to dismantle former dual systems of higher education based on
race.8 The court rulings required the U.S. Department of Education's
Office of Civil Rights to review those states that had maintained dual
systems of higher education. In January 1981 the U.S. Department of
Education announced that Kentucky State University and the other
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five state universities continued to practice subtle de facto racial seg-
regation in student recruitment and in the hiring of black faculty and
staff. Thereafter, the state of Kentucky was required to develop a plan
to end de facto segregation in higher education or risk losing all fed-
eral support.9
As in the student upheavals in the 1960s and 1970s, a simplistic
solution reappeared: close the mostly black Kentucky State and shift
its resources (and students) to the mostly white public institutions.
For the third time, alumni, student, staff, and community groups or-
ganized a campaign to save Kentucky State.10
Interestingly, senior civil rights activist Lyman Johnson did not
agree. His support for Kentucky State University's closure hinged on
the belief that the institution, if continued, would evolve into a pre-
dominantly white college and the dollars allocated to Kentucky State
would be better spent aiding students at other public universities. His
opposition notwithstanding, Kentucky's black leaders galvanized
support in the public hearings on this issue for the retention of
Kentucky State University as a freestanding, historically black but in-
tegrated, institution.11
In its written response to the U.S. Department of Education, the
state proposed that it would meet numerous goals and objectives for
desegregation. Among them was the recruitment of more blacks to
predominantly white institutions and more whites to Kentucky State.
Since 1975 the gradual transformation of Kentucky State into a pre-
dominantly white university often encountered obstacles.12
Dr. William A. Butts, the successor to Carl M. Hill, who retired
as Kentucky State University's president in 1975, took a more pro-
active stance in defending the institution as a historically black but
integrated institution. A highly respected political scientist and sea-
soned university administrator, Butts engaged in an intensive effort to
win more appropriations for the university from the state legislature
in competition with other state university presidents.13
Butts's reforms of the institutional and physical structures were
sidetracked by incidents of violent black student behavior, rising out-
of-state student enrollments, and increasing costs. Compounding
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these problems were shortfalls in the state revenue that meant brutal
budget reductions for all universities, including Kentucky State. With
the public support for his efforts to meet these challenges dwindling
and two votes of no confidence by the faculty, he resigned the presi-
dency effective 1 July 1982.14
His replacement was Raymond M. Burse, a black member of
the Council on Higher Education and a proponent of the plan to
retain Kentucky State University as a freestanding institution while
meeting the desegregation criteria of the U.S. Department of
Education. A practicing attorney in Louisville, a Rhodes scholar, a
graduate of both Centre College of Kentucky and the Harvard
University Law School, Burse had never held an administrative or
faculty position in a higher education institution. Under the desegre-
gation plan, he quickly obtained several million dollars to transform
the institution's physical appearance and introduce new elements to
its academic and physical organization. New faculty and staff were
hired to operate the university's innovative Whitney M. Young
College of Liberal Studies, which attracted outstanding black and
white students from its designated service area of central Kentucky.
Burse's plan to maintain Kentucky State as the "small, liberal
arts state university" enjoyed initial external financial support and at-
tracted new benefactors. The prospect of a revised institutional mis-
sion and policies, however, led to internal disputes among faculty
and staff about President Burse. These events, including several dis-
missals of key administrative staff, became public as many of the
faculty and staff grew dissatisfied with his aggressive and—as de-
scribed in the press—contentious "management style."15
On 24 March 1989 Burse announced his resignation. He
pointed out that under his leadership the university had created the
Whitney Young College of Liberal Studies, which attracted outstand-
ing students; improved institutional fund-raising; increased student
retention; and established campus-wide data and word processing ca-
pabilities. Dr. Mary Levi Smith, academic vice president of Kentucky
State, was appointed by the regents as interim president until a search
committee found a permanent successor.16
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On 9 March 1990 the regents announced that Dr. John T. Wolfe,
provost and vice president at Bowie State University in Maryland,
was to become the tenth president of Kentucky State University ef-
fective 1 July 1990. Like his immediate predecessors, he wanted to
make his mark on the campus and the commonwealth. He sought
new academic programs and facilities and widened recruitment ef-
forts for white and black students.17 Professionally trained and re-
spected internationally as a linguist, he adapted to the Kentucky
culture quickly and won friends for himself and the university until
September 1991.
The press reported at that time that President Wolfe had deleted
the names of five key administrators from the list of administrators to
be recommended for annual contracts by the regents. Board of re-
gents chair and former governor Louie B. Nunn, who wanted certain
Kentucky State University administrators not rehired, sought to clar-
ify these personnel matters with the president. Subsequently, the
board discovered that Wolfe had made repairs to the president's resi-
dence without complete board approval and had submitted a pay in-
crease for himself to the regents. In an uncanny repeat of the scenario
surrounding the forced resignation of Green P. Russell in 1929, the
regents took depositions from Wolfe and twenty other officials at an
off-campus attorney's office. On 28 September 1991 the Louisville
Courier Journal reported that the regents had asked Wolfe to cancel
plans for his delayed formal inauguration and resign. Wolfe refused.18
Students, alumni, and friends expressed concern about these events.
On 6 October 1991 Rev. Jesse Jackson of the National Rainbow
Coalition, who had visited Kentucky State in the 1980s, returned and
asked for a massive prayer vigil before the regents met to decide
President Wolfe's fate. The vigil did not materialize.
On 7 October 1991 the regents formally charged President
Wolfe with incompetence, immoral conduct, and neglect of duty.
These charges were based on his self-proposed pay raise (any salary
increase for the president is the prerogative of the regents) and his
bidding of improvements to the president's residence in amounts less
than ten thousand dollars and thus avoiding board approval. Student
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and alumni concern over the charges led to calls by them to Gov.
Wallace Wilkinson for the dismissal of the board of regents and its
chair. He refused. On 12 October 1991 a brief sit-in at the administra-
tion building by a small group of students during the homecoming
weekend heightened tensions. As a hearing (required by statute) on
the charges began on 18 October 1991, Wolfe announced that he had
resigned both the presidency and his tenured professorship.
The settlement allowed Wolfe to serve as a consultant to
Kentucky State's executive vice president, Mary L. Smith, and re-
leased both the board and Wolfe from current or future liability.
Wolfe shortly moved to Washington to work for Reverend Jackson's
National Rainbow Coalition.19
Again, academic vice president Mary L. Smith served as in-
terim president. Without engaging in an external search, the board
voted six to three on 30 October 1991 to approve Dr. Smith as
Kentucky State's eleventh president. With her acceptance, she
became only the second female and the first black woman to head a
public college in Kentucky.20
The saga of post-1954 Kentucky black higher education was one of
constant struggle to obtain equal and not extraordinary treatment.
While the predominantly white colleges and state universities re-
ceived encouragement for their desegregation efforts, Kentucky State
continued to be the center of the "race problem" in higher education
and the subject of never-ending scrutiny, suspicion, and concern by
the press and oversight agencies. The small numbers of black stu-
dents on the white campuses remained largely quiescent, with the ex-
ception of black athletes, whose presence helped the University of
Kentucky in 1978 and 1996 and the University of Louisville in 1980
and 1986 to win national basketball championships.
Access by Kentucky blacks to higher education became a nag-
ging "race problem" begging for a quick and painless solution. As the
white politicians and their black critics had admitted since 1900, the
twentieth-century color line had become a social enigma of immense
proportions. Black and white leaders often found it difficult to reach a
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reasonable middle ground, given a half-century of legal segregation
and several additional decades of "deliberate speed" in achieving
complete desegregation. It became apparent that the racial barrier fed
on collective societal delay. More precisely, this procrastination post-
poned the achievement of improved educational opportunity for
blacks and hindered the efforts to remove racism's blot from the
American social fabric. The Commonwealth of Kentucky, as one of
the oldest seams of that fabric, held on doggedly to the concept that
civil or "genteel" racism was preferable to the civil rights for all
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. When the state finally turned
away from enforcing racial discrimination as public policy, it reacted
slowly to the courageous efforts of certain blacks and whites who
were committed to complete equality of educational opportunity
under law. Their individual untold stories are the missing pieces in
the continuing puzzle of Kentucky race relations.
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Table 1. Black and White Population in Kentucky,
1870-1950
Year
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
Percent of
blacks to whites in
total population
16.8
16.5
14.4
13.4
11.4
9.8
8.6
7.5
6.9
Whites
1,098,692
1,377,179
1,590,462
1,862,309
2,027,951
2,180,462
2,388,364
2,631,425
2,726,022
Blacks
222,210
271,451
268,071
284,706
261,656
226,040
235,938
214,031
201,921
SOURCES: 1870-1910: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negro Population
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918). 1920-30: U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States, 1920-1932 (Wash-
ington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1932). 1940: U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Sixteenth Census of the U.S., 1940: Population Volume: Charac-
teristics of the Population (Washington, D.C: Government Printing
Office, 1943). 1950: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population:
1950, vol. 2, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 17, "Kentucky"
(Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1952).
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Table 2. 1917-1918 State Appropriations for Black and
White Colleges and Normal Schools in Selected Southern
and Border States
State
Alabama
Arkansas
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
Black percent
of total
18
11
0
12
0
13
0
7
7
12
34
33
16
13
21
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Interior,
Survey of Education, bulletin 1919, vol. 4
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1
Black
20,000
2,000
0
21,000
0
10,000
0
33,682
22,449
50,537
64,500
26,659
142,297
32,250
51,850
White
91,000
99,426
237,500
150,000
68,750
70,000
54,500
464,966
278,200
378,957
122,490
53,319
772,881
210,133
189,425
Bureau of Education, Biennial
,no. 91, 1916-18 (Washington,
921). 89-93. 100-105.
NOTE: Delaware, District of Columbia, and Florida were not reported in
the set of data. This table excluded state-supported universities. States
were not consistent in identifying colleges or normal schools. Hence,
aggregate appropriations are provided.
Appendix 125
Table 3. 1927 State Appropriations for Black and White
Teachers Colleges and Normal Schools in Selected
Southern and Border States
State
Alabama
Arkansas
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
Black percent
of total
19
34
7
4
24
6
12
10.2
26
11
52
14
11
28
1.5
Black
74,475
76,506
25,071
70,000
140,000
44,020
40,677
127,661
207,346
182,500
122,336
165,000
271,169
240,278
11,000
White
322,708
147,853
347,388
1,711,795
433,017
695,854
292,829
1,243,371
586,248
1,501,000
112,836
1,003,000
2,281,905
622,011
716,500
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Education, Biennial
Survey of Education, 1926-1928, bulletin 1930, no. 16 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1930), 898, 928-31, 944-45.
NOTE: Delaware, District of Columbia, and Florida were not reported.
Data excludes state universities. States were not consistent in identify-
ing colleges or normal schools. Hence, aggregated data is indicated.
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Table 4. 1937-1938 State Appropriations for Black and
White Colleges in Selected Southern and Border States
State
Alabama
Arkansas
Delaware
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
Black percent
of total
30.4
19.9
17
13
3
4
24
3
7
27
4
13
8
2
9
16
Black
150,575
46,433
60,667
267,188
66,500
278,889
418,630
55,233
356,143
1,096,186
293,728
240,442
110,171
150,947
256,680
326,500
White
344,336
185,761
296,571
1,784,385
2,305,391
6,059,020
1,328,744
1,883,453
5,032,818
2,933,024
7,055,607
1,564,921
1,264,921
8,982,714
2,705,793
1,671,688
SOURCE: U.S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Biennial
Survey of Education in the United States, Statistics of Higher Education,
1937-38, bulletin 1940, no. 2, chap. 4 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1942), 194-237.
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Table 5. Illiteracy in Kentucky for Persons Ten Years Old
and Older among Blacks and Whites, 1900-1930
Group 1900 1910 1920 1930
Total population 2,147,174 2,289,905 2,416,630 2,614,589
White illiterates 174,768 150,097 112,206 102,962
Black illiterates 88,137 57,900 40,548 28,553
Percentage of white
illiterates in
total population 8.1 6.5 4.6 3.9
Percentage of black
illiterates in
total population 4.1 2.5 1.6 1.0
SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United
States, 1910: Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1913), 2:725; Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920:
Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1923), 3:666; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States
1920-1932 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1932), 734.
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Table 6. Highest Grade Completed by Kentucky Blacks
and Whites Twenty-Five Years Old and Older, 1940 and
1950
Group
Population (all ages)
Blacks
Whites
Population (25 years
and older)
Blacks
Whites
College (1-3 years)
Blacks
Whites
College (4 years)
Blacks
Whites
1940
Total
2,845,627
214,031
2,631,425
118,405
1,434,100
2,573
57,519
2,039
40,444
Percent
of
total
100.00
7.52
92.47
2.1
4.4
1.6
3.1
1950
Total
2,944,806
201,921
2,742,090
124,259
1,316,675
3,430
79,065
2,630
56,380
Percent
of
total
100.00
6.85
93.11
2.9
5.5
2.2
3.9
SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Decennial Census,
1940: Population Characteristics (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1943), 2:5, 191; Seventeenth Decennial Census, 1950
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), 2:17-32.
NOTE: The question on illiteracy addressed in previous censuses was
deleted and replaced by a question on the highest grade completed.
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Table 7. Initial Admission of Blacks to Publicly Supported
Kentucky Colleges and Universities, 1904-1954
Name and years of operation Location
Year of first black
admission
Kentucky State University Frankfort
Louisville Municipal College
for Negroes (1931-51) Louisville
University of Kentucky
(1865 to present) Lexington
University of Louisville
(1798 to present) Louisville
West Kentucky Industrial
College for Colored Persons
(1909-38) Paducah
1886
1931
1949
1950
1909
Also known as Kentucky State Normal School for Colored Persons
(1886-1902), Kentucky Normal and Industrial Institute for Colored
Persons (1902-26), Kentucky State Industrial College for Colored
Persons (1926-38), Kentucky State College for Negroes (1938-52), and
Kentucky State College (1952-72). The name Kentucky State University
has been used since 1972.
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Table 8. Initial Admission of Blacks to Privately Supported
Kentucky Colleges and Universities, 1904-1954
Name and Years of Operation
Berea College
Bellarmine College
Eckstein Norton Institute
Lincoln Institute*
Louisville Presbyterian
Theological Seminary
Nazareth College
Simmons University**
Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary
Ursuline College
Location
Berea
Louisville
Cane Springs
Lincoln Ridge
Louisville
Louisville
Louisville
Louisville
Louisville
Year of first black
admission
1855-1904, 1950
1950
1890-1911
1910
1950
1950
1879
1950
1950
The junior college division closed in 1932.
**Also known as Kentucky Theological and Normal Institute (1879-81)
and State Colored Baptist University (1881-1918).
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Epilogue
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2. See Ann Jackson Heartwell-Hunter, Against the Tide (Lexington:
Published by the author, 1987). Hunter served as dean of students from 1947
to 1965 and supported Atwood during a crucial period in Kentucky State's
history. Until the 1960 student upheavals, the campus newspaper, Kentucky
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